Presidentialism: What it Holds for the Future of Turkey by Gur, Serap
Louisiana State University
LSU Digital Commons
LSU Doctoral Dissertations Graduate School
2015
Presidentialism: What it Holds for the Future of
Turkey
Serap Gur
Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, sgur2@lsu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations
Part of the Political Science Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
LSU Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized graduate school editor of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please contactgradetd@lsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Gur, Serap, "Presidentialism: What it Holds for the Future of Turkey" (2015). LSU Doctoral Dissertations. 3414.
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations/3414
PRESIDENTIALISM: WHAT IT HOLDS FOR THE FUTURE OF TURKEY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation 
 
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the 
Louisiana State University and 
Agricultural and Mechanical College 
in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
in 
 
The Department of Political Science 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
Serap Gur 
Doctoral Candidate 
B.A., Marmara University, 2007 
M.A., Gaziantep University, 2009 
December 2015 
ii 
 
To my daughter Mehtap Sare Gur and my husband Furkan Amil Gur 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
 
I could not complete this long journey without the guidance of my committee members 
and the support of my family.  
First of all, I would like to thank Professor William Clark for his generosity, his 
guidance, and his patience. He was a wonderful advisor and mentor and also I learned a lot from 
him as a person. He took every possible step to support me during my doctoral studies and 
became a perfect role model that I will always look up to my entire life. I am so thankful that I 
had a chance to work with him and it is difficult to find proper words to express my gratitude to 
him. 
I would like to also thank the members of my dissertation committee: Dr. Joe Clare and 
Dr. Wonik Kim, who provided their most invaluable comments and contributed to completion of 
my dissertation. I am especially thankful to Dr. Clare for his advice on methodological issues; 
his recommendations contributed to the rigor of my study and made my life easier.  
I also wanted to thank Bob Mann from Manship School of Communication at LSU for 
his extraordinary support and his willingness to read and edit my dissertation chapter by chapter.  
Finally I want to thank my husband, Furkan Amil Gur for his support and understanding 
through this process and to my daughter, Mehtap Sare Gur who brought joy and happiness to our 
lives and made every hurdle much more bearable. Without them, I could not finish this 
dissertation.   
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT ............................................................................................................... iii 
 
LIST OF TABLES  ..........................................................................................................................v 
 
LIST OF FIGURES  ...................................................................................................................... vi 
 
ABSTRACT  ................................................................................................................................. vii 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................1 
    1.1.  Literature Review ............................................................................................................4 
     1.2.  Research Design  ...........................................................................................................19 
     1.3.  The Organization of the Project  ...................................................................................22 
 
CHAPTER 2: THE STRUCTURE OF THE MODERN TURKISH REPUBLIC  .......................23 
2.1.  Constitutional Development from the Ottoman Period to the Turkish Republic  ........23 
         2.2.  Turkish Parliamentary System  .....................................................................................29 
     2.3.  New Presidential Election in Turkey  ...........................................................................33 
         2.4.  Presidential System Discussion in Turkey  ...................................................................37 
 
CHAPTER 3: PARTY STRUCTURE OF TURKEY: IS IT APPLICABLE  
TO PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM  ...........................................................................46 
3.1.  Literature Review .........................................................................................................46 
         3.2.  History of Turkish Party Systems  ................................................................................48 
     3.3.  Data and Examination  ..................................................................................................66 
         3.4.  Results and Conclusion  ................................................................................................75 
 
CHAPTER 4: THE IMPACTS OF FORM OF GOVERNMENT FORMATION ON 
POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT ............................77 
4.1.  Introduction  ..................................................................................................................77 
  4.2.  Literature Review and Arguments  ...............................................................................78 
         4.3.  Data and Methodological Issues  ..................................................................................87 
     4.4.  Empirical Analysis and Results  ...................................................................................91 
         4.5.  Country Comparisons  ................................................................................................101 
         4.6.  Conclusion  .................................................................................................................112 
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION  ...................................................................................................114 
 
REFERENCES  ...........................................................................................................................122 
 
APPENDIX: VARIABLES  ........................................................................................................138 
 
VITA  ...........................................................................................................................................141 
v 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1.1: Number of Free, Partly Free and Not Free Countries in the World…………………...3 
Table 3.1: Governments in Turkey, 1983-2011………………………………………………….56 
Table 3.2: Political Parties According to the Traditions…………………………………………59 
Table 3.3: Electoral Volatility and Fragmentation in Turkey, 1965-2011………………………60 
Table 3.4: Turkish Electoral Systems, 1950-2011……………………………………………….64 
Table 3.5: Number of Parties, Number of Parties that Gained Seats, Number of  
Effective Parties by seats and by votes, 1950 -2011……………………………………………..65 
 
Table 3.6: Stable Democracies, 1946-2010……………………………………………………...68 
Table 3.7: Party Fractionalization in Stable Democracies……………………………………….70 
Table 3.8: Number of Effective Parties and Disproportionality in Presidential  
Democracies……………………………………………………………………………………...72 
 
Table 3.9: Number of Effective Parties and Disproportionality in Parliamentary  
Democracies……………………………………………………………………………………...73 
 
Table 3.10: Number of Effective Parties and Disproportionality in Mixed  
Democracies……………………………………………………………………………………..74 
 
Table 4.1: Dickey-Fuller Test for Unit Root…………………………………………………….91 
Table 4.2: Durbin’s Alternative Test for Autocorrelation……………………………………….92 
Table 4.3: Breusch-Godfrey LM Test for Autocorrelation………………………………………92 
Table 4.4: The Tolerance and VIF test…………………………………………………………..93 
Table 4.5: Countries with Presidential Systems from 1975-2012……………………………...102 
Table 4.6: Country Comparisons from Economic Perspective…………………………………104 
Table 4.7: Country Comparisons from Political Perspective…………………………………...106 
Table 4.8: Country Comparisons from Electoral Perspective……………………………….....109 
Table 4.9: Country Comparisons from Social Perspective……………………………………..111 
 
vi 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1.1: Classification of Parliamentary, Presidential, and Semi-Presidential  
Democracies.....................................................................................................................................7 
 
Figure 1.2: Features of Parliamentary, Presidential and Semi-Presidential Systems……………..8 
 
Figure 1.3: Advantages / Disadvantages of Parliamentary, Presidential and  
Semi-Presidential Systems……………………………………………………………………….11 
 
Figure 3.1: Percentage of Votes and Number of Seats Won by Parties in Parliamentary  
Elections, 1983-2011…………………………………………………………………………….55 
 
Figure 4.1: Political Development……………………………………………………………….94 
Figure 4.2: Economic Development……………………………………………………………..96 
Figure 4.3: Social Development…………………………………………………………………97 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vii 
 
ABSTRACT 
A transformation from parliamentarism to presidentialism has been an important debate 
in Turkey since 1980s. After 2010, discussions turned to creating a Turkish-style presidential 
system which brings many uncertainties for Turkey. Different scholars and politicians focus on 
the adaptation of presidential system; however, none of these studies provide any empirical 
work. They only evaluate the literature and conclude that a presidential system will provide 
political stability and improve Turkey’s economic, political, and social development.  
In order to fill this gap, this dissertation examines the applicability of a presidential 
system in Turkey by using quantitative analysis and country-based comparisons. The political 
instability issue has been the central topic of regime transformation. I evaluate this instability and 
parliamentary system puzzle and argue that the instability problem is not a result of the current 
parliamentary system; instead, it is based on the electoral system and highly fractionalized party 
structure.  
I further explore the relationship between government system and political, economic, 
social development in a time-series analysis covering the period from 1975-2010. The results 
suggest strongly that parliamentary systems have important advantages over presidential systems 
across a wide range of indicators of political and economic development. However, the results in 
these areas are not equally impressive for presidential systems.   
Lastly, I provide a country-based comparison in which Turkey is compared with other 
states that have or have tried a presidential system since 1975 by examining social, economic, 
political variables. It appears that each country has its own characteristics and may have different 
factors that affect its economic or political success. In other words, it is not proper to expect that 
a regime transformation to a presidential system will, per se, dramatically improve Turkey’s 
economic, political, social development. 
viii 
 
I find as well that there may be some difficulties with Turkey’s parliamentary system, but 
these alleged problems do not warrant a whole system change. It is important to analyze all the 
processes and develop a very well organized plan based on the features of Turkey. Because of 
the 1982 constitution and a new election procedure for president, it is crucial to focus on a new 
constitution.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Parliamentarism has been one of the main characteristics of the Turkish political tradition 
since the 1876 Ottoman constitution. In 1923, with the founding of the Turkish Republic, 
modern parliamentarianism began in Turkey. From the establishment of the Turkish Republic, 
political life has been known for its turbulent and unstable nature. Turkey has witnessed four 
military coups (1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997), short-lived multi-party coalitions, and ineffective 
governments during this time period. Some argue that the main problem associated with this 
instability is the structure of the government--its parliamentary system-- and thus, several 
scholars and intellectuals have argued that Turkey must adopt a presidential system as a solution 
(Kuzu, 2006; Fendoglu, 2010; Gonenc, 2011).  
As a result, there are ongoing discussions among academics and senior leaders of the 
Justice and Development Party (AKP) about the transformation from a parliamentary system of 
government to a presidential system in Turkey. This debate first arose during Turgut Ozal’s 
period in office in the late 1980s, but ended due to his unexpected death in 1993. Then, President 
Suleyman Demirel in 1997 brought up the issue again, but did not accomplish the 
transformation. Former Prime Minister and present President Recep Tayyip Erdogan raised the 
issue again in 2003
1
, but this debate became more serious after 2010 (Gonenc, 2005). All of 
these prominent Turkish political figures have argued that a presidential system is more suitable 
for Turkish society and political system because Turkey needs an executive authority that can 
decide and execute decisions more efficiently and quickly (Kalaycioglu, 2005; Uran, 2010).  
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 “My only wish is to create a presidential or semi-presidential system and the ideal example is the 
American presidential system (Siyasetteki tek arzum başkanlık ya da yarı başkanlık modeli. Bunun ideali 
de Amerika’da uygulanan system), Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan said, on April 2003, see 
Fendoglu, 2012. 
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The Erdogan government is serious about its plans to change to a presidential system 
from a parliamentary system and has begun making some arrangements for this transformation, 
including changes regarding the election of president. Before 2007, the Turkish President was 
elected in a secret ballot by the parliament for a seven-year term. A two-thirds majority was 
required for election. But after 2007, as a result of a national referendum, the President has been 
elected in a popular plurality election. The presidential term was reduced from seven years to 
five and the re-election of the President for a second term was allowed (Ay, 2004; Arslan, 2005). 
 After Erdogan’s statements2 about the presidential system, the debate over 
presidentialism and parliamentarism became a lively subject of discussion throughout Turkish 
society. Some argue that this movement toward presidentialism is only related to Erdogan’s 
desire to stay in office longer with greater authority (Egrikavuk, 2011). Others argue that it will 
create a better political system for Turkish politics, regardless of Erdogan’s alleged personal 
ambitions (Kuzu, 2006; Turkone, 2011). This is not an easy decision. There has been over the 
past decades a profound transformation towards democratization and freedom in the world. 
According to Freedom House, the number of countries categorized as a “free” and “partly free” 
has been significantly raised while the number of “not-free” countries decreased (see Table 1.1).  
 
                                                          
2
 “The presidential system is being debated. In the past, May God rest their souls, Mr. Turgut (Özal) and 
Mr. (Süleyman) Demirel also brought the issue to the agenda. Furthermore, this is not a foreign concept. 
The Ottoman’s practiced a similar system. At present the world’s most advanced nations abide by a 
presidential system. This is what America, Russia and, under the semi-presidential system, France and 
Latin American nations are experiencing. In other words over 100 countries in the world are going by a 
presidential system”, Erdogan said, On April 2013, in his televised speech speaking at a meeting in 
Ankara’s Kızılcahamam neighborhood with members of his Justice and Development Party, see Berber, 
2013. On May 2012, Erdogan, during a fashion conference in Istanbul, said that “we can discuss 
everything about it — whether it will be a presidential system or a co-presidency”, see Demir 2012.  
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Table1.1: Number of Free, Partly Free and Not Free Countries in the World 
Year         Free Countries Partly Free Countries      Not-Free Countries 
1973    44 (29%)  38 (25%)  69 (46%) 
2013   90 (46%)  58 (30%)  47 (24%) 
Source: Freedom House 2013, Freedom in the World data set. 
 
However, a recent successful example of a transformation from pure parliamentary 
system to pure presidential one (or vice versa) does not exist. For instance, Brazil changed from 
a presidential to a semi-presidential system in 1960s, but reversed back to presidentialism in 
1963. Israel also alters the mechanism of selecting its prime minister in 1992, but then it returned 
its old system again in 2001. Similarly, Moldova had a semi-presidential system until 2000 but it 
turned to a parliamentary form of government system in 2000. Armenia turned to a mixed system 
from a presidential one in the mid-1990s. In other words, there are a few examples (such as 
Brazil, France, Moldova, and Armenia) but they represent only a transition from pure to mixed 
and mixed to pure institutional forms (Fendoglu, 2010). For Turkey, the problem is that while the 
AKP government is talking about a fundamental change from pure parliamentarism to pure 
presidentialism, there is no example in the world of such a change over the past decades. In 
addition, the public -- even parliamentarians -- do not fully understand the true operation of 
presidential system. Erdogan criticizes the US presidential system and argues that it works 
slowly; as a result he offers to create a “Turkish-style presidential system”3 (Albayrak 2012). 
For a “Turkish-style presidential system,” Erdogan’s aim is to create a unicameral 
legislature instead of a bicameral one; because he argues that having two bodies slow down the  
                                                          
3
 “The U.S. president cannot appoint an ambassador, he cannot even solely decide on the sale of a 
helicopter … That’s why we should create a Turkish-style presidential system,” President Erdogan said, 
speaking to a group of journalists on his way back to Turkey from Spain, on 29 November 2012.  
Erdoğan mentioned a “U.S. decision to sell attack helicopters to Turkey, which had waited for congress 
approval for years before a vote was finally held last year”, on 29 November 2012, see Demir, 2012. 
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process. He says that one parliamentary chamber can easily control the president
4
 (Albayrak, 
2012; Demir, 2012).  
To address this troubling lack of knowledge, this study will attempt to evaluate both 
systems in detail to understand their characteristics and shed light on the applicability of a 
presidential system for Turkey. It aims to show whether such a change might solve Turkey’s 
main political problems or if it might create more problems for the nation.  
The main goal of this study is to answer this primary question: which system of 
government should Turkey choose? Should it retain the current parliamentary system? 
Alternatively, should it move towards a presidential system? This study will also evaluate the 
following research sub-questions: (1) is there another viable approach as a different solution, 
instead of the proposed rapid fundamental change? (2) What might be the possible consequences 
of a system change? (3) Is this proposed system change applicable to the Turkey’s party 
structure? (4) How will the proposed system change affect the country’s economic, social and 
political development? 
1. 1. Literature Review 
1.1.1. Presidential, Parliamentary and Semi-Presidential Systems   
There is an ongoing institutional debate in the literature about government structure, and 
its effects on consolidation of democracy5. Much of this debate centers on governmental regime 
type: i.e., whether the government has a presidential, semi- presidential or parliamentary system.
                                                          
4
 “Parliament does the supervision job, having too many supervisors makes the system clumsy,” the 
prime minister said. “We should be practical and get results quickly.” President Erdogan said, on 29 
November 2012, see Demir, 2012.  
5
 See, Linz, 1994; Stepan & Skach, 1994; Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997a,b; Riggs, 1997; Lane & Ersson, 
2000; Colomer & Negretto, 2005; Cheibub, 2007; Gerring et al. 2009. 
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The most common type of democratic system is parliamentarism, in which the legislative and 
executive branches are fused, resulting in a government that is controlled by the legislative 
majority. Parliamentary systems emerged in the 19
th
 century, most notably in Britain (Wolfgang 
& Strom, 2000). A parliamentary system is defined as “a system of mutual dependence: first, the 
chief executive power must be supported by a majority in the legislature and can fall if it 
receives a vote of no confidence and second, the executive power (normally in conjunction with 
the head of state) has the capacity to dissolve the legislature and call for elections” (Stepan & 
Skach, 1993: 3).  
In general, the executive consists of a head of state and a head of government. The head 
of state has pro forma ceremonial power in the appointment of the Prime Minister, the head of 
government. The Prime Minister nominates other ministers. In such systems, the government is a 
collective body which is responsible to the assembly and only indirectly responsible to the 
electorate. Parliamentary systems imply cooperation between the executive and legislative 
branches, but neither dominates the other (Verney, 1959). In addition, Siaroff (2003) defines 
parliamentary government by describing its three main characteristics. The first is the 
responsibility of government to the parliament; in other words, the government has not been 
appointed for a certain time, parliament can remove the government at any time. The second 
characteristic is the election of the government: the government is nominated by the legislature 
not elected by citizens’ votes. Third is the structure of the cabinet; it is collective. 
A presidential system, on the other hand, is “a system where policymaking power is 
divided between two separately elected bodies, the legislature and the president, for fixed terms 
of office” (Gerring et al. 2009: 15). Sartori (1996) argues that there are three main characteristics 
of presidential systems: first, the head of state is elected for a fixed term by a popular election; 
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second, the government or executive cannot be removed by a legislative vote; third, the head of 
state is also the head of the government.   
Lijphart (1999) emphasizes three points to distinguish presidential and parliamentary 
systems. First, in a presidential system the head of government becomes president as a result of 
popular election. However, in a parliamentary system the legislature is responsible for the 
selection of the head of government. Second, in a presidential system the president or the head of 
government remains in power for fixed term of office. However, in a parliamentary system, there 
is no fixed term for the head of government; the prime minister and cabinet can be removed at 
any time by the legislature or may serve until an election is called. Third, in a parliamentary 
system the cabinet is collective, but in a presidential system it is not (Lijphart, 1999).  
In addition to parliamentary and presidential systems, semi-presidential systems are 
explained by describing their three main characteristics. First, the president or head of state 
comes to power by direct or indirect popular election, has a fixed term of office, and is not 
responsible to the parliament. Second, the Prime Minister, who is not directly elected and does 
not have a fixed term office, is the head of government and is responsible to the parliament. 
Third, the head of state shares executive power with a prime minister, which creates a dual 
authority (Sartori, 1996:131; Elgie, 1999: 13). 
It is clearly determined that the relationship between the executive and legislative is the 
main indicator for the distinction between the government systems. The primary point is the 
responsibility of government to the legislature. If governments cannot be removed by the 
legislature, the systems are presidential, but if they can, the systems are either parliamentary or 
semi-presidential. In both parliamentary and semi-presidential systems, the parliament is 
effective in both the formation and survival of governments and has power to dismiss the 
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government (Cheibub et al. 2010). Government removal in such systems can be achieved by the 
vote of no-confidence initiated by the legislature, the vote of confidence initiated by the 
government itself or early elections when the government falls by virtue of the fact that 
parliament is dissolved (Cheibub et al. 2010: 14). The second point concerns the election of the 
head of state, whether there is a popular election or not. If there is not an independently elected 
president, the system is parliamentary. However, if there is an independently elected president 
and fixed term office, the systems can be either presidential or semi-presidential (Cheibub, 
2007). The third point is the responsibility of government to the president. If a government is not 
responsible to the president, the system is parliamentary, but if it is responsible to the president 
the system is semi-presidential or presidential (Cheibub, 2007). This classification is shown in 
Figure 1.1 below.  
DEMOCRACIES 
1. Legislative responsibility (Is the government responsible to the assembly?) 
 
NO            YES 
 
PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACIES 2. Is the head of state popularly elected for a fixed term in office? 
     3. Is the government responsible to the president? 
 
NO (for 2.&3. questions)               YES (for 2.&3. questions) 
PARLIAMENTARY           PRESIDENTIAL or SEMI-PRESIDENTIAL  
DEMOCRACIES      DEMOCRACIES 
 
Figure 1.1: Classification of Parliamentary, Presidential, and Semi-Presidential Democracies  
Source: Cheibub, 2007. 
 
There are other indicators which are used to distinguish government systems, such as the 
nature of the executive power or division of power. While the executive is collective and there is 
a fusion of legislative and executive power in parliamentarism, the executive is individual and 
there is a separation of power in presidentialism (Verney, 1992; Lijphart, 1999). The detailed 
features of parliamentary, presidential and semi-presidential systems are shown in Figure 1.2.  
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  Presidential System 
Parliamentary 
System 
Semi-Presidential 
Nature of 
Executive 
The executive is not 
collective, it is 
formed by one person 
(The President) 
The executive is 
collective. (The 
President and Prime 
Minister) 
Both the Prime minster and 
the president are 
responsible from the 
executive 
Election of 
executive 
The president comes 
to power for a fixed 
term by a popular 
direct election 
The executive 
comes to power as a 
result of indirect 
election 
 President comes to power 
by a direct election while 
the prime minister can be 
appointed by the president 
or directly elected 
Structure of 
executive 
The head of 
government and the 
head of state is the 
same person 
Usually the head of 
state and head of 
government is 
different 
There is a dual authority 
between the president and 
prime minister 
Division of 
Power 
There is a separation 
of power between the 
executive and 
legislative 
There is a fusion of 
power between the 
executive and 
legislative 
Usually, there is a 
separation of power 
between the executive and 
legislative 
Legislative 
Responsibility 
Executive and 
legislative, no one 
can dismiss the other. 
But there are some 
exceptions like 
impeachment 
The government is 
responsible to the 
assembly, and it can 
be removed by a 
parliamentary vote 
of no-confidence 
The prime minister is 
responsible of the 
appointment of the cabinet, 
while the president is 
responsible for the 
appointment of the prime 
minister. The president can 
remove the parliament 
Executive 
Accountability  
There is a direct 
accountability of 
president to the 
people as a result of 
popular election 
The prime minister 
is directly 
responsible to the 
parliament not to 
people 
The president is responsible 
to the people, but the prime 
minister is only responsible 
to the president or the 
parliament 
Characteristics 
of the Cabinet 
The members of 
cabinet are 
subordinated, they 
have counseling 
power 
The members of 
cabinet have 
executive power 
Usually, the members of 
cabinet are subordinated 
 
Figure 1.2: Features of Parliamentary, Presidential and Semi-Presidential Systems 
Source: Verney 1959, 1992; Sartori 1996; Elgie 1999; Lijphart 1999; Siaroff 2003; Newton 
2005; Gerring et al. 2009; Cheibub et al. 2010. 
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1.1. 2. Advantages and Disadvantages of Government Systems  
From the characteristics of government systems, some notable advantages and 
disadvantages of each system can be identified. Four main advantages of presidential system are 
identified in the literature. First, as a result of separation of powers between the executive and 
legislative branches of government, a presidential system creates a checks and balance process 
through the branches. Each branch may check and control the actions of the others and as a result 
none of them may exercise its power solely for its benefit. Second, the fixed term of office of 
each branch --the president and the legislatures-- may create stability, predictability, and 
permanence in the government process. Third, a popular election of president gives more 
democratic legitimization for the presidential power and gives more prestige to the president. 
Fourth, because of the existence of individual executive, a president may take decisions more 
quickly and respond to a crisis more easily (Shugart & Carey, 1992; Parreno, 2003).  
For a parliamentary system, three main advantages are evident. First is the accountability 
of government to the assembly, since the assembly has the power to remove the government if 
the parliamentary majority is unsatisfied with the government’s performance. Second, there is 
not a rigid system in governmental office. If there is any dissatisfaction in the government 
performance, the offending official can be easily removed by the legislature. There is no need to 
wait for a completion of fixed terms of elective officials. Third, coalition governments are 
common in parliamentary systems in which a proportional representation (PR) election system is 
used and it increases representativeness by allowing participation of more than one party in the 
formation of government (Linz, 1994; Cheibub, 2007; Parreno, 2003).  
Furthermore, for semi-presidential systems, it is argued that stability is created as a result 
of the fixed-term status of president, and at the same time, flexibility exists as a result of the 
10 
 
status of prime minister, who must maintain parliamentary confidence. Also, there is a dual 
leadership between the prime minister and president (Lijphart, 1998; Milardovic, 2005).   
On the other side, each system has also some disadvantages. For a presidential system, 
three main disadvantages can be identified. First is the possibility, as a result of the separation of 
powers, of serious clashes between the executive and legislature. A second concern is the 
temporal rigidity in the fixed-term office of the president. Third is the zero-sum game structure 
inherent in the winner-take-all character of the presidency. There is a lack of incentives, as well, 
for cooperation between legislative and executive branches if they are controlled by different 
parties. For that reason, it tends to foster political polarization.  
For a parliamentary system, two disadvantages can be expressed. First is the possibility 
of political instability and discontinuity in politics as a result of coalition governments in 
multiparty parliamentary democracies. This problem may exist because coalitions are formed by 
different parties which have different opinions, beliefs; they may not maintain political 
agreement for governmental policy and may be easily dissolved (Iorio, 2007). Second is the lack 
of direct accountability to the people, since the prime minister is appointed by legislature not 
elected by citizens’ vote (Milardovic, 2005).  
For semi-presidential system, cohabitation or intra-executive conflicts are explained as 
the main disadvantage. Cohabitation defines the situation when the president and the prime 
minister, who share power, are from different parties (Elgie, 2005; Kasselman, 2009; Colton & 
Skach, 2005). A summary of the advantages and disadvantages of each institutional approach is 
presented in Figure 1.3 below.  
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  Presidential System Parliamentary System 
Semi-Presidential 
System 
Advantages Executive stability 
Responsibility of 
government to the 
assembly 
Stability as a result of 
the status of president 
  
Democratic election- 
legitimization of 
President 
Flexibility in 
removing the 
government 
Flexibility as a result 
of the status of prime 
minister. 
  
Direct accountability 
of president to the 
people 
Representativeness as 
a result of coalition 
governments if there is 
a PR system 
 
  
Check and balance 
between the 
executive and 
legislative 
    
  
Fastness in decision 
making process 
    
Disadvantages 
Possibility of high 
clash between the 
executive and 
legislative 
Political instability 
and discontinuity  
Cohabitation or intra-
executive conflicts  
  
Rigidity in the fixed 
term office of the 
president 
Lack of direct 
accountability to the 
people 
 
  
Winners get all, 
zero-sum game  
  
 
Collection of all 
executive power to 
one person 
  
 
Figure 1.3: Advantages / Disadvantages of Parliamentary, Presidential and Semi-Presidential 
Systems 
Source: Shugart & Carey 1992; Lijphart 1998; Parreno 2003; Colton & Skach 2005; Elgie 2005; 
Milardovic 2005; Kasselman 2009. 
 
1.1. 3. Comparison of Parliamentary, Presidential and Semi-Presidential Systems 
The presidential-parliamentary debate emerged prominently in the literature in the 1980s. 
At first, the debate concentrated primarily on the relationship between regime type and 
democratic consolidation. Then in the 1990s the content of the debate began to change as a result 
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of the influential works of Shugart & Carey (1992), Mainwaring (1993), and Lijphart (1990). 
With the effects of these studies, new topics such as the party system and alternative electoral 
systems were integrated into these discussions of, regime type, good governance, and democratic 
consolidation (Elgie, 2004). 
Linz (1990a, 1990b, 1994) most forcefully focused the scholarly criticism of presidential 
regimes. Linz clearly explains what in his view is the superiority of parliamentary system and 
argues that presidential forms of governments are less likely than parliamentary forms of 
government to provide stable democracies. Linz believes that this instability is endogenous to the 
form of government (presidentialism), not the result of outside factors such as economic 
development or political culture. He explains that the institutional weaknesses of presidential 
systems prevent democratic consolidation. He concentrates primarily on three main alleged 
flaws: first, the executive and legislative branches in presidential regimes are elected separately 
and as a result create a situation of dual democratic legitimacy. This system provides a 
potentially conflicting relationship between the two bodies. Second, the fixed term of office in 
presidential systems creates an institutional rigidity in the system of government. For instance, 
winners and losers are separated for the entire presidential term and there will be no changes in 
the government and no new election as a response to an emergency situation or pressing national 
issue. And third, a presidential system is a zero-sum game, and generally performs according to 
the rule of winner-take-all scenarios.  Notably for Linz, there is a lack of incentives for 
cooperation between legislative and executive branches if they are controlled by different parties. 
For that reason, it tends to foster political polarization (Linz, 1990a, 1990b; Mainwaring & 
Shugart, 1997a; Lawrence, 2000; Elgie, 2004).  
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Scholars such as Stepan & Skach (1994) and Lane & Ersson (2000) support Linz’s 
argument and claim that parliamentary systems result in higher performance than presidentialism 
and provide more democratic stability in terms of system survival (Lane & Ersson, 2000). 
Furthermore, it is argued that parliamentary systems are better than presidential systems, 
especially in a transition period, because divided governments reduce government effectiveness 
and lead to deadlock (Stepan & Skach, 1994).  
However, this argument is not accepted by all scholars. For instance, Power and 
Gasiorowski (1997), show that there is not a significant relationship between regime type and 
democratic survival, especially in less-developed countries (123). Additionally, Horowitz (1990) 
criticizes Linz and argues that Linz concentrates on very selective sample of states, mainly in 
Latin American, and he does not include the effects of electoral systems. First, Horowitz (1990) 
points out Linz’s argument about the potentially conflicting relationship between the executive 
and legislative bodies (especially if they are controlled by different parties) and argues that “if 
the two are controlled by different parties, the system has not produced a winner-take-all result 
and it is difficult to complain about inter-branch checks and balances and winner-take- all 
politics at the same time” (75). In addition, he says that Linz concentrates on the presidential 
election under a plurality system or a majority system, but he claims that such it is not a general 
rule: presidents “do not need to be elected on a plurality or majority-runoff basis” (75- 76). 
Different electoral systems can be used in presidential elections and he shows this in practice by 
evaluating Nigeria and Sri Lanka cases. As a result, he explains that “winner-take-all is a 
function of electoral systems, not of institutions in the abstract” (76). In other words, 
parliamentary regimes with plurality systems may also create winner-take-all politics (Horowitz, 
1990). In short, Horowitz (1990) argues that “Linz’s quarrel is not with the presidency, but with 
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two features that epitomize the Westminster version of democracy: first, plurality elections that 
produce a majority of seats by shutting out third party competitors; and second, adversary 
democracy, with its sharp divide between winners and losers, government and opposition” 
(Horowitz, 1990: 79). As conclusion, he says that Linz opposes plurality elections, not 
presidential systems (Horowitz, 1990). 
Furthermore, Strom (1990) also claims that there is not a general rule that parliamentary 
systems need to create majority governments; they may have minority governments, too. For 
example, from 1946 to 1999 it is showed that fully 22 percent of parliamentary regimes had 
minority governments. Mainwaring and Shugart (1997a) also challenge Linz and claim that Linz 
does not evaluate the variations in presidentialism. They also analyze Latin American states and 
conclude that presidential systems “vary so greatly in the powers accorded to the president, the 
types of party and electoral systems with which they are associated, and the socioeconomic and 
historical context in which they were created” (Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997b: 435). They assert 
that the main problem in Linz’s works is the generalization of the consequences of 
presidentialism. However, they argue that by using different variables these consequences can be 
different from one presidential regime to another.  In a word, not all presidential systems are the 
same and can vary significantly in their operation. 
In the 1990s the debate began to expand, with research from new scholars such as 
Shugart & Carey (1992), Mainwaring (1990, 1993), Stepan & Skach (1993), Mainwaring & 
Shugart (1997a, 1997b), and Cheibub & Limongi (1990). They argued that focusing solely on 
the general system characteristics of each regime type is not sufficient. They assert that the 
effects of other institutional variables (such as party system, electoral system, and the powers of 
the executive) also need to be included. At the same time, some scholars such as Sartori (1994) 
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also include the role of semi-presidential systems into the debate and evaluate its effects on 
democratic consolidation.  
For instance, Mainwaring (1990, 1993) examines the relationship between party systems 
and regime type and argues that the presidentialism with a multi-party system is contrary to 
democratic survival. In his 1993 article, he evaluates democratic success in the period of 1967-92 
and concludes that social, cultural and economic factors – not just government variables –also 
impact democratic survival. In addition, his main conclusion is that a very small number of 
democracies have presidential systems in this time period and all these successful democratic 
presidential states have two-party systems. He concludes that the problem in presidentialism is 
the existence of multiparty systems, which may increase the deadlock between the executive and 
legislature and may increase the possibility of ideological polarization. He argues that in a 
presidential regime, “parties are less committed to supporting the government [and that] 
incentives for parties to break coalitions are generally stronger than in parliamentary systems” 
(Mainwaring, 1993: 200). Carey (2002) also evaluates the party system and argues that 
presidential and parliamentary systems are more likely to have developed different kinds of 
parties. The general idea is that parliamentary systems produce highly unified parties while 
presidential systems have more likely undisciplined parties (Carey, 2002).  
Yet, some other studies show that presidential system may also create unified parties and 
may create an effective government (Figueiredo & Limongi, 2000). On the other hand, Persson 
and Guido (2004b) claim that the differences between the presidential and parliamentary systems 
are not due to the party systems. Instead, they argue, the electoral system is the main factor that 
affects the types of government and party structure. The number of parties may change based on 
the electoral rules. For example, “plurality rule and small district magnitude produce fewer 
16 
 
parties and a more skewed distribution of seats than proportional representation and large district 
magnitude” (see for example Duverger, 1954; Lijphart, 1990). If there are a few parties in a 
parliamentary system, for instance, it is more likely to produce single-party majority 
governments instead of coalition governments (Taagepera & Shugart, 1989; Strom, 1990). But if 
there is a proportional electoral rule in a parliamentary system, it is more likely create coalition 
governments (Persson & Guido, 2004b). 
Furthermore, Shugart and Carey (1992) address the debate by looking at another 
institutional variable: the power of the executive. They claim that presidential systems with a 
president who has less legislative power are less likely to break down than presidential systems 
with the president who has much more legislative power (Shugart & Carey, 1992). In addition, 
Cheibub and Limongi (2002) evaluate the debate from a different perspective. They argue that 
the main difference between presidential and parliamentary systems is the decision-making 
process. Parliamentarism as a result of the fusion of power characteristics provide “highly 
centralized decision-making process,” because it is based on a majority in parliament. However, 
in presidential regimes, presidents cannot count on a majority of seats in the legislature. As a 
result, this system provides “highly decentralized decision-making process” (Cheibub & 
Limongi, 2002: 152). 
After 2000, the content of the debate has been further expanded with the introduction of 
economic variables such as the effects of economic development or economic crisis. For 
instance, Przeworski et al. (2000) compare presidential and parliamentary systems by looking at 
economic variables and they find that parliamentary regimes are less likely to break down than 
presidential regimes when controlling for the economic conditions of states. Only in economic 
crisis situations are presidential regimes more stable than parliamentary regimes. In addition, 
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they find that multipartism and religious heterogeneity are not well suited to presidential 
regimes. Presidential regimes in such settings are generally less stable than otherwise. As a result 
they conclude that “presidential democracies are simply more brittle than parliamentary and 
hybrid systems under all economic and political conditions” (Przeworski et al 2000: 136). Like 
Przeworski et al. (2000), Bernhard, Nordstrom, and Reenock (2001) evaluate economic 
variables, and conclude that “parliamentary regimes tend to be more successful in dealing with 
the consequences of economic growth, while presidential regimes are more resistant to 
breakdown in the face of economic crisis” (Bernhard et al. 2001:777).  
In general, the scholarly literature has argued that parliamentary systems are superior to 
presidentialism. They provide better governance; they create stronger economic and social 
conditions; they have a more-sound constitutional framework (Linz, 1990a, 1990b; Stepan & 
Skach, 1993; Riggs, 1997; Colomer & Negretto, 2005; Gerring et al. 2009).  
On the other hand, opponents claim that while presidential regimes have historically 
failed at higher rates than have parliamentary regimes, there is not a strong link between 
presidentialism, per se, and democratic breakdown (Cheibub, 2007). Latin American and African 
countries are more likely to adopt presidential systems, but these parts of the world already have 
significant problems, such as military legacy and economic problems, which can prevent the 
consolidation of democratic systems. On the other hand, parliamentarism is common in Europe 
and in former British colonies (they have more optimal conditions than some Latin American 
and African countries). Therefore, there may be other forces that lead to stable democracies or 
increase the survival rates of governments other than having presidential or parliamentary 
systems (Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997a; Lane & Ersson, 2000; Cheibub, 2007). Those include 
economic conditions (Lane & Ersson, 2000) or geographic location, the physical size of the 
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country, a military legacy (Cheibub, 2007), or particular decision-making processes (Cheibub & 
Limongi, 2002). Likewise, some scholars criticize Linz’s argument and assert that some 
parliamentary systems such as the UK may actually have a stronger winner-takes-all 
characteristic than presidential systems; they argue that switching to a parliamentary system can 
create more serious problems, especially in presidential systems with undisciplined parties 
(Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997a).  Some also argue that the problem is not the party systems; 
instead it is all about the election systems that can determine the party structure and government 
type (Persson & Guido, 2004b).  
In addition, it is claimed that “parliamentary systems do not always operate under a 
‘majoritarian imperative’; coalition governments are not foreign to presidential systems; decision 
making is not always centralized under parliamentarism and is not always decentralized under 
presidentialism” (Cheibub & Limongi, 2002: 175-76). In other words, they argue that the debate 
between presidential and parliamentary regimes is much more complicated that Linz makes it out 
to be (Elgie, 2004). Too many scholars, then, Linz has unfairly created a presidential straw man 
and then beat it with an overly simplistic stick. 
In contrast to parliamentary and presidential systems, semi-presidentialism is more 
problematic than presidential or parliamentary systems because of intra-executive conflicts -- 
especially competition for power between the prime minister and the president (Colton & Skach, 
2005; Elgie, 2005; Kasselman, 2009).  
Overall, it seems that there is not a common scholarly consensus about which system 
(presidential or parliamentary) is better for democracy or the survival of a government. Some 
argue that presidential systems are less stable than parliamentary systems because they break 
down at higher rates; some argue that stability is not related solely to the system of government. 
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There can be different factors such as economic factors, military legacies and other social factors 
that affect the survival of democracy or survival of the regime. Some also emphasize the 
importance of the general conditions of states. In other words, in the evaluation of the 
government type, it is important to concentrate on the basic characteristics of a state such as 
party and electoral systems, the power of the president and prime minister (if there is one), the 
social, economic and historical conditions, and the state’s heritage. 
1.2. Research Design 
To answer the research questions guiding this research, I use different methods, a 
quantitative analysis, and country comparisons. First, I present a general view about the Turkish 
parliamentary system. Specifically, I evaluate the debates over the past decades regarding system 
change. It appears that the instability issue has been always the central topic. Previous supporters 
of a presidential system (e.g., former President Turgut Ozal, former President Suleyman Demirel 
and current President Erdogan and deputies of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP)) 
all point to the stability issue. A new system, they argue, will eliminate ineffective coalition 
governments and provide stability. However, if coalition governments were the main source of 
this instability, it looks like Turkey has already eliminated this instability problem in 2002, by 
the creation of a single party government (the Justice and Development party) under the 
parliamentary system. For that reason, it is important to ask what is the main factor leading to 
this instability or coalition governments; is it the parliamentary system or is it the election system 
or party system? To evaluate this instability and parliamentary system puzzle, I examine the 
party structure of Turkey. First, based on Mainwaring’s (1993) analysis and by using Rae index 
of party fractionalization, the effective number of parties, and Least Square index, Turkey is 
compared with a set of stable democracies that have presidential, parliamentary and semi-
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presidential systems from 1946 to 2010. Stable democracies (defined as countries with at least 30 
years of uninterrupted democracy (Mainwaring, 1993: 4) are selected for the comparison. 
Democracy here is defined by three characteristics: First, there must be free, fair competitive 
elections. Second, there must be nearly universal adult suffrage and, third, there must be 
guarantees of traditional civil rights such as freedom of speech, freedom of organization, due 
process of law, etc. (Mainwaring, 1993: 4). To ensure these criteria, the Polity data set and 
Freedom House data set are both used. The data include the period of 1946 to 2010. The main 
point is to identify countries that have had stable democracies for thirty years until 2010. 
I duplicated Mainwaring’s approach in integrating the Turkish case to the analysis. 
However, some changes are made to the Mainwaring’s (1993) analysis; first, the time period was 
extended from 1992 to 2010. As a result there have been some changes in status of democratic 
states. For instance, Mainwaring (1993) evaluates Venezuela under presidential democracies; 
however, the status of Venezuela was changed by the military coup in 2001. For that reason, it 
was removed from the analysis. Second, the number of democracies has been increasing and 
there are some countries -- such as Greece (1967-2010), Mauritius (1968-2010), Spain (1978-
2010), Botswana (1966-2010), Cyprus (1974-2010) and Portugal (1976-2010) -- that now meet 
the thirty years criteria, which were not examined in Mainwaring’s analysis; these countries are 
also added to the analysis, bringing the number of countries in the analysis from twenty five to 
twenty eight. Third, Turkey is added to the analysis. It is important to mention that Turkey does 
not meet the criteria of thirty years democratic stability. Stable democracy in Turkey started in 
1983, so there have been twenty seven years without interruption in democracy. However, to 
show the possibility of presidential system under the Turkish party structure, Turkey’s case is 
also evaluated and the number of democracies is thereby increased from twenty eight to twenty 
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nine. Fourth, the Least Square index (LSq) is also used in addition to the Rae index to clearly 
indicate the real disproportionality in elections. It is argued that if there are small parties in the 
election, the Least Square index (LSq) provides better results than the Rae index (Lijphart, 
1994). In addition, I evaluate the Turkish party structure since 1923, by explaining the election 
systems, the characteristics of the party systems and single-party and multi-party periods.   
I further explore and test the relationship between government system and political, 
economic, and social development. The main stated motivation under the idea of adopting a 
presidential system is to improve economic, political and social development. However, it is 
important to explore whether or not a presidential system provides a better economic, political 
and social development. For that reason, I explore theoretically and empirically different forms 
of government systems and their effects on three policy areas—political, economic and social 
development. In a time series analysis, I use different dependent variables for each policy areas 
with the main independent variable being government structure (presidentialism, semi-
presidentialism, parliamentarism). For the government structure, I created three new variables: 
the first represents presidentialism, the second shows semi-presidentialism and the third indicates 
parliamentarism. I use government effectiveness, corruption control, rule of law, government 
accountability, and political stability as dependent variables in different models for political 
development. For economic development, I use telephone mainlines, import duties, trade policy, 
GDP per capita as dependent variables in different models. For social development, mortality 
rate, life expectancy and literacy rates are used as dependent variables. I use level of economic 
development (GDP), democratic history of each country, ethnic fractionalization, population, 
region, religion, legal origin, latitude, oil and gas production, regime durability and 
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institutionalized democracy as independent variables. Different fixed effect, random effect and 
GLS-ARMA models are used for each dependent variable.  
Lastly, to show the similarities and differences between presidential countries and 
Turkey, I use a country-based comparison in which Turkey is compared with other states that 
have or have tried a presidential system since 1975 by using social, economic, and political 
variables. The main goal is to provide a general view to the reader about Turkey and other 
presidential systems.  
1.3. The Organization of the Project  
The dissertation consists of five chapters and the structure of it is as follows. In Chapter 
1, I have provided a brief introduction and present a comprehensive review of the literature on 
presidential, parliamentary and semi-presidential systems. I then explain the research design and 
dissertation plan. In Chapter 2, I focus on the parliamentary system in Turkey by explaining the 
main characteristics, the pillars and problems of the current system, and by explaining the 
arguments against and in favor of the current system. In addition, the new change in the rules for 
the election of president (and a new presidential election following this change) is explained. In 
Chapter 3, I evaluate the party structure and election system of Turkey and focus on the 
applicability of adopting a presidential system under the Turkish party structure. In addition, a 
country comparison based on the number of effective parties is provided. In Chapter 4, I analyses 
theoretically and empirically different forms of government systems and their effects on three 
policy areas—political, economic and social development -- to evaluate which government 
system is more appropriate to produce economic, political and social development. In Chapter 5, 
I conclude the dissertation with discussion of the results and provide a conclusion, and point to 
future research.  
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CHAPTER 2: THE STRUCTURE OF THE MODERN TURKISH REPUBLIC 
2.1. Constitutional Development from the Ottoman Period to the Turkish Republic 
The first constitution was written in 1876 (Kanun-i Esasiye, Basic Law) during the 
Ottoman Empire and was revised numerous times in Turkish history: the Constitution of 1921, 
the Constitution of 1924, the Constitution of 1961, and the current Constitution of 1982. The 
1876 Constitution established a parliamentary monarchy and the Constitution of 1921, written 
during the Independence War, created an assembly government. With the establishment of the 
Turkish Republic in 1923, the Constitution of 1924 was written and parliamentary elements were 
introduced. For the first time, Turkey adopted a classical parliamentary system with the adoption 
of the 1961 Constitution. The current constitution, written in 1982, preserves the parliamentary 
system while increasing the power and privileges of the president (Gonenc, 2008).  
2.1.1. 1876 Constitution 
The first and most important step for the rule of law was the establishment of the 1876 
Constitution and with this constitution; the First Constitutional Period was established in the 
Ottoman Empire. The 1876 Constitution was written by the Young Ottomans who were a 
reformist group influenced by Western political structures. According to the Young Ottomans 
the solution for the growing political, social, and economic problems of the Empire was found in 
Western political institutions, especially the system of “parliamentary monarchy” (Kocak, 
2001:72-79). Sultan Abdulhamid II accepted the Constitution of 1876 (Kanun-i Esasi) officially 
by supporting the Young Ottomans. This constitution recognized the basic rights and freedoms 
(such as right to liberty, art.10, freedom of the press, art.12, and the right to own property, art.21) 
for Ottomans and also introduced bicameral legislature as well as other institutions (Meclis-i 
Umumi, article 42). The General Assembly of the Ottoman Empire was established and 
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consisted of two branches: the Chamber of Deputies was the lower house of the legislature 
 (Meclis-i Mebusan), and the Senate was the upper house was (Heyet-i Ayan) (Tanor, 1992; 
Shaw & Shaw, 1995). 
Then in 1877, a new reformist group called the Young Turks emerged and created the 
Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) and they started to demand revisions to the 
Constitution of 1876. As a result of the growing opposition, Sultan Abdulhamid II accepted the 
Young Turks demands and revised the 1876 Constitution in 1908 and the Second Constitutional 
Period (1908-1918) in the Ottoman Empire began (Feroz, 1993:31-37). In the Second 
Constitutional period the Sultan’s power and political status started to change in response to the 
requirements of a system of constitutional monarchy (Tanor, 1992:145). “The executive and 
legislative powers were separated from the Sultan’s sovereignty and granted to different bodies; 
the Council of Ministers was made responsible to the parliament which had now been given 
additional powers while the monarch enjoyed only limited powers” (Tanor, 1992:174-175). 
During the First and Second Constitutional Period, there was a parliament, but it was not the 
classical parliamentary system of government in reality.  
2.1.2. 1921 Constitution 
In 1920 with the occupation of Istanbul, the General Assembly was dissolved and the 
constitutional period ended (Gurbuz, 1982; Hekimoglu, 2010). A new assembly gathered in 
Ankara in January 20, 1921 to prepare a new constitution which was the Constitution of 1921 
(Teşkilât-ı Esasiye Kanunu). It was written under extraordinary conditions, the Independence 
War was being fought, as a result the constitution could not have any detailed provisions; instead 
it was a very simple document with only twenty-three articles. The constitution did not include 
any rights, freedoms or anything about functioning judicial systems. The most important part of 
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this constitution was introducing the principle of national sovereignty, a first in Ottoman-Turkish 
constitutional history. This principle facilitated the transition from monarchy to republic, 
declared on 29 October 1923. The 1921 Constitution created an assembly government based on 
the supremacy of parliament (Loewenstein, 1962:79-85). In this system, the Grand National 
Assembly (GNA) was responsible from the executive and legislative branches. The executive 
branch functioned through the Executive Ministers Committee (Icra Vekilleri Heyeti), which was 
appointed and dismissed by the Assembly. The Executive Ministers Committee elected one of its 
members as Chairman. These structures were not the same for the Cabinet and the Prime 
Minister in a parliamentary system. Also, there was not a President as the head of state, only a 
President of the Grand National Assembly who acted as the President. In other words, the1921 
Constitution formed to meet the needs of the newly established National Assembly without 
providing a parliamentary system (Kili, 1971:160-162; Ozbudun, 1992).   
2.1.3. 1924 Constitution 
After a short time, the constitution was replaced by a new one, Constitution of 1924 
(Gurbuz, 1982). The republic was declared on October 29, 1923 by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and 
the Constitution of 1921 was replaced with a detailed one. The office of the President was 
created and Mustafa Kemal was elected as the first President. As a result of these amendments, 
the 1924 Constitution established the first Constitution of the Republic and was in force until the 
1960 military coup (Earle, 1925:73). It included one hundred and five articles establishing the 
state as a republic. A unicameral General National Assembly was established with all executive 
and legislative powers. In the constitution, it was written that the president would be elected by 
the General Committee among the members of the Assembly for one legislative term. Also in the 
constitution it was introduced that the prime minister would be elected by the Assembly and had 
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rights to elect the ministers. It is clear that some degree of parliamentary rule was being applied. 
In other words, the 1924 Constitution created a mixed of an assembly government and a 
parliamentary regime (Ozbudun, 2000a; Gurbuz, 1982; Earle, 1925).  
2.1.4. 1961 Constitution  
In 1960 Turkey faced the first military coup and the Constitution of 1961 was created 
under the influence of the military. The military increased its legal and institutional privileges by 
creating the 1961 constitution (Demirel, 2004). The classic parliamentary system was adopted 
for the first time. The presidential term was increased from five years to seven years for each 
term in this Constitution (Gurbuz, 1982). This constitution was more liberal and democratic than 
the previous and following ones. The understanding of a democratic, social and secular state 
has been introduced for the first time. The 1961 Constitution “advocated pluralistic democracy 
based on the principles of 1) supremacy of the constitution, 2) separation of powers and a system 
of check and balances, 3) the structural development of a pluralistic society and it also sought to 
expand and strengthen basic human rights” (Hazama, 1996:317). Economic and social rights 
were granted; the right to strike was given to workers and workers were allowed to form 
unions. A State Planning Organization was established. On the judicial side, the 
Constitutional Court was established and it was clearly stated that the judiciary become 
independent (Coban, 2009). 
Between 1965 and 1969 the Turkish government had been dealing with the left-right 
students’ struggle in the streets. In the 1970s, the situation was exacerbated by the high rate of 
inflation and as a result Turkish Armed Forces declared a memorandum on March 12, 1971. 
Between 1971 and 1973 some constitutional amendments were introduced to limit civil liberties, 
and military power was increased once again.   
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2.1.5. 1982 Constitution 
Between 1971 and 1980, eleven successive governments emerged and defeated 
 
(Davison, 1988). As a result of the economic and political unrest, the military took control once 
again. On September 12,
 
1980, the third military intervention occurred by the general Kenan 
Evren and his friends. After the coup, the 1982 constitution was introduced and it was a revised 
version of the 1961 constitution (Icener, 2010). The founding Assembly, created by the 
National Security Council prepared the new constitution. However, the Turkish military after the 
coup closed down all political parties. For that reason, none of the political parties and civil 
society organizations could contribute to the1982 Constitution; it was prepared and amended 
only by the Turkish Armed Forces (Ormeci, 2012). The 1982 Constitution provided an ideal 
context for the expansion of military power and created a strong presidency (Sakalloglu, 1997). 
Ozbudun (1988) asserts that “the Constitution has transformed the presidency from a largely 
symbolic and ceremonial office into an active and powerful one, with important political and 
appointment functions” (Ozbudun, 1988:37)1. 
Turkey is still governed by the 1982 Constitution, although it has been revised over the 
years. For instance, the voting age was changed from 21 to 20, a constitutional change facilitated 
in 1987. At the beginning of 1990s, some important changes were introduced. The ban on 
establishing political parties and civil society organizations were removed and it became much 
                                                          
1
 Article 104 indicates the power of president which is the longest article in the constitution and gives 
executive, judicial and legislative power to the president. The constitution allows to president to act alone 
in certain cases without specifying such cases (Article 105). There are some ceremonial powers such as 
giving a first speech in the each legislative year, publishing law, or acting as a commander-in-chief in 
army. On the other hand, there are some items that provide a higher political authority such as 
appointment of the judges of the Constitutional Court, one fourth of the judges of the Council of State, the 
Chief public prosecutor of the Court of Cassation and his deputy, judges of the Military Court of 
Cassation, the high military Administrative Court. In addition, the president is responsible from 
appointment of the university rectors and the members of the Board of Higher Education (Ozbudun, 
1988:37).     
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more difficult to close political parties and civil society organizations and in addition, the voting 
age changed to 18. Between 1999-2002 “the State Security Courts were abolished, capital 
punishment was removed, the power of National Security Committee was decreased, all civil 
liberties were granted in parallel with European Declaration of Human Rights, closing-down of 
parties was made more difficult etc” (Ormerci, 2012:3).  
Furthermore, the ruling Justice and Development party (AKP) government emphasized 
the importance of a creation of a new constitution. One of the election promises of the AKP 
government prior to the 2007 elections was a new constitution. The AKP government declared 
that “it would make a new, civilian, and democratic constitution during its second term and the 
new constitution would (1) regulate the relations between state organs in clear and 
understandable terms in accordance with the parliamentary system, (2) redefine the status and 
powers of the President of the Republic, and (3) transform representative democracy into 
participatory democracy (Arslan, 2007:7). They began to prepare a new constitution in 2007, and 
a new draft was prepared but an agreement with other parties could not be reached and as a result 
the draft was shelved. Then in 2010, an amendment package aimed to organize the relationship 
between the civilian and military and revise the judiciary was prepared. The draft did not pass 
through parliament and the amendment package was offered up for referendum. The draft was 
accepted by 58% of the participants in the referendum. In 2012, the AKP government began to 
talk about new changes in the constitution again, but this time the aim was to rewrite the 
constitution. The AKP did not have the majority in parliament (326 out of 550) and lack the 
power to amend the constitution unilaterally. For that reason, they built the Constitution 
Reconciliation Committee (CRC), which included three members from each of the four parties 
(AKP, CHP, MHP and BDP) that currently held seats in the parliament. The commission has 
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been working to write a new constitution since May 2012, and has not made any progress 
(Chugh & Krueger, 2013).  
2.2. Turkish Parliamentary System  
Turkey has a parliamentary system introduced in 1923 with the establishment of the 
Turkish Republic. The executive, legislative and judiciary structure of the republic is explained 
in detail in order in the next section.  
2.2.1. The Executive Structure 
According to the 1982 Constitution (article 8), executive power is vested and 
implemented by the President and the Council of Ministers. The President is the head of state 
and represents the Republic of Turkey and the unity of the Turkish Nation. The President is 
responsible for the implementation of the Constitution and control of the organs of the state to be 
sure that they work in an orderly and harmonious manner. Before 2007, the President was 
elected by two-thirds majority of the Turkish Grand National Assembly for a term of seven 
years. To be elected, a candidate must be a Turkish citizen, over forty-year old and completed 
university education. As a as a result of constitutional amendment which was accepted by a 
nationwide referendum on October 21, 2007, the president has been elected in a popular plurality 
election (Turkish Grand National Assembly, 2011).  
The executive power and duties of the President are listed below (1982 Constitution, 
Article 104:50-51):  
- To appoint the Prime Minister or to accept his resignation upon the recommendation of 
the Prime Minister, to appoint or remove Ministers from office. In the event that he 
deems it necessary, chair the meeting of the Council of Ministers, or summon the Council 
to meet under his chairmanship 
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- To appoint accredited envoys to represent the Turkish State in foreign countries and to 
receive the representatives of foreign states to the Republic of Turkey 
- To ratify and publish international agreements 
- To occupy the position of Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish Armed Forces on behalf 
of the Turkish Grand National Assembly 
- To decide upon the use of the Turkish Armed Forces 
- To appoint the Chief of General Staff 
- To summon the National Security Council to convene and to chair the meetings of the 
Council 
- To proclaim martial law or impose state of emergency by decree to be decided by the 
Council of Ministers meeting under his/her Chairmanship, and to issue Decrees with the 
Power of Law 
- To approve Decrees as signatory 
- To commute or pardon the sentences of certain convicts on the grounds of old age, 
chronic illness or infirmity 
- To appoint the members and President of the State Auditory Council 
- To conduct investigations, inquiries and research through the State Auditory Council 
- To select the members of the Higher Education Board 
- To appoint University Chancellors  
The legislative power and duties of the President: 
- In the event that he/she deems it necessary, to deliver the opening speech on the first day 
of the legislative year 
- To summon the Turkish Grand National Assembly to session 
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- To publish laws 
- To return laws to the Assembly for reconsideration 
- If he/she deems it necessary, to present laws related to changes in the Constitution to 
public referenda 
- Should the whole or some of the provisions of laws, decrees with the power of law or 
Grand National Assembly internal regulations be considered to be in violation of the 
terms of the Constitution in term or in content, to file a suit with the Constitutional Court 
to the repeal of such laws, decrees or regulations 
- To decide upon renewal of parliamentary elections 
The judicial power and duties of the President consist of “appointing the members of the 
Constitutional Court, one fourth of the members of Council of State, the Chief and Deputy Chief 
Public Prosecutor of the Supreme Military Administrative Tribunal and the members of the 
Supreme Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors” (Turkish Grand National Assembly, 
Constitution 1982, Article 104:52).  
The Council of Minister is the second part of the executive branch and consists of a prime 
minister and the ministers. The president selects the prime minister from the parliament; the 
prime minister then selects the ministers who are appointed by the president (Article 109). The 
prime minister as head of the Council of Minister controls the functions of the council and 
provides the coordination between the ministers (Article 112).  Each minister is responsible to 
the prime minister and responsible to perform their jobs in respect to the constitution and laws. 
According to the constitution, the tasks of the Council of Ministers are: draft law, prepare 
decree-laws and regulations, draft budget and final accounts acts, declare martial law, ensure 
national security, and select the chief of staff. 
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2.2.2. The Legislative Structure 
According to the 1982 Constitution (article 7) legislative power is vested in the Turkish 
Grand National Assembly (TGNA) and this legislative power cannot be delegated. It is a 
unicameral parliament. For the first time, the TGNA united and exercised its legislative power in 
Ankara on April 23, 1920 after the occupation of Istanbul. Under the extraordinary conditions, 
this Assembly exercised legislative, executive and judicial powers together for national 
sovereignty. The 1924 Constitution created a fusion of power between these branches while the 
1961 Constitution created the separation of powers principle. In other words, it created a 
parliamentary system with the principle of separation of powers. The 1982 Constitution used the 
same framing as the 1961 Constitution following the same principles. The TGNA consists of 550 
deputies who are elected for five-year term by universal suffrage. An early election can be 
decided by parliament before this period is terminated. To be represented in the TGNA, parties 
need to get at least 10 per cent of the national vote.  Every Turkish citizen over thirty-years old 
has the right to run for a parliament seat (Article 75, 76, 77). The duties of the TGNA are 
outlined as follows (Article 89):  
- To enact, amend and revoke laws 
- To control the practice of the Council of Ministers and Ministers 
- To delegate to the Council of Ministers the authority to issue “Decrees with Power of 
Law” for specific subjects 
- To debate and pass the Budget and the Bills for Final Accounts 
- To ratify the printing of currency and the declaration of war 
- To ratify international agreements 
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- To declare amnesty or pardons for those convicted of crimes other than those specified in 
article 14 of the Constitution and to ratify the execution of death sentences ruled by the 
courts and for which appeals have been denied 
2.2.3. The Judiciary Structure 
According to the 1982 Constitution, judicial power is exercised by independent national 
courts and judges. There is an integrated legal system consisting of civil and military courts, each 
has a Court of Appeal in Ankara. The Constitutional Court follows the law and rules of 
procedure of the TGNA and evaluates the constitutionality of laws. When a decision is reached it 
is published in the official gazette and both the executive and legislative branches enforce the 
decision. The Supreme Council of Judges and Prosecutors select the judges and the President 
makes the appointment.  
2.3. New Presidential Election in Turkey 
2.3.1. The Change in the Election of President 
The constitutional amendment, accepted by a nationwide referendum on October 21, 
2007 carried forward the regime change discussion into a next level. The existing parliamentary 
system evolved into a parliamentary with a popularly elected president system by accepting the 
principle of a popular election of the president. This change was an important step for 
transformation to a presidential system.  
The tenth President of Turkey, Ahmet Necdet Sezer’s term ended in May 2007. The 
Justice and Development Party (AKP), in power since 2002, held the majority in the parliament 
and it appeared possible that the next president was going to be a member of the Justice and 
Development Party. However, the idea of a new president from the ruling party created a 
reaction from the secular groups and the military. The concern was that the AKP represents a 
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religious group and if they occupied the presidents’ office in addition to the governmental office, 
it would weaken the secular principle of Turkish Republic (Migdalovitz, 2007). On April 25, 
2007, Prime Minister Recep Tayip Erdogan declared Abdullah Gul, foreign minister of Turkey 
and a founder of the AKP, a candidate for the presidency. However, the military and leftist party 
(Republican People’s Party, CHP) did not welcome the idea of Gul for president. According to 
them, the president is the main power or institution and must represent secularism. For that 
reason Abdullah Gul’s Islamic ideologies and his wife’s headscarf, were seen as a threat to the 
office of president (Taspinar, 2007; Migdalovitz, 2007). However the AKP still supported Gul’s 
candidacy. On April 27, 2007, after the first round of elections, Gul failed to get enough votes to 
be elected. According to the 1982 Constitution, article 102 (before revision) the president of the 
Turkish Republic was elected by a two-third majority of the Turkish Grand National Assembly 
by secret ballot. If the majority cannot be reached in the first two ballots, a third ballot will be 
cast; the candidate who received the absolute majority of the votes would be the president of the 
Republic. After the first round, the Turkish Armed forces published a press release from the web 
site of the Office of the Chief of General Staff on April 27, 2007 called an e-memorandum 
(Sariibrahimoglu, 2007:1). It was an indirect attempt to intervene in the political process, 
warning and threatening the government for violating the secularism principle (Bacik & Salur, 
2010; Sariibrahimoglu, 2007). 
In the second round, on May 6, 2007, Gul failed to get enough votes once again. Early 
election came into question after failure to elect a president. Meanwhile, the AKP prepared a 
package of constitutional amendments consisting of a popular election of the president and 
reducing the presidential term from seven to five years. The Turkish Grand National Assembly 
accepted this package and passed it to President Sezer, he did not sign it and returned it to the 
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Assembly. It was readopted on June 18, 2007, and for this time, Sezer signed and called for a 
referendum in which all the amendments were accepted. “On July 22, 2007 early general 
elections were held and AKP won 46.5% of the votes and on August 14, 2007 Abdullah Gul 
declared his candidacy on more time. This time, AKP was more powerful and even though the 
opposition parties (CHP) members did not attend the session for the election of president, the 
Assembly was able to acquire the required two-thirds majority to convene and Abdullah Gul was 
elected as the president of Turkey on August 28, 2007” (Uran, 2010:3).  
It is clear that a presidential election crisis -- failure to elect a president in the first and 
second round and an online intervention of the military-- changed the republic by introducing a 
system of popular election of president from a principle of presidential or semi-presidential 
systems. It was a reaction to an election crisis, creating serious problems for Turkey in the future 
(Gonenc, 2007:39-43). 
2.3.2. The First Presidential Election in 2014 
Turkish citizens voted for the first time for the president in the history of Turkish 
democracy on August 10, 2014. Former Prime Minister Erdogan became the 12
th
 president of 
Turkey by getting fifty-two percent of votes. For the first time, a president was elected directly 
by the citizens instead of by the Parliament. Of course the new election brought new debates 
about the Turkish government structure, the functions of the executive structure and the 
transformation to a presidential system (Kanat, 2014). Ahmet Davutoglu was selected as a Prime 
Minister by Erdogan to replace him and he became the 26
th
 Prime Minister of Turkey on 28 
August 2014. The first presidential election brought so many uncertainties for Turkish political 
system. For instance, how the check and balances system will work? How the relations will be 
between the President and Prime Minister? How the parliamentary system will work?  
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There are important results of this presidential election. The most anticipated result is 
emerging a powerful and active president. During the campaign process, Erdogan regularly 
mentioned about a strong and active president and it was visible in his campaign slogan which 
was “National Will, National Power, Target 2023”. Target 2023 shows that he wanted to be 
elected and then serve for two terms in the presidential office (Oder, 2014). After the presidential 
election, Ahmet Davutoglu was selected as a Prime Minster by Erdogan and it is argued that 
Davutoglu is in a secondary position when it comes to take decisions, basically Erdogan is 
deciding and Davutoglu is implementing his decisions” (Idiz, 2014:1).     
The second result of the election is the production of a complicated system vacillating 
between the parliamentary and presidential one. After the election, Turkey’s political structure 
became uncertain. It is not a pure parliamentary system since the president began to be elected 
by people, but also it is not a pure presidential system, since there is a Prime Minister and 
council of ministers. It may be possible to say that the system turned to a semi-presidential 
system but the problem is this is not clarified in the constitution. For instance, Deputy Prime 
Minister Bekir Bozdag, said that “for the first time in Turkey, the public will directly elect the 
president. This means a de facto semi-presidential system and he also added that after the 
election, it is possible to say that Turkey's system became stronger than a traditional semi-
presidential system” (Celebi, 2012:1).  
On the other hand, after the election, Turkey faced with very important constitutional 
challenges; first; after the election Erdogan gave a speech in the main building of the AKP and 
other party leaders were standing near Erdogan at the podium. However, according to the 1982 
constitution, the president cannot be affiliated by any political party. It is possible to say that 
Erdogan formally cut his bonds with the party but it was just symbolic (Oder, 2014). Second; 
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after the election, Erdogan summon AKP’s general assembly and he served as the leader which 
created a second constitutional debate. The main opposition party, the CHP, has already lodged 
an application before the Supreme Court of Appeals to suspend the summoning of AKP’s 
general assembly under the leadership of Erdogan (Cumhuriyet Gazatte, 12 August 2014; Oder, 
2014). 
The third result is the increasing discussion about presidential system. Many AKP 
deputies and many scholars argue that this presidential election was an important step for the 
transformation to the presidential system. The current system after the election can be 
categorized as a semi-presidential system like in France. But the main difference is Turkey has a 
Prime Minister who holds wide-ranging executive powers. A conflict between the prime minister 
and President Erdogan may be inevitable if a different party comes to power in 2015 election as 
a result it is argued that a political transformation based on a new constitution is vital for Turkey 
(Karagoz, 2014). 
2.4. Presidential System Discussion in Turkey 
2.4.1. System-Change Discussion in 1980-1990 
Presidential system debates began with Turgut Ozal (8
th
 President) in the late 1980s. 
Prime Minister and later President Ozal suggested an adaptation of a presidential system in 
Turkey, he advocated for more serious debates once he was appointed as a president. According 
to Ozal, presidential system would increase Turkey’s global power and create political stability. 
At the time, Ozal stated, “If we want to become one of the top ten or top five nations in the 
world, then we need to take an initiative. The only chance would be to transition to a presidential 
system” (Port, 2012:5). The Justice Party submitted a proposal for direct election of a president, 
but it did not pass the Assembly, due to the 1980 coup.  
38 
 
In the middle of the 1990s, President Suleyman Demirel (9
th
 President) revived the 
presidential system debate. He said that, “I have seen six governments in four years of my time. 
From this picture, something is not right here. The executive should be independent from the 
legislative and legislative and judiciary together have to be able to check and balance the 
executive appropriately. This can succeed only in presidential system” (Turk, 2011:42). 
According to President Demirel, the general idea under the regime change was again to provide 
political stability. The electorate once again began to talk about a presidential system but it did 
not gain much support. The idea of a system change was not based on the electorate instead it 
supported President Suleymen Demirel’s desire to stay in power for one more term. In addition, 
at the time the Assembly rejected any proposal regarding a constitutional amendment. As a 
result, a new president was elected and a system change debate ended (Turan, 2005). 
2.4.2. System-Change Discussion under the AKP Government since 2000 
In 2003, the AKP government opened the system change discussion once again. The 
president of the constitutional committee, Burhan Kuzu, discussed a system change specifically 
an American style presidential system and its benefits. He clearly took ownership of the idea 
stating it was not a topic for the AKP. However, four months later, Prime Minister Erdogan in a 
televised interview said “I support presidential and semi-presidential system, but for me the ideal 
one is the US-presidential system” and added that “we still deal with the bureaucratic oligarchy 
and for that reason to solve this problem I want presidential system” (Oder, 2005:57). 
In December 2004 and in January 2005, the Minister of Justice, Cemil Cicek started to 
talk about the advantages of a presidential system by concentrating on the stability issues; the 
main point was that a presidential system would bring continuous stability to Turkey.  
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From 2005 to 2010, the debate remained largely off the agenda of government officials. 
In January 2005, Prime Minister Erdogan said that “the discussion of the presidential system 
may be useful for Turkey, but currently, it is not on our agenda”, then on February 15, 2006, he 
said that “I also want a presidential system but conditions are not proper for a system change 
right now” (Fendoglu, 2010:47).  
 The AKP government started to work on a new constitution in 2010 and the presidential 
system debate suddenly became a trendy topic in Turkish politics. Former Prime Minister 
Erdogan and other AKP deputies changed discourse and started to talk about creating a Turkish-
style presidential system instead of the US style presidential system. “The US president cannot 
appoint an ambassador, he cannot even decide on the sale of a helicopter alone. … That’s why 
we should create a Turkish-style presidential system,” Erdogan said, on his way back from Spain 
in November 2012 (Kemal, 2013). According to him, Turkey needs to establish a single 
parliament instead of a congress with two houses (Kemal, 2013). 
Lastly, the AKP government presented a proposal including twenty-three articles about a 
system change to the Grand National Assembly. For the first time, the debates offered a concrete 
proposal. The proposal included amendments on certain provisions in the constitution. The AKP 
aimed to by-pass the presidential system by changing some provisions of the constitution. 
When the proposal package is examined, it is obvious that the President who is the head 
of the executive branch is endowed with extraordinary powers
2
. First, the new regulations 
regarding the legislature indicate a serious limitation to the legislative authority of parliament 
                                                          
2
 For executive, the authority to appoint and dismiss the ministers, to generate a presidential decree, to 
appoint and dismiss the public administrators, to choose half of the members of the Board of Higher 
Education, to select the university rectors, to confirm laws, to return laws to the Turkey Grand National 
Assembly to be discussed again, to submit amendments on constitutional laws to referendum, and ext are 
given to the President (the AKP proposal, article 22).  
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and the legislature is placed under the supervision of executive
3
. Another important issue is the 
authorization of Presidential Decree which is given to the President and cannot be directly 
controlled by Parliament
4
 (Polatoglu, 2013; Ataay, 2013).  
For the judiciary, the AKP proposal does not identify regulations for processing the 
judiciary and judicial independence. The authority to elect half the members of the Constitutional 
Court, the Council of State, the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council and the Chief Public 
Prosecutor is given to the President (the AKP proposal, article 22). In other words, the President 
gets power to affect the judiciary and judicial decision. The proposal does not provide any 
regulations on separation of power and increases the President’s power (Polatoglu, 2013; Ataay, 
2013).  
To summarize briefly, when the debates regarding system change are examined from the 
beginning, first; it is possible to conclude that the stability issue is always the central topic. 
Previous supporters of a presidential system, Former President Turgut Ozal, Former President 
Suleyman Demirel and then President Erdogan and deputies of AKP, point out the stability issue. 
A new system will eliminate ineffective coalition governments and provide stability according to 
them (Oder, 2005). Second, when President Turgut Ozal started to talk about a system change, 
he concentrated on the power of the president (giving powers to policy-makers rather than the 
Parliament). For him the underlying factor behind the system change was to increase the power 
of the president, in other words, to gain more power for himself. Third, in the 1990s, the 
                                                          
3
 For legislative, the authority to control the Council of Ministers and the ministers and the power to give 
the authority to issue decree-laws on certain matters to the Council of Ministers are taken from the rights 
of the Parliament (the AKP proposal, article 9) and these rights are given to the President (the AKP 
proposal, article 22/g). 
4
 The President in each subject if there is an absence of certain provisions in the laws (except individual 
rights and freedom) will manage the country by creating a Presidential Decree and the presidential decree 
enters to force on the day of the publication without controlled by the parliament (the AKP proposal, 
article 22/4g) 
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discussions took place between presidentialism and semi-presidential system. Demirel mentioned 
both a presidential system and semi-presidential system for Turkey but his explanations clearly 
indicated a semi-presidential system. Fourth, when the AKP government brought this issue to the 
forefront in 2003, they clearly point out the US-presidential system. In addition, for the first 
time, they talked about increasing power of the deputies. However, after 2010, the AKP 
government changed their discourse and started to talk about a Turkish style presidential system. 
They specifically indicated the disadvantages of a pure presidential system and argue that to 
solve Turkey’s problems there is a need to establish a Turkish style presidential system (Oder, 
2005). 
2.4.3. Arguments favors of a system change in Turkey 
People who favor a system change focus on two main arguments; first, a new presidential 
system will bring a strong, effective and stable executive. Second, it will establish a strong and 
efficient legislature governed by creating a check and balance system (Ozbudun, 2005).  
The first important problem is instability, from the 1960-1980’s Turkey had twenty 
governments created and defeated; some governments were in power less than one year (Turan, 
2005). The second problem is sui generis structure of 1982 Constitution, resulting in a complex 
and incomprehensible government system: it is neither pure parliamentarism nor pure 
presidentialism. As a result of the changes on the election procedure of the president, the system 
gets more complicated; it created a parliamentary system with a direct elected president (Kuzu, 
1996; Duran, 1984). The third problem is the double-headed executive branch. There could be 
some internal conflicts between the president and prime minister if they fell into disagreement 
(Fendoglu, 2010). For example, the 10
th
 President Sezer and Prime Minister Erdogan have totally 
different worldviews; as a result in nearly every situation they fell into disagreement and Sezer 
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used his veto power (73 times) and send back to decisions to the Council of Minister more than 
any other president (Uran, 2010:10). Another important problem is the sluggishness of the 
legislative process. In multiparty coalitions, it takes considerable time to make decisions or to 
pass legislation. This means that decisions cannot be made quickly and some important 
regulations might not be passed because of the opposing party conflicts in the coalition 
governments (Uran, 2010). A solution to all these problems, it is argued that Turkey needs to 
adopt a new government system. To make faster decisions, to prevent the problems based on 
coalition governments, to overcome the political crises and increase democracy, it is claimed that 
the adoption of a presidential system is a solution (Kuzu, 2006). First, a presidential system 
supports the unified executive branch structure of a presidential system and will create a speeder 
and more effective decision making process, especially in emergency situations. For instance, at 
the economic crisis, the US could easily and quickly respond the crisis while many European 
countries were forced to act more slowly (Evcimen, 1992). Second, because of Turkey’s 
historical structure, a presidential system is more appropriate for the Turkish Republic. Modern 
Turkey emerged from the Ottoman Empire, and is based on a sultanistic tradition. Third, Turkey 
is a developing and dynamic country, and has some important economic, social and political 
issues. In order to overcome these issues, decisions must be made more rapidly and smoothly. 
For that reason, the argument continues, it is essential for Turkey to adopt the presidential system 
of the United States or the semi-presidential system of France (Gonenc, 2011). 
2.4.4. Arguments against of a system change in Turkey  
Scholars who are against the proposed system change in Turkey argue that 
presidentialism or semi-presidentialism may result in an authoritarian or a dictatorial executive
5
 
                                                          
5
 For more see, Fendoglu, 2010; Tezic, 1991; Soysal, 2007; Ertan, 2010; Kalaycioglu, 2007.  
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and may create more instability based on added tensions and conflicts between legislative and 
executive branch if the president and parliament are not of the same party (Uran, 2010). For 
instance, in Turkey’s case, a lack of democratic stability, the political effects of a powerful 
military, the lack of powerful judiciary, a presidential system may combine to lead to an 
authoritarian regime (Soysal, 2007).  
The other issue in presidential regimes is the risk of gridlock. If control of the executive 
and legislative branches comes from opposite parties, the system can fall into gridlock under the 
presidential system in Turkey (Uran, 2010; Ulusahin, 1999). In addition, it is argued that political 
parties and the electoral system in Turkey have problematic structures which affect political 
instability, especially the non-stable characteristics of the party systems. Extreme fragmentation 
in party structures is important reasons for weak or fragile coalition governments in Turkey 
(Hale, 1999; Fendoglu, 2010). 
Some argue that President Erdogan wants to stay in politics and plans to adopt a 
presidential system solely for that purpose. As a result, he is planning to be President for two 
terms until 2023. In other words, they argue that the changes are only related to the political 
ambitions of Erdogan (Torchia, 2011). After 2010, a system change debate created a Turkish 
style presidential system instead of a pure presidential system by the AKP government. Former 
Prime Minister Erdogan started to talk about the disadvantages of a pure presidential system and 
focused on the creation of a Turkish-style presidential system. According to Kemal (2013) 
Erdogan’s idea about creating a Turkish style presidential system alone explains the desire of 
power; he criticizes the US system where a president needs approval even for the sale of a 
helicopter, and this shows that his main goal is power; he wants to be able to decide everything 
even the sale of helicopter (Kemal, 2013).  
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Furthermore, people who are against system change mention a large potential cost. They 
claim that politicians are talking about a system change without mentioning any potential costs 
which can be classified under three categories and need to be examined before taking any 
actions. The first one is the technical costs. The government system change cannot be done as a 
constitution change only. The judicial system needs to be evaluated and renewed based on the 
needs of a new system. It is argued that more than forty articles of the constitution based on 
hundreds of laws, rules and regulations will need to be changed or rearranged (Cıtak, 2012). In 
addition, for some time Turkey has been working to make changes based on the EU’s norms and 
has not completed the process. While changing an article to meet the EU standards has not 
completed yet, adjusting to a new system will bring more problems instead of solving Turkey’s 
existing problems. The second one is the cost associated with the learning process. It will take 
some time to learn the operation of a new system--presidential or semi-presidential system-- and 
operate under new rules. Third one is the foreign response or reaction to a system change. 
Turkey has been working to be an EU member since the 1950s and the negotiation process 
started in 2004. For that reason, if there is a system change, the opinions or reactions of the EU 
or members of EU must be considered. But at least, most of the EU members have a 
parliamentary system and there are a few examples of a semi-presidential system, currently there 
is a not government with a presidential system in the union. All these costs must be considered in 
the evaluation of a system change and it is possible to argue that it may be more costly to make a 
transition instead of solving the current system problems (Gonenc, 2005). 
Scholars also argue that parliamentary regime is a state tradition and Turkey has 
experience with the current system, for that reason it is more appropriate to solve the problems of 
the current system and continue with the same regime. Turkey’s history is deeply grounded in 
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the current system and if the entire system changes, it will run counter to all these experiences 
(Turgut, 1998; Turan, 2005; Soysal, 2006; Gonenc, 2011).   
To summarize briefly, it is clear that there are some obvious problems in the current 
system. The 1982 constitution is not in full accordance with the parliamentary system and it 
created a mixed or hybrid system. However, it is not proper to expect that a new system will 
solve all the existing problems immediately; at least a new system will bring some problems and 
costs in the adaptation process (Senocakli, 2012; Ozbudun, 2005). In addition, it can be said that 
every strong leader who comes to power puts the presidential system debate on the agenda, their 
intention is to remain in power longer, and the discussion is not based on the needs of the 
society.  
The Turkish case remains in the middle of the parliamentary-presidential debate in the 
literature.  Scholars, politicians, writers and thinkers give different arguments based on their 
political views. However, the system transformation cannot be decided on individual political 
desire or individual political thought, since it will affect society as a whole and the country’s 
future. For that reason, it is important to analyze all the processes and develop a very well 
organize plan before taking action.
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CHAPTER 3: PARTY STRUCTURE OF TURKEY: IS IT APPLICABLE TO 
PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM 
3.1. Literature Review  
3.1.1. Two-Party System vs. Multi-Party System 
Political parties are essential for representative democracy (Norris, 2005) and they are 
crucial for the survival of the democratic system (Olson, 1998; Diamond & Gunther, 2001; 
Webb& White, 2007). Giovanni Sartori (1976) defines a party as “any political group identified 
by an official label that presents at elections, and is capable of placing through election, 
candidates for public office” (63). More broadly, a party can be defined as “an organization that 
pursues a goal of placing its avowed representatives in government positions” (Janda, 1980:5). In 
democracies, political parties compete with each other to implement their ideas. They get power 
from the people through elections. The main purpose of the general election is to determine 
which party or parties will form the government and which one or ones will be the opposition 
(Turk, 1994).  
The party system; formation and evaluation of it and its relations with the electoral 
system play an important role in political science literature.
1
 The party system is defined as “the 
forms and modes of their coexistence which has characteristics that do not appear in individual 
parties such as; numbers, respective sizes, alliances, geographical localization, political 
distribution and so on” (Duverger, 1954:203). Also, Sartori (2005) defines party system “as an 
interaction between parties, how the parties are related with each other, how they react 
competitively or otherwise to the other parties” (39). In addition, Wolinetz (2006) argues that 
there are different characteristics of party systems such as “the number of parties, their relative 
                                                          
1
 For party formation, see, Lipset& Rokkan, 1967; Cox, 1997; Mainwarring, 1999 and for the relationship 
between party formation and electoral system see, Duverger, 1954; Sartori, 1976; Weiner& Ozbudun, 
1987; Taagepera& Shugart 1989. 
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size and strength, the number of dimensions on which they compete, the distance which 
separates them on key issues, and their willingness to work with each other” (53). For the 
classification of party system, different scholars use some of these dimensions but the most 
common one is the effective number of parties in the competition which fights for power, which 
is generally used to identify the party systems (Duverger, 1990). It is categorized as one-, two- 
and multi-party systems. In a single-party system, there is only one dominant party which has the 
hegemonic power. In two-party system, there are two parties which win the most of the votes and 
share of the seats in the legislature. Multi-party system means that there are more than two 
parties that are effective in political competition (Lijphart, 1999; Hofmeister & Grabow, 2011).  
There are different factors like political traditions, political institutions, regional 
cleavages, ethnical groups, socio-economic factors, and election system that determine the 
development of a two-party or a multi-party system (Hofmeister & Grabow, 2011). In addition, 
the government system has an influence on the development of party systems. For instance, it is 
possible to say that political parties have more influence in parliamentary system than in 
presidential system. The government is directly formed by a party or parties and also the 
relationship between the government and the ruling party or parties is more direct greater in 
parliamentary system. However, in presidential system the head of the government is directly 
elected by the people even though he or she might depend on a party or not. People choose the 
president as a person; they do not choose a party, so parties have minor role in presidential 
system (Hofmeister & Grabow, 2011).   
3.1.2. Party Systems in Presidential and Parliamentary Systems 
Mainwaring (1993) examines the relationship between party systems and regime type and 
argues that presidentialism with a multi-party system is associated with lower rates of democratic 
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survival. He evaluates democratic success in the period 1945-92 and concludes that social, 
cultural and economic factors also impact democratic survival rates. In addition, his research 
shows that a very small number of democracies have presidential systems in this time period and 
all these successful democratic presidential states had two-party systems. He concludes that 
presidentialism and multi-party systems are a dangerous combination which may increase the 
gridlock between the executive-legislative and may increase the possibility of ideological 
polarization. He argues that in a presidential regime, “parties are less committed to supporting 
the government [and that] incentives for parties to break coalitions are generally stronger than in 
parliamentary systems” (Mainwaring, 1993:200).  
Carey (2002) also evaluates the party system and argues that presidential and 
parliamentary systems are more likely to have developed different kinds of parties. The general 
idea is that parliamentary systems produce highly unified parties while presidential systems more 
likely have undisciplined parties (Carey, 2002). Yet, some other studies show that presidential 
systems may also create unified parties and may create an effective government (Figueiredo & 
Limongi, 2000).  Also, Linz and Velenzuela (1994) argues that if a state has a multi-party 
political structure and applies a presidential system, it will probably create a conflict between 
presidential and parliamentary institutions and will result in a failure of democracy.  
3. 2. History of Turkish Party Systems 
3.2.1. Political Party System in Turkey 
In classifying political party systems, Sartori (1976) focuses on the number of relevant 
parties and degree of ideological polarization and as a result he classifies party systems under 
four categories: two-party, moderate pluralism (multipartism with low ideological polarization), 
polarized pluralism (multipartism with considerable polarization) and predominant (in which the 
49 
 
same party consistently wins a majority of seats) (Sartori, 1976:283).  The Turkish party system 
is one of the best examples of this classification. The party system started with a single party 
period until 1950s and then a transformation to a multiparty system occurred. The period 
between 1961 and 1980 can be categorized as moderate pluralism. After 1975, the party system 
took the form of polarized pluralism in Sartorian terms, because of the political violence and 
terrorism associated with the political and economic crisis in Turkey. Then after 2002, with the 
emergence of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and their hegemonic victories in 2002, 
2007 and 2011 elections, the Turkish party system can be characterized as a predominant system 
(Sartori, 1976; Sayari, 2002).  
3.2.1.1. Single party period in Turkey (1923-1946) 
In Turkey, the period of 1920-1946 was the single-party period. The Republican People’s 
Party was the only party in the Turkish politics from 1923 to 1946. This single-party period 
cannot be compared with Hitler's Germany, or the Italy under Mussolini. Mustafa Kemal tried to 
end this single-party period several times.  
The first opposition political party - Progressive Republican Party (Trakkiperver 
Cumhuriyet Firkasi) - was established on November 17, 1924 by Kazim Karabekir and Ali Fuat 
Cebesoy who were former military commanders. PRP was more liberal and democratic than 
Republican People’s Party and it was more concentrated on individual freedoms than RPP. The 
party’s main objective was to revive the liberal economic policies again. In a very short time, the 
party started to become very popular and got more support in the press. However, before the 
completion of its seventh month of political life, the party was closed by the government on 3 
June 1925, with the Sheikh Said uprising which was an extreme religious revolt. For the 
justification of the closure of the PRP, the government argued that the party was against Mustafa 
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Kemal and they involved in the Izmir Assassination which was an attempt to kill Mustafa Kemal 
and also the party was connected with the Sheikh Said uprisings. As a result, the party’s founders 
and members were on trial and seventeen of them were executed (Ozden & Yilmaz, 2010). 
The second opposition political party - the Liberal Republican Party - was founded on 
August 12, 1930, by Fethi Okyar who was Ataturk’s school friend and military commander. 
Mustafa Kemal wanted an opposition party to end the negative dictatorship image seen from the 
outside. But at the same time, he wanted to control the opposition from the inside, and for that 
reason, he asked his friend Fethi Okyar to form a new party. However, after a very short time of 
the establishment of the party, followers of liberal party started to campaign against to secular 
state. As a result of this, on December 17, 1930, the party dissolved by its president Fethi Okyar. 
After that, the opposition became effective in the parliament up to 1946 under the name of the 
Independent Group (Ozden & Yilmaz, 2010; Arslan, 2005).  
3.2.1.2. Multi-party period in Turkey (1946-1995) 
With the establishment of the Democratic Party on January 7, 1946, a transformation to a 
multi-party system was achieved. The Democratic Party was founded by Adnan Menderes, Celal 
Bayar, Fuat Koprulu and Refik Koraltan who were the members of Republican People’s Party 
(RPP). It became very successful by winning sixty one deputies in the1946 elections. However, 
the election in 1946 was not completely free and fair because open ballot and secret counting 
procedure was used in the election (Erdogan & Unal, 2013). For that reason, the period of 1946-
50 can be defined as the “transitional period” to the multi-party system. In the 1950 election, the 
Democratic Party won the election with 53.35 percent of the votes. They won the election in 
1957 with 47.3 percent of votes. Their popularity and, as a result, their votes had started to 
decline because of the nation’s worsening economic situation. Under the DP rule, the nation’s 
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economic situation started to get worse; inflation rates were increased, economic development 
started to decrease and the nation faced with the shortage of important goods. The Democratic 
Party was dissolved on 27 May, 1960, by the military as a result of the first military coup 
(Arslan, 2005). The party system during the 1950–1960 periods can be categorized as a two-
party system. The two parties -- DP and the CHP-- dominated politics and the other small parties 
had very limited role in politics. 
In 1960, Turkey faced its first military coup as a result of the declining economic 
situations and increased tensions in the society and after the coup the military developed its legal 
and institutional privileges by establishing 1961 constitution (Demirel, 2004). After the regime 
breakdown in 1960 and a short period of military rule, Turkish party system faced a new phase. 
The DP which was one of the two dominant parties of the previous decade was closed and 
banned from politics by the military. The closure of DP and a transformation from a plurality to a 
proportional representation system in the 1961 elections increased the party fragmentation. After 
the coup, many political parties formed. The National Action Party (NAP) and the Socialist 
Workers Party (WPT) were formed in the 1960s and the New Turkey Party (NTP) and the 
Justice Party (JP) were established in 1961.  
From 1961-1965 different parties tried to take the role of Democratic Party. Especially in 
1961 election, voters were confused about which party was the real heir of the Democratic Party. 
As a result of the proportional representation and the subsequent growth in the number of 
effective parties, the 1960s was the period of coalition governments (Arslan, 2005; Ozbudun & 
Myron, 1987). However, then Justice Party (JP; Adalet Partisi) successfully managed to take the 
role of the Democratic Party and as a result, in 1965 and 1969 elections, the Justice Party under 
Suleyman Demirel’s leadership won parliamentary majorities despite the use of proportional 
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representation. As a result, in this period from 1965 to 1971, the system turned to a moderate 
form of multipartism as described by Giovanni Sartori (Sayari, 2002; Tachau, 2000). Sartori 
defines a moderate pluralist system as centripetal competition between bipolar three-four parties 
in the elections (Sartori, 1966:139). 
Turkey between 1965 and 1969 had been dealing with the left-right students’ struggle in 
the street. In the 1970s, the situation was exacerbated by the high rate of inflation and as a result 
the Turkish Armed Forces issued a memorandum on 12 March 1971. Between 1971 and 1973 
some constitutional amendments were adopted to limit civil liberties. Military power was 
increased once again. Then, by taking support from the military, Nihat Erim, who was a former 
legal advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a university professor, formed the 
government in 1971. This sparked an operation against civil rights and liberties. The Erim 
government began to make changes in every institution, such as the universities, the press, radio 
and television, the Council of State, and the Constitutional Court. In addition, any left wing 
organizations or publications were prohibited and many socialist intellectuals, writers, scientists, 
university students were arrested in this period (Kircak, 1993). During the 1960s and 1970s, 
there was a growing ideological polarization between the political left and the right in Turkish 
party politics (Sayari, 2002) In this period, extremist Islamic and extremist right-wing parties 
developed and took other centrist parties’ place; as a result the domination of two parties was 
ended (Sayari, 2002).  
Between 1971 and 1980, eleven successive governments emerged and were unsuccessful 
(Davison, 1988). As a result of the economic and political unrest, the military again decided to 
control the nation’s politics. On September 12, 1980, the third military intervention into the 
country’s political system was instituted by General Kenan Evren and his associates. After the 
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coup, the 1982 constitution (which was an expanded version of the 1961 constitution) was 
promulgated and the Turkish military closed down all political parties (Icener, 2010). For that 
reason, any political parties or any civil society organizations could not contribute to the crafting 
of the 1982 Constitution; it was prepared solely by the Turkish Armed Forces (Ormeci, 2012). 
The 1982 Constitution provided an ideal context for the expansion of military power (Sakalloglu, 
1997). In addition, the military imposed a 10% national threshold system to prevent the small 
ideological parties from winning parliamentary seats in this period (Ozbudun, 2000b:75-76). 
The 1980 coup was very different from the previous military interventions in 1960 and 
1971. Military rule was sustained until 1983. In previous coups, only one (such as DP in 1960) or 
a few small parties (such as Marxist TOP and the Islamist MNP) were banned by the 
Constitutional Court, while other parties continued to be active in politics. However, after the 
1980 coup, all political parties were banned. The general idea was to create new parties based on 
two moderate centrist parties. There would be no continuity with the parties before 1980s and 
there would be no extremist radical leftist or Islamist parties (Sayari, 1996-1997; Akarca & 
Tansel, 2007).  
However, a new party, Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi, ANAP), was formed by 
Turgut Ozal and was allowed to enter the elections. Overcoming opposition by the military, 
ANAP got 45.1 percent of the votes and 52 percent of the parliamentary seats. Because of 
ANAP’s victory, the power of military in the politics was diminished. As a result of ANAP’s 
majority party government, the period of short-lived and weak coalition governments was ended 
(Erguder, 1991).  
After fifteen years, with the general election on November 2002, a single-party period 
began in Turkish politics with the emergence of the Justice and Development Party (AKP). The 
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2002 election resulted in an AKP victory and it created a single party government. In the 2007 
election, the AKP won the election again by increasing its votes over the 2002 result. Then, in 
2011 election, the AKP increased its votes again and won the elections for a third time since 
2002.  
Sartori (1976:193-194) argues that if there is a ten percentage point difference between 
the strongest and the other parties, the leading party can be classified as a dominant party. The 
AKP satisfies this criterion (the difference between the AKP and the second party was 15% in 
2002, was about 25% in 2007, and was about 24% percentage points in 2011) and can be defined 
as a dominant party (Carkoglu, 2011). In 2002, the AKP created a single-party government. The 
percentage of votes and number of seats won by parties over the past eight elections is provided 
in Figure 3.1 and governments in Turkey are also listed in Table 3.1.  
3.2.2. Characteristics of Turkish Political Parties 
Turkish political parties can be categorized under five main groups. The first one is the 
Kemalist group which is represented by Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP, Republican People’s 
Party). This is the oldest party in Turkish politics. The second one is the Nationalistic group 
which is represented by Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (MHP, Nationalist Movement Party).  The 
third one is the moderate right-wing party, which is now dominated by the ruling party Adalet ve 
Kalkınma Partisi (AK Parti; Justice and Development Party). The fourth one is the Islamist 
group which represented by the Saadet Partisi (SP; Felicity Party), and AKP’s roots lies within it. 
The last one is the Kurdish group which became effective after 1990s (Carkoglu, 2002; 
Koseoglu, 2011).  
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Party  1983     1987 1991    1995       1999 2002    2007         2011 
 
AKP (Justice      --    --  --     --        --  34.3    46.6         49.8 
Development P)       (363)    (341)         (327)  
ANAP   45.1    36.3  24 19.6       13.2 5.1     --        --             -- 
(Motherland P) (211)    (292)            (115)    (132)        (86)     
DYP      --     19.1  27.1    19.1       12  9.5     --          0.2 
(Right Path P)      (59)            (178)    (135)      (85)   --             -- 
CHP    
(Republican   --     --  --    10.7        8.7  19.4    20.19        26 
People’s P)        (49)        --   (178)    (112)        (135) 
DSP   
(Democratic  --    8.5  10.8    14.6       22.2   1.2      --         0.3 
Leftist P)     --  (7)    (76)       (136)    --           -- 
SHP 
(Social   --   24.7  20.88    --        --     --     --          -- 
Democratic     (99)  (88) 
People’s P) 
MHP  
(Nationalist  --  2.9  --   8.2      17.9  8.4   14.3         13 
Movement P)    --      --      (129)    (71)        (53) 
RP           --   7.2  16.9   21.4        --    --     --          -- 
Welfare P)     --  (62)   (158) 
SP            -- --  --   --        --           2.5     --          -- 
(Felicity P)                  -- 
FP              --   --  --    --      15.4  --     --          -- 
(Virtue P)           (111) 
HEP      30.5 
 (People’s  (117)    --  --    --        --          --     --          -- 
Labor P) 
MDP     23.3    --  --    --       --          --     --          -- 
 (National  (71) 
Democratic P) 
GP           --    --  --    --       --         7.3     3         -- 
 (Young P)                --     -- 
HADEP  --    --  --   4.2       4.8           --     --         -- 
(People’s         --        -- 
Democracy P) 
DEHAP  --    --  --   --        --         6.2     --         -- 
(Democratic                 -- 
People’s P)             
Independents 1.1    0.4  0.1   0.5        0.9        1  5.2     6.6 
               (3)       (9)  (26)     (35) 
 
Figure 3.1: Percentage of Votes and Number of Seats Won by Parties in Parliamentary Elections, 
1983-2011 
Note: The first column indicates the percentage of votes and the second column which is 
determined by parenthesis indicates the number of seats.  
Source: Turkish Statistical Institute, General election results from 1983-2011.  
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Table 3.1: Governments in Turkey, 1983-2011 
 
Period    Type of government      Governing party(s)      Prime Minister 
 
Dec.1983- Dec. 1987  Single party/majority         ANAP   Turgut Ozal  
Dec.1987- Sept.1989  Single party/majority         ANAP   Turgut Ozal 
Sept. 1989- June 1991 Single party/majority         ANAP        Yildirim Akbulut  
June 1991- Dec. 1991  Single party/majority         ANAP   Mesut Yılmaz 
Dec. 1991- June 1993  Coalition/majority         DYP, SHP      Suleyman Demirel 
June 1993- May 1995  Coalition/majority         DYP, SHP  Tansu Çiller 
May 1995- Oct. 1995  Single party/minority         DYP   Tansu Çiller 
Oct. 1995- March 1996 Coalition/majority         DYP, CHP  Tansu Çiller 
March 1996- June 1996 Coalition/majority         ANAP, DYP  Mesut Yılmaz 
June 1996- June 1997  Coalition/majority         RP, DYP            Necmettin Erbakan 
June 1997- Jan. 1999  Coalition/minority         ANAP, DSP, DTP Mesut Yılmaz 
Jan. 1999- May 1999  Single party/minority         DSP   Bulent Ecevit 
May 1999- Nov. 2002  Coalition/majority         DSP, ANAP, MHP Bulent Ecevit 
Nov. 2002- January 2015 Single party/majority         AKP  R.T.Erdogan, A. Davutoglu* 
 
Source: Data compiled from www.tbmm.gov.tr/ambar/hukumet 
*Ahmet Davutoglu became Prime minister when Erdogan was elected as President in 2014.  
 
 
The first group: Kemalist group adopts the Kemalist ideology which was implemented by 
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. It was the founding ideology of the Turkish Republic. It was defined as 
the establishment of new Turkish state based on new political, social, cultural and religious 
reforms. Over the years, this group supports Westernized modern state, democracy, secularism, 
civil and political equality for everyone. Under this group, CHP was established in 1923 and is 
one of the main parties; the party got 85% of the votes in1946 election, 39.45% in 1950, 34.8% 
average vote from 1954 to 1980. It was not very strong in 1990s, but after 2002 election the CHP 
became the main opposition party again by getting 19.2 % votes. The first opposition to the CHP 
under this group came from Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi (CGP; Republican Trust Party) which 
was founded by the politicians separated from CHP. It was effective in 1969 and 1973 elections 
by getting 6.6% and 5.3% of the votes, respectively, but it only got 1.9% of the votes in the 1977 
elections. The second challenge to the CHP under this group was provided by Halkçı Parti (HP; 
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People’s Party), which was only allowed by the junta to join the elections after 1980 military 
coup. These parties are from the Kemalist group. The second Kemalist party --Sosyal Demokrat 
Halkçı Parti (SHP; Social Democratic People’s Party)--was established after the election from by 
merging of Republican Trust Party and People’s Party in 1985. Then, the Demokratik Sol Parti 
(DSP; Democratic Leftist Party) was formed by Bulent Ecevit, former president of the CHP, in 
1985. The latter party belongs to the Kemalist tradition is the Yeni Türkiye Partisi (YTP; New 
Turkey Party). It was formed in 2002 and dissolved in 2004. From all these parties, CHP has 
been the central figure of Kemalist tradition (Koseoglu, 2011).    
The other groups –on the Nationalistic and moderate right wing-- became effective after 
the single-party system was abolished. The second group moderate right wing group supports 
nationalism, conservatism, democracy, liberal and free market economy. Under this tradition, 
Demokrat Parti (DP; DemocratParty) was founded in 1946 and represents the right wing and 
formed the government in 1950 for ten years.  Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi (MDP; Nationalist 
Democracy Party), Anavatan Partisi (ANAP; Motherland Party) Doğru Yol Partisi (DYP; Right 
Path Party) are other examples of the right-wing parties and they were active in politics in 1980 
and 1990s. Today, it is argued that AK Party dominates this tradition (Ete, 2008). 
The third group: nationalistic group support Turkish and Islam synthesis and Turkish 
nationalism very strongly. They define their doctrines as a national doctrine that respects to the 
nation’s beliefs, religion, culture, and focuses on science and technology. Millet Partisi (MP; The 
Nation Party), was established in 1948 and represents the nationalistic group. In 1954, the party 
changed its name to Cumhuriyetçi Millet Partisi (CMP; Republican Nation Party) and then 
merged with the minor Ciftci Partisi (ÇP; Peasants’ Party) in 1958 and became the Republican 
Peasant Nation Party. In 1969, the party name was changed to the Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi 
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(MHP; Nationalist Movement Party), by Alparslan Türkeş, a retired coronel, who became the 
leader of the party. In the 1980 coup, MHP was also banned. After the closure of the MHP, a 
new party the Milliyetçi Çalışma Partisi (MÇP; Nationalist Mission Party) was formed by the 
leaders of the MHP. In 1993, MÇP became the MHP once again. In 1993 Büyük Birlik Partisi 
(BBP; Great Union Party) was established under this tradition and in 2002 the Genç Parti (GP; 
Youth Party) was established by Cem Uzan, who is a media tycoon, under this tradition 
(Koseoglu, 2011).  
In 1970, the Islamist tradition appeared on the scene, and this Islamist group adopts a 
National Outlook (Milli Görüş) tradition which is a kind of religious nationalism based on anti-
Westernization. The National Order Party, formed by Necmeddin Erbakan, was the first party 
under this group. The party was banned by the judiciary because of the anti-secular activities 
after a year and then changed its name to the National Salvation Party. In 1983, the Refah Partisi 
(RP; Welfare Party) was established to represent this tradition. It was also banned by the Turkish 
Judiciary in 1998 because of the anti-secular policies. That same year, the Fazilet Partisi (FP; 
Virtue Party) was formed to continue this tradition. In 2001, it was also banned. Some of the 
followers formed a new party called Saadet Partisi (SP; Felicity Party) and some of them formed 
the AKP in 2001 (Koseoglu, 2011). Most interestingly, most of the Islamist parties were closed 
by the judiciary because of the anti-secular activities but after every closure a new party with a 
different name under the same tradition was established.  
The last group is the Kurdish group which became active in 1990 in Turkish politics. This 
group entered into the political life by demanding their own cultural and national demands. For 
this group, the main goal is to get independence or autonomy from Turkish Republic. Today, 
they are looking for a democratic solution to the Kurdish problem in Turkey. The first party 
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under this group was the Halkın Emek Partisi (HEP; People’s Labor Party). Then, the Demokrasi 
Partisi (DEP; Democracy Party), the Halkın Demokrasi Partisi (HADEP; People’s Democracy 
Party), the Demokratik Halk Partisi (DEHAP; Democratic People’s Party) and the Demokratik 
Toplum Partisi (DTP; Democratic Society Party) were formed in order. All of them were later 
banned by the judiciary because of their relations with the terrorist organization PKK. Today, the 
Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi (BDP; Peace and Democracy Party) represents this tradition 
(Koseoglu, 2011). All political parties based on their traditions are showed in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2: Political Parties According to the Traditions 
TRADITION    PARTIES 
Kemalist  CHP      CGP       HP     SHP          DSP    YTP 
Mod. Right  DP     AP        YTP            DEM.P      HUR.P       ANAP     MDP      DYP 
Nationalist  MP     CMP       CKMP        MHP          MCP    BBP         GP 
Islamist  MNP     MSP        RP    FP          SP    AKP         HAS.P 
Kurdish  HEP     DEP         HADEP      DEHAP    DTP    BDP 
 
Source: Koseoglu, 2011. 
 
Moreover, there are different characteristics of the Turkish party system and one of them 
is volatility, which is defined as “sudden and significant changes in party votes from one election 
to the next” (Ozbudun, 2000b:74). Electoral volatility defines the net change in the elections by 
counting individual vote transfers. It shows the net percentage of the voters who changed their 
votes from the previous election. It is calculated by the Pedersen index
2
 and this index ranges 
between 0 to 1, in which 0 refers that all parties get the same vote as they did in the previous 
election, while 1 refers that voters vote for different parties.  
In addition, the high electoral volatility is one of the main reasons for highly 
fractionalized parliaments. Highly party fragmentation refers that there are many small parties 
                                                          
2
 The Pedersen volatility index is calculated by using the following formula. In the formula N represents 
the number of parties. V= (1/2)∑N (IVote%it-Vote%it-1).  
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that receive a small amount of the votes. Party fragmentation is calculated by the 
fractionalization index (F) 
3
 that ranges from 0, which means a party gets all of the votes, and 1 
refers so many parties receive a small amount of the votes. Electoral volatility and fragmentation 
in Turkey is presented in Table 3.3. 
Table 3.3: Electoral Volatility and Fragmentation in Turkey, 1965-2011 
Year  Total Volatility  Fragmentation 
1961      0.71 
1965   23.4   0.63 
1969   11.2   0.70 
1973   16.8   0.77 
1977   18.3   0.68 
1983   --   0.66 
1987   38.5   0.75 
1991   16.6   0.79 
1995   17.9   0.83 
1999   20.2   0.85 
2002   41.7   0.82 
2007   18.6   0.72 
2011   11.6   0.67 
Source: Hazama, 2003, 2004; Kalaycioglu, 2008, 2010; Carkoglu, 2011; Tezcur, 2012. 
Note: Electoral volatility for general elections immediately after the military interventions (1960, 
1980), was not calculated, since these interventions disrupted the continuity of party systems.  
 
From the Table 3.3, it is seen that for Turkey, the electoral volatility scores are very high, 
the mean is 19.42 from 1965-2012. It refers that voters change their votes in every election and 
they vote differently compared to previous elections. Especially, the electoral volatility score 
reached its zenith in 2002 election (the score is 41.2). It shows that nearly half of the voters 
changed their vote in 2002 election. After 2002, the electoral volatility starts to decline. Party 
fragmentation scores are also very high for Turkey; the mean score is 0.73 from 1961 to 2011. It 
means that there are always many small parties in the system and these parties get a small 
amount of the votes. However, it is seen that party fragmentation is also declining after 2002 
                                                          
3
 The fractionlization index (F) is calculated by the following formula: F= [ 1- ∑N(Vote %)
2
] 
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election with the AKP party. Based on these results, it is possible to say that after 2002 with the 
entrance of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), there is a consolidation and stabilization 
in the electoral preferences. The second characteristic of the Turkish party system is the lack of 
stable partisan support which negatively affects party loyalty. These two characteristics—
volatility and lack of loyalty—are the main reasons for a less-stabilized party system in Turkey 
(Sayari, 2002). The third characteristic is the broad ideological spectrum of the system or high 
level of polarization (Sayari, 2002:10). In 1970s, the left-right ideological polarization was an 
important characteristic of Turkish party system. In 1990s, in addition to the left-right 
ideological polarization, secularist/Islamist divides began to take an important role in party 
system polarization. During the 1990s, the political life has witnessed the tensions between those 
who wanted to increase the role of religion in politics and those who wanted to endure the 
secular policies. Most interestingly, in Turkey non-electoral forces, such as the military or 
bureaucratic elites, are also effective in party politics. For instance, the military after the each 
coup banned some of the parties or removed some of the party leaders from the politics. From 
the beginning of the multi-party elections, the party structure can be categorized as instable 
because of military interventions, party switches and a ban on political parties (Sayarı, 2008). 
3.2.3. Election Systems in Turkey 
Electoral systems and their consequences have been intensively studied in the literature.
4
 
Electoral system is the method that determines the distribution of votes into the seats in 
parliament or in other government area. There are different factors such as district magnitude, 
ballot structures, effective thresholds, assembly size, open/closed lists that affect the electoral 
system, but the most important factor is the electoral formula which is used for the calculation of 
                                                          
4
 For electoral systems see, Duverger, 1954; Rae, 1971; for the consequences of electoral systems see, 
Lijphart, 1994; Lijphart & Grofman, 1984; Blais &Massicotte, 1996; Taagepera & Shugart, 1989; Farrell, 
1997. 
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votes. There are many different types of electoral systems but the main ones are Plurality system, 
Proportional Representation, and Mixed system (Norris, 1997). Duverger (1954) argues that the 
election system goes a long way in determining the structure of the party system. According to 
the Duverger Law, plurality systems in single-member districts tend to create two-party systems, 
while proportional systems tend to produce multi-party systems. As a proof of this thesis, 
Lijphart (1994) compares twenty seven industrialized democracies from 1945-90 by using the 
effective number of parties index and finds that number of effective parties was 2.0 in plurality 
systems, and 3.6 in proportional systems (Norris, 1997:7).  
Single-Member District Plurality (SMDP) systems, also known as the “first-past-the-
post,” are used in the U.S., Canada, the United Kingdom and other countries. In such systems, 
the country is divided into geographical districts, each one of which produces on election day a 
winning candidate to represent it in the national legislature. Voters in each district cast a ballot 
for the candidate of their choice and whichever candidate receives the largest number of votes – 
even if short of a mathematical majority – is declared the winner. One of the disadvantages of 
this system is the disproportionality between the votes and the seats. Because of the need to 
defeat all other candidates and the winner-take-all nature of the contest, SMDP tends to eliminate 
small parties in the parliament (Norris, 1997; Turk, 1994).  
Proportional representation (PR) is commonly used in European countries such as Italy, 
Spain, and Finland. In such systems, people vote for a political party of their choice. Under PR, 
the seats in the parliament are distributed in proportion to the percentage of the votes received by 
the parties, and, as a result, medium and small parties can be represented in addition to the large 
parties. Generally, it leads to multi-party system and provides a fair representation, especially for 
the minorities.  
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Mixed-member systems are systems that combine aspects of both PR system and 
plurality SMDP system. Such systems are used in New Zealand and Germany. Voters cast one 
vote for their preferred party and one vote for a candidate to represent their electoral district. It is 
more complicated than the other systems, so it is sometimes hard for voters to understand. 
Generally, it tends to create multi-party systems (Norris, 1997; Turk, 1994).  
Until 1960, the SMDP plurality system was used in Turkey. It is possible to see all the 
drawbacks of a plurality system in Turkey at that time. The votes of the government party and 
opposition parties were close to each other, but because of the plurality system, the government 
party--DP-- had an overwhelming majority of seats in the parliament (Turk, 1994). As a result, 
the absolute power of the DP was not overcome and this hegemonic power of the government led 
the country into a political crisis that resulted in a military coup. As a result, to prevent this kind 
of political crisis, the PR system was chosen after 1960 (Cop, 2011). 
After the 1960 coup, a new electoral law and a new constitution were implemented. 
Proportional representation system with the d'Hondt and with district threshold, the Hare quota, 
was introduced. According to this system, for each district a threshold is determined (the votes in 
the district divided by the number of seats in that district) and if a party vote does not surpass the 
threshold, it will not get any seats in the legislature. After 1965, the National Remainder system 
was used. According to this system, first the district threshold was determined based on the Hare 
quota. Then, the total remaining votes were divided by the seats and then the result was divided 
by each party's remainder votes based on the national results (Cop, 2011). The main goal behind 
the adaptation of National Remainder system was to prevent the absolute majority of one party in 
the parliament. As a result of the National Remainder system, the 1965 elections provided the 
most proportional results in modern Turkish history. The disproportionality level was very low; 
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for instance, the CHP got 28.7 percent of the votes and earned 29.8 percent of seats, so the 
deviation was only 1.1 percent. However, in spite of the National Remainder system, the AP got 
52.9 percent of the votes and formed the government by itself. After the election, the AP 
government changed this election system and returned to the previous d'Hondt system. This 
system was then used in the1969, 1973 and 1977 elections. Then, after the 1980 military coup, a 
new election system, which was d'Hondt with the district threshold, was introduced in 1983. In 
addition, a ten percent national threshold was introduced (Cop, 2011; Turk, 1994), which 
reduced the probability of small parties winning legislative seats. Turkish election system since 
1950 is provided in Table 3.4 and number of parties and effective parties are showed in Table 
3.5. 
Table 3.4: Turkish Electoral Systems, 1950-2011 
 
Election Year   Election System         
    1950  Multimember district – Plurality               
    1954  Multimember district – Plurality    
    1957  Multimember district – Plurality    
    1961  PR- D’Hondt with district threshold                
    1965  PR- D’Hondt with National Remainder          
    1969  PR- D’Hondt with no threshold    
    1973  PR- D’Hondt with no threshold                
    1983  PR- D’Hondt with double threshold1                  
    1987  PR- D’Hondt with double threshold and quota2     
    1991  PR- D’Hondt with double threshold and quota    
    1995  PR- D’Hondt with national threshold             
    1999  PR- D’Hondt with national threshold             
    2002  PR- D’Hondt with national threshold            
    2007  PR- D’Hondt with national threshold             
    2011  PR- D’Hondt with national threshold             
 
Source: Cop, 2011; Information about the 2011 election is added by the author. 
1
: The Hare quota was coupled with a 10 percent national threshold. Parties were required to get 
at least 10 percent of votes at national level in order to gain representation in parliament. 
2. The “quota” was an extra seat added to the ones already allocated to the district’s winner party 
by the d’Hondt system. 
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Table 3.5: Number of Parties, Number of Parties that Gained Seats, Number of Effective Parties 
by seats and by votes, 1950-2011 
 
Election Year   N. of Party N. of Party  NEP by votes   NEP by seats 
     Gaining Seats 
1950    3  3   2.2   1.3 
1954    4  3   2.1   1.1 
1957    4  4   2.4   1.7 
1961    4  4   3.4   3.2 
1965    6  6   2.7   2.6 
1969    8  8   3.3   2.3 
1973    8  7   4.3   3.3 
1977    8  2   3.1   1.2 
1983    3  3   2.8   2.5 
1987    7  3   4.1   2.1 
1991    6  5   4.6   3.6 
1995    12  5   6.1   4.4. 
1999    20  5   6.7   4.9 
2002    18  2   5.4   1.8 
2007    14  3   3.4   2.3 
2011    15  3   2.9   2.3 
 
Source: Cop, 2011; Turkish Statistical Institute election results from 1950-2011.Information 
about the NEP by votes and NEP by seats are added by the author. 
 
For Turkey, when the number of effective parties is examined, most interestingly, the 
results show that in the last three elections (2002, 2007 and 2011), the number of effective 
parties is very low in Turkey. There is an emergence of a two-party system in the parliament 
after 2002 election. What is the reason of this two-party system after 2002 election?  
First and the most important reason is the Turkish electoral system; proportional 
representation with multimember districts under d”Hondt formula and a 10 percent national 
threshold which is used for translation of the votes into the seats. In the 2002 election, the AKP 
got almost one-third of the vote (34.3 percent of the votes) and as a result won nearly two-thirds 
of the seats (363 out of 550) in the parliament. Also, CHP, the opposition party got only one-fifth 
of the votes (19.4 percent of the votes), but the party won one-third (178 out of 550) of the 
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parliamentary seats. On the other side, almost forty five percent of the popular votes were wasted 
because, these votes were shared by other parties that failed to pass the10 percent barrier. The 
electoral system clearly damages the proportionality of the party representation in the parliament 
and it works in favor of the AKP and CHP in terms of seats. And most importantly, the 10 
percent national threshold prevents the introduction of other parties to the parliament. For 
instance, if the threshold was 5 percent in 2002 election, five other parties-- DYP, MHP, GP, 
ANAP, and DEHAP-- would gain parliamentary representation in addition to the AKP and CHP. 
So, it is possible to argue that the main reason of the reduction in the number of parliamentary 
parties is the electoral system (Sayari, 2002).  
Second, the voters’ dissatisfaction with the most of the established parties was also 
effective in the change of party system in 2002. High levels of inflation rates, the financial crisis 
in 2001 negatively affected the credibility of the parties in the coalition government in 1990s. As 
a result, voters wanted to see a new fresh party in the politics (Sayari, 2002).  
3.3. Data and Examination  
Based on Mainwaring’s (1993) analysis, this study focuses on the effective number of 
parties in Turkey and compares it with those in other democracies that have presidential and 
parliamentary systems. Mainwaring (1993) compares the stable democracies from 1967 to 1992 
by using the Rae index of party fractionalization and the effective number of parties. Mainwaring 
(1993) argues that presidentialism and multi-party systems are a dangerous combination which 
may increase the gridlock between the executive-legislative and may increase the possibility of 
ideological polarization.  
Some changes are made to the Mainwaring’s (1993) analysis; first, the time period was 
extended from 1992 to 2010. As a result there have been some changes in status of democratic 
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states. For instance, Mainwaring (1993) evaluates Venezuela under presidential democracies; 
however, the status of Venezuela was changed by the military coup in 2001. For that reason, it 
was removed from the analysis. Second, the number of democracies has been increasing and the 
number of countries in the analysis is also increased from twenty five to twenty nine. Third, 
Turkey is added to the analysis. Fourth, the Least Square index (LSq) is also used in addition to 
the Rae index to clearly indicate the real disproportionality in elections.
5
 
Stable democracies, which are defined “on the basis of democratic longevity, more 
specifically, at least 30 years of uninterrupted democracy,” (Mainwaring, 1993: 4) are selected 
for the comparison. Democracy here is defined by three characteristics: First, there must be free, 
fair competitive elections. Second, there must be nearly universal adult suffrage and, third, there 
must be guarantees of traditional civil rights such as freedom of speech, freedom of organization, 
due process of law, etc. (Mainwaring, 1993:4). To ensure these criteria, the polity data set and 
Freedom House data set are both used. The data include the period of 1946 to 2010. The main 
point is to identify democracies that have had stable democracies for thirty years until 2010. 
Freedom House scores countries on a 1-7 scale for political rights and civil liberties, with the 
lower numbers indicating a greater degree of these key rights.” The main criterion is to 
determine the countries categorized as “free” (having free or with scores 3 or lower out of 7). 
There are some countries that meet the thirty years criteria, such as Greece (1967-2010), 
Mauritius (1968-2010), Spain (1978-2010), Botswana (1966-2010), Cyprus (1974-2010) and 
Portugal (1976-2010), which were not examined in Mainwaring’s analysis; these countries are 
also added to the analysis, bringing the number of countries in the analysis from twenty five to 
                                                          
5 The LSq is employed here because it is has been argued that the Rae index does not accurately 
estimate the real disproportionality if there are small parties in the election. The LSq estimates 
disproportionality for each election instead of for each party. Lijphart (1994) characterizes this index as 
“the most faithful reflection of disproportionality of election results” (Kalogirou & Panaretos, 1999:66). 
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twenty eight. Some countries became democracies after 1946, such as Israel (1948), but still the 
main criterion is to have at least 30 years of uninterrupted democracy until 2010.  These 
democracies are also included. It is also important to mention that Turkey does not meet the 
criteria of thirty years stability. Stable democracy in Turkey started in 1983, so there have been 
twenty seven years without interruption in democracy. It is important to show the possibility of 
multiparty structure with the presidential system in Turkey. For that reason, Turkey’s case is also 
evaluated and the number of democracies is thereby increased from twenty eight to twenty nine 
with the inclusion of Turkey. The list of stable democracies is provided in Table 3.6. 
Table 3.6: Stable Democracies, 1946-2010 
Parliamentary Systems Presidential Systems   Other Mixed Systems  
Australia (1946-2010) Botswana (1966-2010)  Finland (1946-2010) 
Austria (1946-2010)  Costa Rica (1946-2010)  France (1946-2010)  
Belgium (1946-2010)  Cyprus (1974-2010)   Portugal (1976-2010) 
Canada (1946-2010)  United States (1946-2010)  Switzerland (1946-2010) 
Denmark (1946-2010)      
Greece (1967-2010)  
India (1950-2010) 
Ireland (1946-2010) 
Israel (1948-2010) 
Italy (1946-2010) 
Jamaica (1959-2010) 
Japan (1946-2010) 
Mauritius (1968-2010)  
Netherlands (1946-2010) 
New Zealand (1946-2010) 
Norway (1946-2010) 
Spain (1978-2010)  
Sweden (1946-2010) 
Trinidad and Tobago (1962-2010) 
Turkey (1983-2010) 
United Kingdom (1946-2010) 
Source: The Political Instability Task Force (PITF), Polity IV Individual Country Regime 
Trends, 1946-2010; Freedom House, Freedom in the World; Lijphart, 1999; Przeworski et al. 
2000. *Freedom Ratings 1.00: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Ireland, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, Costa Rica, Cyprus, 
United States, Finland, France, Portugal, Switzerland *Freedom Ratings 1.5: Greece, Israel, 
Italy, Japan, and Mauritius *Freedom Ratings 2.0: Trinidad and Tobago *Freedom Ratings 2.5: 
India, Jamaica, and Botswana; *Freedom Ratings 3.0: Turkey 
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It is clearly seen that the number of stable presidential democracies is quite low compared 
to the number of stable parliamentary democracies. From the twenty nine countries that have 
been stable democracies, only four of them – Botswana, Costa Rica, Cyprus and the United 
States--have presidential system. Twenty of them have had parliamentary systems and four of 
them have had mixed systems.  
3.3.1. The Rae index of party fractionalization  
Three measures -- the Rae index of party fractionalization, the effective number of 
parties, and the Least Square index (LSq) -- are used for the comparison. The Rae index 
generates scores between zero and one, where zero indicates that all members of a country’s 
legislature came from the same party (i.e., no party fractionalization) and one means each and 
every representative come from a different party (maximum party fractionalization). Values are 
calculated by squaring each party’s shares of seats and subtracting the sum of all these squares 
from 1 (Rae 1967). The formula is: 
   N 
Fs = 1 – ∑ pi2 
  i=1 
In this formula, F represents index of fragmentation expressed in seats, N shows the 
number of parties, and pi determines the proportion of seats held by the ith party. If the number 
is low, it means that a few parties (probably one or two) get a large majority of seats. If the 
number is high, it shows that there are many parties that have seats (Rae 1967). Party 
fragmentation determines the number of parties in the system; if there are more parties the party 
system becomes more fragmented. Sartori (1976) classifies the party system into three main 
categories: (1) low fragmentation two-party systems, (2) medium fragmentation-limited pluralist 
systems with between three and five parties, and (3) highly fragmented extreme pluralist systems 
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with five parties or more (Sartori, 1976:196). The results of party fractionalizations are listed in 
Table 3.7 below.  
Table 3.7: Party Fractionalization in Stable Democracies 
DEMOCRACIES   PARTY FRACTIONALIZATIONS 
Parliamentary Democracies 
Australia      .565 
Austria      .556 
Belgium      .667    
Canada      .574      
Denmark      .755     
Greece       .570 
India       .487 
Ireland       .624 
Israel       .784 
Italy       .721 
Jamaica      .479 
Japan       .645 
Mauritius      .481 
Netherlands      .787 
New Zealand      .494 
Norway      .691 
Spain        .610 
Sweden      .685 
Trinidad and Tobago     .457 
Turkey       .461 
United Kingdom     .512 
 
Presidential Democracies 
Botswana      .181 
Colombia      .753 
Costa Rica      .541 
Cyprus       .720 
United States      .483  
 
Mixed Systems 
Finland      .716 
France       .620 
Portugal       .650 
Switzerland      .801 
 
Source: Sartori, 2005 
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3.3.2. The Effective number of parties  
The effective number of parties is used to count parties in a weighted fashion and also to 
measure their relative strength. It is used in the comparison of electoral systems in different 
countries (Lijphart, 1999).The effective number of parties is measured by squaring the each 
party’s share of seats or votes and adding all these squares and dividing 1.00 by this number 
(Laakso & Taagepera, 1979). The formula is: 
 
Ns =   _    1_    
n 
          ∑i=1 pi
2
 
   
 
 
In this measure, N represents the number of effective parties in seats; pi shows the 
fractional share of seats of the i-th party. If the number of seats is divided equally between two 
parties, the number of effective parties will be the same as the number of parties that have seats. 
If the majority of the seats are dominated by two parties, and the other third party has only fewer 
seats, the number of effective party will be some number between 2.0 and 3.0 (Laakso & 
Taagepera, 1979). 
3.3.3. The Least Square index  
Also, to clearly indicate the real disproportionality in elections, the Least Square index 
(LSq) is used in addition to the Rae index. The LSq is employed here because it is has been 
argued that the Rae index does not accurately estimate the real disproportionality if there are 
small parties in the election. A least square index is categorized between 0 to 100 and it is 
calculated by squaring the difference for vote-seat of each party, adding these values, dividing 
the sum by two and taking its square root (Gallagher, 1991:40): 
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It estimates disproportionality for each election instead of for each party. If there are only 
two parties, this index estimates exactly the same values as the Rae index. But if there are more 
than two parties, it calculates a medium value between these two measures. Lijphart (1994) 
characterizes this index as “the most faithful reflection of disproportionality of election results” 
(Kalogirou & Panaretos, 1999:66). The main difference from the Rae index is that the total 
amount of disproportionality is divided by the effective number of parties rather than by the 
actual number of parties in least square index which is an improvement in Rae index (Gallagher, 
1991). Disproportionality tends to be higher in pluralist/majoritarian systems which penalize 
small parties and reward large ones, and lowest for countries with PR system (Moser &Scheiner, 
2012:78). The number of effective parties and the result of Least Square index are provided in 
Tables 3.8, 3.9 and 3.10.  
Table 3.8: Number of Effective Parties and Disproportionality in Presidential Democracies 
 
Presidential Democracies Disproportionality    Number of Effective Parties  
    Btw votes and Seats   (Laakso/Taagepera Index)* 
    The least squares index (LSq)  
      Mean    Mean 
 
Botswana (1966-2010)        14.74    1.42 
Costa Rica (1946-2010)        5.16    2.66 
Cyprus (1974-2010)         2.00    3.71 
United States (1946-2010)        19.61    1.64 
 
Sources: Botswana: Carbone, 2007; Colombia: Cárdenas et al. 2006; Costa Rica, Cyprus and 
United States: Gallagher, 2014. 
* The ENP by seats are used in here.  
** Elections on which calculations are based: Botswana 1965-2009, Colombia 1974-2002, Costa 
Rica 1953-2010, Cyprus 2001-2011, USA 1948-2008 
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Table 3.9: Number of Effective Parties and Disproportionality in Parliamentary Democracies 
 
Parliamentary   Disproportionality   Number of Effective Parties  
Democracies   btw votes and Seats  (Laakso/Taagepera Index)
*
 
    The least squares index (LSq)  
Mean        Mean 
 
Australia (1946-2010)  9.14        2.50     
Austria (1946-2010)   2.49        2.71    
Belgium (1946-2010)   3.35        5.63     
Canada (1946-2010)   12.24        2.50     
Denmark (1946-2010)  1.71        4.57    
Greece (1967-2010)    8.46        2.43 
India (1950-2010)   6.18        5.76   
Ireland (1946-2010)   4.02       2.87 
Israel (1948-2010)   1.88       5.15 
Italy (1946-2010)   3.96        4.25 
Jamaica (1959-2010)   14.21       1.74 
Japan (1946-2010)   7.14       2.99 
Mauritius (1968-2010)   12.96       2.00 
Netherlands (1946-2010)   1.25       4.86   
New Zealand (1946-2010)  9.20       2.27 
Norway (1946-2010)   4.29       3.66 
Spain (1978-2010)    7.24       2.63 
Sweden (1946-2010)   2.01       3.52 
Trinidad and Tobago (1962-2010) 11.57      1.80   
Turkey (1983-2010)   11.76    4.77 
United Kingdom (1946-2010) 11.70        2.16   
 
Source: Gallagher, 2014 
* The ENP by seats are used in here. 
**Elections on which calculations are based: Australia 1946-2010, Austria 1949 - 2008, Belgium 
1946- 2010, Canada 1949- 2008, Denmark 1947-2007, Greece 1946-2009,  India 2004- 2010, 
Ireland 1948-2017, Israel 1949- 2009, Italy 1946- 2008, Jamaica 1949-2007, Japan 1946- 2009, 
Mauritius 2010, Netherlands 1946- 2010, New Zealand 1946- 2008, Norway 1949- 2009, Spain 
1977- 2008, Sweden 1948- 2010, Trinidad and Tobago 1961- 2010, United Kingdom 1950- 
2010.  
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Table 3.10: Number of Effective Parties and Disproportionality in Mixed Democracies 
 
Semi-presidential  Disproportionality    Number of Effective Parties  
    between votes and Seats  (Laakso/Taagepera Index)* 
    The least squares index (LSq)  
Mean     Mean 
 
Finland (1946-2010)     3.00     5.05 
France (1946-2010)    12.61     3.69 
Portugal (1976-2010)                           4.72     2.84 
Switzerland (1946-2010)    2.58     5.22 
 
Source: Gallagher, 2014. 
* The ENP by seats are used in here  
**Elections on which calculations are based: Finland 1948-2007, France 1946-2007, Portugal 
1975-2009, Switzerland 1947-2007.   
                                      
 
Party fragmentation in presidential democracies is lower than party fragmentation in 
parliamentary or mixed democracies, which indicates that the number of parties are lower in 
presidential system compared to parliamentary and mixed systems. It is important to clarify that, 
there is a strong correlations between voting rules and the party systems. Duverger (1954) argues 
that the election system goes a long way in determining the structure of the party system. 
According to the Duverger Law, plurality systems in single-member districts tend to create two-
party systems, while proportional systems tend to produce multi-party systems. In other word, 
because of the electoral system that they use in the elections, presidential systems are more likely 
to have two party systems. Two of presidential democracies (Botswana and United States) are 
under .500. On the other side, party fragmentation is very high in parliamentary democracies. 
Only, six out of twenty (India, Jamaica, Mauritius, New Zealand, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey) 
is under .500, and there are four (Denmark, Israel, Italy, Netherlands) very highly fragmented 
democracies over .700. For mixed regimes, the party fragmentation is also very high. Four of 
them are over .600.  
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The number of effective parties is also lower in presidential democracies compared to 
parliamentary and mixed democracies. Two out of four presidential democracies (Botswana and 
United States) have less than two effective parties and two (Colombia and Costa Rica) have less 
than three effective parties. For parliamentary democracies, there are only two cases (Jamaica, 
Trinidad and Tobago) out of twenty one that have less than two effective parties. Four of them 
(Netherlands, Turkey, Italy and Denmark) have more than four effective parties and three of 
them (Belgium, India and Israel) have more than five effective parties. Disproportionality 
between votes and seats is also very high in presidential democracies compared to parliamentary 
democracies and mixed democracies.  
3.4. Results and Conclusion 
The applicability of adopting a presidential system in Turkey by focusing on party 
structure is evaluated. Based on Mainwaring’s (1993) analysis, this chapter examines the 
effective number of parties and compares the set of stable democracies. In so doing, the Rae 
index of party fractionalization, the effective number of parties, and Least Square index are used. 
Stable democracies from 1946 to 2010 are determined for the comparison. Before explaining the 
results, it is important to clarify that there is not a relationship between the number of effective 
parties and democracy status of a country. In other words, having two or lower effective parties 
or more than two effective parties do not imply less democracy or high democracy.  
Within the population of stable democracies, the number of presidential systems is very 
low, while the number of parliamentary systems is significantly higher. From the list of twenty 
nine stable democracies, only four of them – Botswana, Costa Rica, Cyprus and the United 
States – have a presidential system. Twenty one of them have parliamentary systems and four of 
them have mixed systems. In addition, measures of the number of effective parties and party 
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fragmentation are very low in presidential democracies compared to parliamentary and mixed 
systems. Half of the presidential democracies have less than two effective parties. However, for 
parliamentary democracies, the numbers of effective parties are generally high (four and five in 
some cases) but of course there are some cases that have two effective parties. Disproportionality 
between votes and seats is also very high in presidential democracies when compared to 
parliamentary democracies and mixed democracies. 
This study provides important inferences for Turkey. First, from 1946 to 2010, 
parliamentary democracies seem to be more successful in sustaining democracy (four 
presidential, twenty one parliamentary democracies). Then when the party fragmentation and the 
number of effective parties are compared, it is seen that they are low in presidential systems 
compared to parliamentary systems or mixed systems. It does not imply less democracy or not, 
instead this shows that presidential systems are more likely to have two effective parties from 
these time periods. On the other hand, parliamentary systems are more likely to have more than 
two effective parties in generally. However, because of the Turkish complicated party structure, 
it is not easy to make a conclusion. Most interestingly, Turkish case provides a complicated party 
system for the examination. First, the multiparty system has been using since 1946 in Turkey. 
However, because of its election systems --proportional representation with multimember 
districts under d”Hondt formula and a 10 percent national threshold--, after 2002 election, a two-
party system was emerged in the parliament. The electoral system and specifically the 10 percent 
national threshold is the main reason of this emergence of a two-party system. But with this new 
structure, it is not proper to argue that Turkish party structure is not proper for presidentialism or 
parliamentarism. There are important indeed problems in the electoral system, such as 
representation problem and waste of nearly half of the votes because of the ten percent threshold.  
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CHAPTER 4: THE IMPACTS OF FORM OF GOVERNMENT FORMATION ON 
POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
4. 1. Introduction  
Does a form of government (parliamentarism-presidentialism) have an impact on 
economic growth and political development? Or how do these political institution matter and 
how do they affect economic and political development or government performance? For 
instance, if a country changes its governmental system from a parliamentary to presidential 
system, or vice-versa, what happens to its economic and government performance? In the 
political science literature, there is an agreement that “institutions matter” (Linz, 1990a: 51-69), 
but disagreement starts when the outcomes of specific institutional structure are analyzed 
(Tsebelis, 1995).  
Differences in institutions (such as systems of representation, arrangements for the 
division and supervision of powers, methods of organizing interests, and systems of election) 
create different outcomes for different policy areas. There is not a clear answer to the question 
“which institutions have which effects under which conditions” (Przeworski et al. 1996)? It is 
important to start with an explanation of political institutions. The term “political institution” is 
“a label that has been attached to a wide range of different phenomena from written 
constitutions, via organizations like political parties or trade unions, all the way to existing social 
norms” (Persson & Tabellini, 2003:17). This study is focused on the formal rules, specifically 
the forms of government (parliamentarism-presidentialism).  
The main stated motivation for some in Turkey who wish to adopt a presidential system 
is to improve economic, political, and social development. However, it is important to explore 
whether or not a presidential system does indeed create a better level of economic, political and 
social development and whether or not it is applicable to countries that have a certain level of 
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preexisting socio-economic development. For that reason, this chapter analyses theoretically and 
empirically different forms of government systems and their effects on three policy areas—
political, economic, and social development. Moreover, the main question is this: which 
government system is more appropriate to produce economic, political, and social development? 
The first aim is to show, in general, which system is better for economic and political 
development. Then, the second part of this chapter presents a comparison of Turkey with other 
states that have (or have tried) a presidential system by using social-economic and political 
variables. Section 2 discusses why different forms of government may matter for economic and 
political development. Section 3 presents the data, and section 4 focuses on the empirical 
analysis and results. Then, section 5 presents a comparison of Turkey with other states and a 
conclusion is presented in the last part.  
4. 2. Literature Review and Arguments 
 
In the literature, the political consequences of government formation, such as regime 
stability and nature of the party system, have been intensively studied. Recently, however, a 
large number of studies have started to focus on the relations between political institutions and 
different policy areas (Persson & Tabellini, 2003-2004a). The effects of government formation 
on economic and political development are explained, in order, in the following section. 
4.2.1. Form of Government and Economic Growth 
 
There are two main differences between presidential and parliamentary systems, 
separation of power and confidence requirements. These main differences have various effects 
on economic development. First, why should separation of powers be important for economic 
policy? The general idea is that checks and balances between different offices prevent politicians 
from abusing their power. Because parliamentary systems fuse the executive and legislative 
powers of the state, office holders in parliamentary systems have greater concentration of powers 
79 
 
and sometimes can misuse this power for their personal or political interests. However, in 
presidential regimes, the existing of strong checks and balances decreases the potential for abuse 
of power (Persson & Tabellini, 2003). This separation of power between the executive and 
legislative branches in presidential systems increases the possibility of credible political 
commitments (Keefer & Stasavage, 2003) and facilitates the transmission of information to the 
public about the political process (Persson et al., 1997). This can increase political accountability 
and may increase economic growth (Benhabib & Przeworski, 2005). Political accountability is 
important for economic growth (Ferejohn, 1986; Benhabib and Przeworski, 2005). If political 
accountability is high, citizens may vote based on the politicians’ performance. For that reason, 
politicians must show extra effort and work to generate stronger economic performance (Powell 
&Whitten, 1993). On the other hand, if different parties control the legislature and the executive, 
it may result in gridlock. Under this situation, it may be hard to pass or enhance economic 
reforms (Knutsen, 2011).  
Second, another important difference between presidential and parliamentary 
democracies is the implementation of a confidence requirement. This rule does not apply to 
presidential regimes and the executive may have power without majority support in the 
legislature. For that reason, politicians in presidential regimes are more focused on targeted 
programs instead of broad government programs. However, in parliamentary regimes, the 
existence of cabinet confidence procedures improves party discipline and high party discipline 
results in public spending on broad national programs instead of narrow region-specific 
programs (Gerring et al., 2009; Persson & Tabellini, 2003-2004a).  
It is argued that parliamentarism creates better governance and, as a result, it enhances 
economic policies. One of the reasons behind this claim is that parliamentarism solves the 
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political coordination problem better than presidential systems, since it “institutionalizes debate 
and negotiations, and reduces the number of veto players” (Gerring et al. 2009: 354–355). In 
general, Gerring et al. (2009) argue that parliamentarism creates better economic growth, 
superior bureaucratic quality, a better investment environment, and longer life expectancy than 
presidentialism. Also, Persson (2005) finds that reform towards parliamentary democracy may 
generate higher economic growth by increasing property rights and trade openness, as opposed to 
reforms in a presidential democracy (but the results are not robust). Particularly, Persson & 
Tabellini (2003) show that “a constitutional reform from parliamentary to presidential regime 
would shrink the size of overall spending by about 5% of GDP, and the size of welfare programs 
by about 2% of GDP” (150). 
Compared to parliamentary systems, presidential systems and plurality-majoritarian 
systems are more likely to have created smaller governments, lower tax rates, less public 
spending, and they concentrate on targeted, narrow-based programs (Acemoglu, 2005; Gabel & 
Hix, 2005; Persson et al., 2000; Persson & Tabellini, 2003). They also create less rent extraction 
than parliamentary regimes (Persson & Tabellini, 2003). In addition, these constitutional rules 
are also effective in spurring economic growth by systematically affecting governments’ 
economic policies (Persson & Tabellini, 2003; Rodrik, 1996) and countries’ economic 
institutions (North, 1990; Acemoglu et al., 2001; Persson, 2005). However, it is not entirely clear 
which specific types of constitutional structure increase economic growth.  
Although some studies show that proportional representation system and parliamentarism 
have a positive effect on growth, there is not a consensus in the literature. For instance, there are 
some studies that find that there is not a robust relationship between either parliamentarism or 
presidentialism and economic growth (Knutsen, 2011). However, some studies find that the 
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method of government formation does affect economic development (Knack & Keefer, 1995; 
Kaufmann et al.2000; Mauro, 1995; Persson & Tabellini, 2003-2004a; Persson, 2005). 
Institutions affect economic growth by shaping the incentives to accumulate, innovate and 
accommodate change. For instance, Alesina (1998) shows that institutional quality, as measured 
by bureaucratic efficiency, absence of corruption, protection of property rights, and the rule of 
law, is important for growth.  
However, it appears there is a consensus in the literature pointing to the importance of 
electoral rules. The general idea is that PR and semi-PR electoral rules are more likely to create 
higher growth rates than plurality-majoritarian rules (Knutsen, 2011). Lizzeri and Persico (2001), 
Persson and Tabellini (2000-2003-2004a) and Milesi-Ferretti, et al. (2002) examine the effects of 
election system on government expenditure. Their conclusion is that to a degree greater than 
proportional electoral systems, majoritarian systems create smaller governmental expenditure, 
smaller welfare programs, and focus on targeted programs.  
4. 2.2. Form of Government and Political and Social Development 
 
Gerring, et al., (2009) argue that corruption, government effectiveness, bureaucratic 
quality, political stability, and rule of law represent key indicators of political development and 
for all these indicators except corruption, high scores produce better governance for political 
development. But what is good government? Different definitions are used by different 
organizations. The World Bank defines good governance as “sound development management” 
encompassing public sector management, accountability, the legal framework for development 
and information and transparency” (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2004, 3). The UN 
Secretary-General claims that good governance aims at “ensuring respect for human rights and 
the rule of law; strengthening democracy; promoting transparency and capacity in public 
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administration.” The UNDP explains governance as “the exercise of economic, political, and 
administrative authority to manage a country’s affairs at all levels. It comprises mechanisms, 
processes and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise 
their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences” (Avellaneda, 2010:7). 
These definitions of good governance generally imply the legitimacy of authority, public 
responsiveness and public accountability of government (Samarasinghe, 1994). 
Przeworski et al. (1996) evaluate the stability of alternative institutional arrangements, 
focusing specifically on parliamentarism, presidentialism and mixed systems from 1950 to 1990.  
They find that only one in eight mixed system collapsed during this period; fourteen of fifty 
parliamentary systems and twenty-four of forty-six presidential systems died. “The probability 
that a democracy would die under presidentialism during that time period was 0.049; the 
comparable probability under parliamentarism was 0.014, in other words, democracy’s life 
expectancy under presidentialism is less than 20 years, while under parliamentarism it is 71 
years” (Przeworski et al. 1996:7). They argue that being in Latin America is not one of the 
reasons behind the short lifespans of presidential systems. The life of presidential systems 
changes according to the level of development, economic growth, and presence of legislative 
majorities (Przeworski et al. 1996).  
Similarly, Cheibub (2002) compares presidential and parliamentary democracies between 
1950 and 1990 and argues that parliamentary democracies are more likely to survive than 
presidential democracies. He shows that in these given years “the probability that a 
parliamentary democracy would die in any given year was 0.0138, corresponding to an expected 
life of 73 years; the probability that a presidential democracy would die was 0.0477, 
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corresponding to an expected life equal to 21 years” (284). The country’s economic performance 
and its military legacy are in Cheibub’s analysis the main reasons for these differences.  
The other important difference for forms of government and political development is the 
accountability. Shugart and Carey (1992) claim that the separation of powers in presidential 
systems may create different forms of representation and accountability than in parliamentary 
systems. The separation of power between the executive and legislative in presidential system 
increases the possibility of credible political commitments (Keefer & Stasavage, 2003) and 
facilitates the transmission of information to the public about the political process (Persson et al., 
1997). As a result, it increases political accountability (Benhabib and Przeworski, 2005). In 
general the idea is that presidential systems are more accountable than parliamentary systems.  
Also, the nature of the executive creates differences in different policy areas. Gerring et 
al. (2009) argue that parliamentary systems provide better results in policy than presidential 
systems and are more strongly correlated with good governance. Specifically in economic and 
human development areas “parliamentary systems are associated with superior governance” 
(Gerring et al. 2009: 28). The reasons why parliamentarism may provide better governance 
include “a) stronger political parties, b) corporatist interest organization, c) tighter principal-
agent relationships within the various arms of the bureaucracy, d) centralized (national-level) 
electoral accountability, e) the capacity for flexible policymaking, f) a more institutionalized 
political sphere, and g) decisive leadership” (Gerring et al. 2009: 28). Some also argue that 
parliamentary systems have positive effects on the quality and performance of the government. 
Particularly, “a parliamentary system with inclusive electoral rules makes possible the 
coexistence of multipartism with fair representation, socially efficient outcomes and relatively 
effective government”(Colomer & Negretto, 2005: 74-75). On the other hand, because of the 
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separate elections and divided powers, presidential systems decrease the quality and performance 
of government. Moreover, Schmidt (2002) claims that “presidential government performs less 
well than parliamentary government in policy areas” (154).   
Gerring, et al., (2009) argue that corruption, government effectiveness, bureaucratic 
quality, political stability, and rule of law represent political development and for all these 
indicators except corruption, high scores produce better governance for political development. 
But what is good government? Different definitions are used by different organizations. The 
World Bank defines good governance as “sound development management” encompassing 
public sector management, accountability, the legal framework for development and, information 
and transparency” (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2004, 3). The UN Secretary-General claims 
that good governance is “ensuring respect for human rights and the rule of law; strengthening 
democracy; promoting transparency and capacity in public administration.” The UNDP explains 
governance as “the exercise of economic, political, and administrative authority to manage a 
country’s affairs at all levels. It comprises mechanisms, processes and institutions through which 
citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and 
mediate their differences” (Avellaneda, 2010:7). These definitions of good governance generally 
imply the legitimacy of authority, public responsiveness and public accountability of government 
(Samarasinghe, 1994). 
Przeworski et al. (1996) evaluate the stability of alternative institutional arrangements 
specifically parliamentarism, presidentialism and mixed system from 1950 to 1990 and find that 
only one mixed system died  among eight cases; fourteen parliamentary systems died under fifty 
cases and twenty-four presidential systems died under forty-six cases. “The probability that a 
democracy would die under presidentialism during that time period was 0.049; the comparable 
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probability under parliamentarism was 0.014, in other words, democracy’s life expectancy under 
presidentialism is less than 20 years, while under parliamentarism it is 71 years” (Przeworski et 
al. 1996:7). They argue that being in Latin America is not one of the reasons of short-living for 
presidential systems. The life of presidential systems changes according to the level of 
development, economic growth and presence of legislative majorities (Przeworski et al. 1996).  
Similarly, Cheibub (2002) compares presidential and parliamentary democracies between 
1950 and 1990 and argues that parliamentary democracies are more likely to survive than 
presidential democracies. Cheibub (2002) shows that in these given years “the probability that a 
parliamentary democracy would die in any given year was 0.0138, corresponding to an expected 
life of 73 years; the probability that a presidential democracy would die was 0.0477, 
corresponding to an expected life equal to 21 years” (284). The country’s economic performance 
and its military legacy are the main reasons of these differences.  
The other important difference for forms of government and political development is the 
accountability. Shugart and Carey (1992) claim that the separation of powers may create 
different forms of representation and accountability than parliamentary systems. The separation 
of power between the executive and legislative in presidential system increase the possibility of 
credible political commitments (Keefer & Stasavage, 2003) and facilitate transformation of 
information to the public about the political process (Persson et al., 1997), as a result these 
increase political accountability (Benhabib and Przeworski, 2005). In general the idea is that 
presidential system is better in accountability than parliamentary system.  
Also, the nature of the executive creates differences in different policy areas. Gerring et 
al. (2009) argue that parliamentary systems provide better results in policy areas than presidential 
systems and it is more strongly correlated with good governance. Specifically in economic and 
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human development areas, “parliamentary systems are associated with superior governance” 
(Gerring et al. 2009: 28). The reasons why parliamentarism may provide better governance 
include “a) stronger political parties, b) corporatist interest organization, c) tighter principal-
agent relationships within the various arms of the bureaucracy, d) centralized (national-level) 
electoral accountability, e) the capacity for flexible policymaking, f) a more institutionalized 
political sphere, and g) decisive leadership” (Gerring et al. 2009: 28). Some also argue that a 
parliamentary system has positive effects on the quality and performance of the government. 
Particularly, “a parliamentary system with inclusive electoral rules makes possible the 
coexistence of multipartism with fair representation, socially efficient outcomes and relatively 
effective government”. (Colomer & Negretto, 2005: 74-75). On the other hand, because of the 
separate elections and divided powers, a presidential system decreases the quality and 
performance of government. Moreover, Schmidt (2002) claims that “presidential government 
performs less well than parliamentary government in policy areas” (154).   
On the other hand, Shugart & Carey (1992) evaluate the form of government and 
government performance and argue that the high number of veto players and diffusion of power 
in government branches does not cause the instability or poor governance for presidential 
regimes. They argue instead that there are other institutional factors (such as “the timing of 
elections, the legislative authority of the executive and representative apportionment in the 
legislature”) that can have a negative impact in the context of a presidential system and produce 
poor governance (Shugart & Carey, 1992). In response, Gerring et al. (2009) claim that 
parliamentary systems create effective governance because of the unity and centralization of the 
lawmaking process and that this results in better performance than presidential systems (with 
their diffusion of power in different branches of government). 
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Political institutions affect social development through redistribution and public interest. 
Hristakopoulos, (2011) argues that political institutions affect human development, and 
specifically that parliamentary governments perform better than presidential ones in social 
development. Similarly, Gerring and Thacker (2001) evaluate the impact of political institutions 
on social development. They find that proportional electoral systems and parliamentary systems 
increase social development. Also, Gerring et al. (2009) argue that parliamentarism is related to 
better governance, as measured by indicators of political, economic, and human development 
(such as GDP per capita, and infant mortality).  
In theory, it is argued that a parliamentary government is better in representation, 
protection of minority rights and voter participation (Lijphart 1992; Linz 1990a, 1990b; Linz & 
Valenzuela 1994). However, cases studies show that there is a more complex relationship 
between political performance and form of government. There is not a clear distinction between 
these forms, because there are many different factors that affect the political performance for 
each form (Schmidt, 2002). In other words, in the literature there is not a consensus about the 
effects of forms of government on political developments, some in favor of parliamentary 
regimes while some support presidential ones.    
4. 3. Data and Methodological Issues 
 
4. 3.1. Data and Variables 
 
To examine these questions, I utilize two data sets. The first data come from the Quality 
of Government (QoG) 2015 Standard time-series dataset which contains data from 1946 to 2014. 
The unit of analysis in the data set is country-year (such as Spain 1946, Spain 1947). However, 
because of the variation in data availability (there are some missing data before 1975), I evaluate 
the years from 1975 to 2012. The second source of data, which is used for the country 
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comparisons, comes from Cheibub (2007). It covers 199 countries, from 1946 to 2002. Both data 
sets include different variables about type of government system, elections, electoral rules, 
economic, political and social development and general descriptive characteristics like 
population, region, religion, GDP.  
4. 3.1.1. Dependent Variables 
In the current analysis, I seek to evaluate the effects of government systems on three 
policy areas; for that reason, different dependent variables for each policy areas are examined. 
4. 3.1.1.1. Political Development. There are different indicators for political 
development, such as government effectiveness, corruption control, political stability, and rule of 
law (Gering et al., 2009). In addition to these variables, government accountability is also 
evaluated. For all these variables, high scores reflect better political development. Corruption 
control measures “perceptions of corruption,” which is defined as the abuse of public power for 
private gain. Corruption is measured by different sources, ranging from “the frequency of 
additional payments to get things done, to the effects of corruption on the business environment, 
to measuring grand corruption in the political arena or in the tendency of elite forms to engage in 
state capture” (QoG: 98). Government effectiveness combines “into single grouping responses 
on the quality of public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil 
servants, the independence of the civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of the 
government's commitment to policies” (QoG: 99). The general idea is to present how 
governments are able to produce and implement good policies and deliver public good (QoG: 
99). Political stability indicates the continuity of the government without any unconstitutional 
and/or violent destruction, including domestic violence and terrorism. Rule of Law includes 
several indicators, such as “perceptions of the incidence of crime, the effectiveness and 
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predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts. Together, these indicators 
measure the success of a society in developing an environment in which fair and predictable 
rules form the basis for economic and social interactions and the extent to which property rights 
are protected” (QoG: 100). The Accountability and Voice variable includes “a number of 
indicators measuring various aspects of the political process, civil liberties and political rights. 
These indicators measure the extent to which citizens of a country are able to participate in the 
selection of governments. This category also includes indicators measuring the independence of 
the media, which serves an important role in monitoring those in authority and holding them 
accountable for their actions” (QoG: 101). 
4. 3.1.1.2. Economic development. Economic development indicators include the 
number of telephone mainlines, import duties, trade policy, GDP per capita, and investment 
climate (Gering et al., 2009). For the current analysis, most of these indicators except investment 
climate are used. Telephone line per 100 people is an important indicator of economic 
infrastructure and communication (QoG: 116). Trade rate is measure by the sum of export and 
import rates as a share of gross domestic product. The Export and Import rates variable is 
defined as the total exports and import of goods and services (QoG: 116). In addition, the level 
of economic prosperity is identified with real per capita GDP (QoG: 60).  For these variables, if 
the values are higher, it indicates better economic governance.  
4. 3.1.1.3. Social development. Some of the social development indicators include 
the infant mortality rate, life expectancy, and literacy rates (Gering et al., 2009). The infant 
mortality rate per 1000 people is important to show the health and quality of life of the country. 
Life expectancy presents the number of years, on average, that a newborn infant will probably 
live. Literacy rates indicate that the population that is able to read and write in its native language 
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(QoG: 60). For life expectancy and literacy rates, higher scores and for infant mortality rates 
lower scores shows better social development. 
4. 3.1.2. Independent variables 
The most important independent variable is the institutional profile of the political 
system. For the classification of presidential and parliamentary systems, first the election of the 
president is evaluated. If there is a prime minister and president, different factors such as the 
degree of separation between the president and parliament and the power of the two players are 
considered. As a result, the political system variable is coded as 0=Presidential, 1=Semi-
Presidential, 2=Parliamentary. 
In addition, the model includes several control variables. In the literature, many political, 
economic, geographic, demographic, and cultural factors are indicated as useful control 
variables, but it is not possible to consider all of them in the current analysis because of the lack 
of data availability. Still, some of these standard control variables are included. Level of 
economic development (GDP), the democratic history of each country, ethnic (and linguistic) 
fractionalization, and a large population are more likely to have negative impacts on political, 
economic, and social development. The geographic location of the country is also important. 
Being located in Africa, Latin America/Caribbean, and Middle East is expected to have a 
negative impact. The legal origin, specifically a British legal origin, has a positive impact on 
political development while other colonial origins are expected to have a negative impact on 
political developments (LaPorta et al. 1999). The latitude scaled indicates the distance of 
countries from the equator and it is expected to be positively related with political and economic 
development (LaPorta et al. 1999). Oil production in million barrels and gas production in metric 
tons, produce wealth and revenue, but the expectations for these are not certain. In addition, 
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religion (Protestant, Muslim and Catholic heritage) has an impact. The expectation in the 
literature is that a Protestant heritage may have a positive effect on state capacity (Gerring & 
Thacker, 2004), while a large Muslim population may have a negative effect on political and 
social development (Moon, 1991). All variables are explained in Appendix1.  
4.4. Empirical Analysis and Results 
4.4.1. Empirical Analysis 
 
In the Quality of the Government data set, country number is larger than time variable. 
For that reason, it is not time dependent; instead, it is important to deal with the unit effects. Unit 
heterogeneity stipulates that differences in units, such as states or countries, are not explained by 
the independent variables (Wilson & Butler, 2007). To learn whether or not the series has a unit 
root, and to get more information, the Dickey-Fuller test is used and the result is presented in 
Table 4.1. The Dickey-Fuller test is one of the most commonly use tests for stationarity. The null 
hypothesis is that the series has a unit root (not stationary).                                       
Table 4.1: Dickey-Fuller Test for Unit Root                 
 
Interpolated Dickey-Fuller 
                  Test           1% Critical        5% Critical       10% Critical 
               Statistic               Value                   Value                          Value 
 
Z(t)            -69.515               -3.430                  -2.860             -2.570 
 
*MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0000 
* *Number of observation: 5055                                       
 
 
 
According to Table 4.1, the test statistic shows that the political institution series do not 
have a unit root. The test statistic (-69.515) is smaller than the critical values and, therefore, we 
can reject the null hypothesis of unit root. The series does not have unit root or, in other words, it 
is stationary.  
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If the unit effect is solved, then the correlated error issues are matters of concern. There 
are two correlated errors: time-serial autocorrelation and contemporaneous correlation. In other 
words, observations of the dependent variable may not be independent of each other. 
Specifically, a particular observation can be related with a previous observation and this might 
lead to either autocorrelation or serial correlation in the error term (Monogan, 2010). Breush-
Godfrey and Durbin-Watson techniques are used to test for serial correlation. The null 
hypothesis in both tests is that there is no serial correlation. To show whether there is any auto-
correlation or not, I use both Breush-Godfrey and Durbin-Watson tests and the results are 
showed in Tables 4.2 and 4.3. Both tables show that there is not any auto-correlation. 
Table 4.2: Durbin’s Alternative Test for Autocorrelation 
 
lags(p)           chi2                df                 Prob > chi2 
 
1               1.974                1                   0.1600 
 
* H0: no serial correlation 
                                      
Table 4.3: Breusch-Godfrey LM Test for Autocorrelation 
lags(p)           chi2                df                 Prob > chi2 
 
       1            1.990                1                   0.1584 
 
* H0: no serial correlation 
                                      
Then, to show whether or not there exists a collinearity problem, the Tolerance and VIF 
test is used and the result is presented in Table 4.4. According to this test, if a VIF (Variance 
Inflation Factor) values exceed a value of 10, it is accepted as the good indicator that collinearity 
is a problem. From Table 4.4, it is seen that all VIF values are much smaller than 10. Clearly 
there is not a collinearity problem. 
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Table 4.4: The Tolerance and VIF test 
Variable        VIF        1/VIF   
Political system L1.      1.02     0.979974 
Year                 1.02     0.979974 
Mean VIF       1.02 
 
 
For time series data sets, the use of OLS models is not proper because of the time and 
unit variance (Beck & Katz, 1995). For the unit effects, three models (Fixed Effect, Random 
Effect, and Lag Dependent Variable) are used. Political scientists generally use fixed effects (FE) 
and random effects (RE) models to examine the unobserved heterogeneity in time series data 
sets. Each model provides different interpretations. Generally, fixed effect models are more 
common than random effects models (Wilson & Butler, 2007).  In addition, if there are not 
serious issues or problems in the data set, a GLS-ARMA model can be used.  
For political development, I use both fixed effects and random effects models. For each 
Random effect model, I use the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test which shows the 
applicability of random effects. If the results show that a random effect model is suitable, then 
random effect models are used (such as in Control Corruption, Government Effectiveness and 
Political Stability variables). For rule of law and voice and accountability variables, a random 
effects model is not suitable based on Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test, so only 
fixed effects models results are presented. Then, the GLS-ARMA model is used to show a 
comparison between models. The results are shown in Figure 4.1.  
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Political Development      Control of    Government            Political 
      Corruption             Effectiveness                        Stability   
Model Estimator      RE            FE      RE          FE          RE   FE     
Parliamentarism     .246***        .223***        .249***   .232***    .238***     .230*** 
Semi          .074             .061***         .109         .104                     -.107       -.110 
Presidentialism 
Population        -5.30***       -4.44**      -4.30       5.36    -1.12***    -1.08***     
GDP per capita       .0003***      .0003***      .0003***   .0003***   .0002         .0002***   
Region          .026**         -.017             .035***      .031***            -.012       -.016 
Regime Durability  .009***       .009***        .005***      .004***             .004***     .003***  
Institutionalized      .005***       .006***         .008***      .008***   .011***     .011***  
Democracy      
Ethnic               -.024         -.0.04             -.150       -.130  .088       .105  
Fractionalization  
Western Colonial   .052***     .057***          014          .018*                .067***     .070***  
Origin    
Legal Origin         - 0.56**      -.055**      -.098***  -.097*** .116 .117***     
Latitude         1.41***       1.33***      1.33***     1.26***            1.33*** 1.928***  
Muslim        -.004***     -.003***   -.003***    -.003***  -.006*** -.006***  
Other Religion        -.002***     -.001***   -.001***   -.001**    -.008      -.001         
Oil Production        -2.48***      -2.67***    -1.75***   -1.88**    -2.89*** -2.99*** 
per capita 
Party           .082       .056               .115     .102  -.254*** -.276*** 
Fractionalization 
Plurality System      -.112**     -.109**                 -.004 -.001  -.079       -.078 
Proportional E. S.     .037         .053        .     117** .131***     -.128** -.118*** 
Constant          -1.048***  -1.08***             -.879***  -.911*** -.992***  -1.01*** 
(Presidentialism)          
Observations              1656      1656                1695           1695     1697       1972  
Sample Period      1996-2012         1996-2012           1996-2012 
R2 within   0.7568   0.7579                0.7556      0.7564       0.5613   0.5251 
R2 between   0.6887   0.7075                0.7250     0.7409       0.2769   0.3274 
R2 overall   0.7431   0.7420                0.7449     0.7441       0.5545   0.5193 
F   282.55              304.09          153.60 
Prob> F     0.000         0.000          0.000 
  
*** prob. <0.01 ** prob. <0.05 * prob. <0.10 
 
Figure 4.1: Political Development  
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(Figure 4.1 continued)  
Political  Development  Rule of  Law    Voice and Accountability      
Model Estimator     FE              GLS              FE                 GLS 
Parliamentarism    .209 ***        .225**                .294 ***            .306 *** 
Semi 
Presidentialism     .049  .054*  -.095  -.092 
Population       1.66 1.12  3.10  2.78 
GDP per capita     .00003*** 2.04  .00001*** .00001*** 
Region        .021* .026**  .046***  .049*** 
Regime Durability .006*** .006***  .002***  .002*** 
Institutionalized     .008***        .008***             .009***  .009*** 
Democracy     
Ethnic                -.102 -.124  .062  .048 
Fractionalization  
Western Colonial   .038*** .034***  .002  .0009   
Legal Origin       -.081*** -.082*** -.162 *** -.162 *** 
Latitude        1.39*** 1.46***  1.73 **  1.78 *** 
Muslim       -.002*** -.002*** -.010*** -.010*** 
Other Religion       -.006 -.0009  -.004*** -.005*** 
Oil Production       -3.02*** -2.88*** -1.94 *** -1.85 *** 
per capita 
Party          .046  .064  .182***  .189*** 
Fractionalization 
Plurality System    -.067 -.070  -.058  -.061 
Proportional E. S   .022 .008  .225***  .215*** 
Constant        -1.04*** -1.01*** -.524 *** -.500 *** 
(Presidentialism)    
Observations        1697 1697  1697  1930 
Sample Period     1996-2012                        1996-2012 
R2 within       0.7689   0.7322 
R2 between       0.6987   0.3450 
R2 overall       0.7560   0.7261 
F       326.25     268.17 
Prob> F          0.0000   0.0000 
  
*** prob. <0.01 ** prob. <0.05 * prob. <0.10 
 
For economic development, I use both fixed effects and random effects models. For each 
Random effect model, I use the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test. The results show 
that the random effect is suitable in GDP and Import model. In addition, to show which model 
(random effect or fixed effect model) is better, the Hausman test is used and in some cases the 
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results shows that fixed effect model is better. For that reason, the fixed effect model is used in 
Telephone lines, Trade and Export model. Then, again, GLS-ARMA model is used to show a 
comparison between models. All results are presented in Figure 4.2.  
Economic         Telephone  Trade           GDP          Export       Import 
Development    Lines    
Model Estimator     FE          GLS   FE     GLS       RE      FE        FE       GLS   RE         FE 
Parliamentarism      3.83***     3.40***     20.4 ***    19.3 *** 311*** 391 ***    347**   486 **      408     201 
Semi           1.58**      1.22   14.7 ***   13.8***   -126      -96.2         406       435         148    107 
Presidentialism  
Population         -1.16***   -1.13***    -8.97*** -8.60***   -.0001*** -.0001***.002***.003***    003***.002** 
GDP per capita        .0006***   .0006*** .0018*** .0020***       ---        --        .974    4.56***       5.24*** .264 
Region           .410***   .385***  .191    -.137       195       377***    115 ***  -675 **    -108*  142*** 
Regime Durability  .136***     .132***  -.364***  -.387***   130 ***125***     281     -13.7        -172     -120 
Institutionalized       .019          .012            -.006     -.024       11.0       17.0        -496     -557        -175    -36.1 
Democracy     
Ethnic                 -3.81***   -3.73***     10.3*    12.9**       -181**    -327*** -889*** -919 **  -239   -208  
Fractionalization  
Western Colonial    -1.11***  -1.10***   .512   .743       -327    -481***      -403      361        899   -250  
Legal Origin           1.06***    1.05***  -4.72 *** -4.45***    747***   457**    -240 ** -215***    -144 ** -184 *** 
Latitude                     19.6***    19.8***      -23.7***  -24.6***   905***   833***  292 ** 352***     362***  265 *** 
Oil Production         -6.06        -6.35  -2.01***  -2.29**      .0003***0004*** -.001***-.001*** -.002*** -.001*** 
per capita 
Gas Production       .0009        . 0008 -      . .012***  .015***    -1.61**  -2.95***  116 ***  114***   236*** 233*** 
Per capita 
Party           1.53** 2.05***   4.09         3.67       286*** 207***     268***  228         -482   -119 
Fractionalization 
Plurality System     .468   .516          -8.47*** -8.31***   323          43.0      429*** 338***     222 355***  
Proportional E. S    2.22***       2.05         -13.5*** -13.5***   988*         815       -458*** -535*** -726*** -609***  
Constant         -.572           -.394         92.4 ***   91.2 ***   -774        421        -840  -130**       -130  -599 
(Presidentialism)    
 
Observations           3457               3406          3478          5570  5570 
Sample Period  1975-2012 1975-2012     1975-2011          1975-2012       1975-2012  
R2 within       0.8282          0.2292     0.5752  0.5832        0.9273      0.9154   0.9443 
R2 between       0.0467        0.8270     0.4489 0.5608         0.4664  0.6198   0.4683 
R2 overall       0.8202        0.2401     0.5140 0.5065          0.8244  0.9007   0.8118 
F      1025.84        62.31  319.54            400.81  533.43 
Prob> F         0.0000        0.0000  0.0000           0.0000  0.0000 
  
*** prob. <0.01 ** prob. <0.05 * prob. <0.10 
Figure 4.2: Economic Development 
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For consideration of social development, again both fixed effects and random effects 
models are used. However, the results for both models started to give very similar results, and for 
that reason only fixed effect models are presented. Then, again, the GLS-ARMA model is used 
to show a comparison between models. Results are showed in Figure 4.3.  
Social        Total Fertility        Life            Literacy    
Development         Rate              Expectancy              Rate       
Model Estimator    FE GLS         FE GLS        FE          GLS  
Parliamentarism        -2.79***      -2.42***       1.17***  .888**            2.12          1.85 
Semi             -.926   -.824.          1.38*** 1.22**          6.37           4.45 
Presidentialism  
Population             4.64***    2.57*          -5.62***  -5.02***        -1.28        -1.50 
GDP per capita          .0007***  -.0002***      .0002*** .0002***       .0005*** .0005*** 
Region             -.981***   .136          -.033 -.068        -.860         -.746*** 
Regime Durability    .009    .006          .040***  .037***         .114            .124         
Institutionalized         .044*    .068***        .062***   .062 ***       .161           .128 
Democracy     
Ethnic                    2.89    3.50***       -12.0*** -11.7***         -21.1***   -19.3*** 
Fractionalization  
Western Colonial      -1.33***      -1.03***       -1.21*** -1.17***         -4.03*** -4.32           
Legal Origin            .266    .187          -.404**   -.391**         -.170 .262 
Latitude             -26.4***        -19.8***     -1.75  -2.07          -16.9 -21.6** 
Oil Production             8.10     1.49           2.68***   2.33***          4.19   3.71 
per capita 
Gas Production           -.001   -.0009            -.002***  -.003***         -.001           .0005 
Per capita 
Party             -.557   -.039              3.08***       3.07***           4.37          3.80 
Fractionalization 
Plurality System       -3.29***   -3.04***       .810**         .844**            -2.34         -1.48   
Proportional E. S      -1.49**   -1.39*           1.29***        1.32***         -2.10         -1.20 
Constant            30.0***     25.5***       71.8***    71.6***       105***     103 *** 
(Presidentialism)      
 
Observations    1075      3478   488   
Sample Period      1975-2012    1975-2012  1975-2012 
R2 within       0.5343    0.6372              0.5389    
R2 between       0.2431   0.4183                     0.6068   
R2 overall       0.3666      0.6344              0.5453   
F       65.77    375.94              23.45     
Prob> F          0.0000    0.0000              0.0000    
            
*** prob. <0.01 ** prob. <0.05 * prob. <0.10 
Figure 4.3: Social Development 
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4.4.2. Results 
Figure 4.1 presents the results of different tests of the relationship between 
presidentialism, parliamentarism, semi-presidentialism, and political development. In every case, 
the model fit is good with F values significant at better than the 0.0001 level and R
2
 overall 
ranging from 0.27 to 0.76.  
Parliamentarism appears to be associated with better political development than 
presidentialism, even though some relationships are not significant across all dependent 
variables. Parliamentarism is strongly correlated with corruption control in both models (RE and 
FE), but both presidentialism is negatively related to corruption control in both models (RE and 
FE). There is also a significant positive relationship between semi-presidentialism and corruption 
control in FE model.  
Parliamentarism is strongly and positively associated with both government effectiveness 
and political stability in both models (RE and FE). However, presidentialism is negatively 
associated with government effectiveness and political stability in both models (RE and FE). On 
the other hand, semi-presidentialism is positively related with government effectiveness and 
political stability but it does not prove a significant relationship in both models.  
In addition, parliamentarism is strongly correlated with rule of law and government 
accountability in both models (FE and RE), while presidentialism is negatively related to rule of 
law and government accountability in both models (FE and RE). However, semi-presidentialism 
is positively related to rule of law and negatively correlated with government accountability but 
it does not provide any significant relationship in all models. In general, then, parliamentarism is 
positively associated with political development while presidentialism is negatively associated. 
For semi-presidentialism, some results are inconclusive. Also, from other variables, regime 
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durability, institutionalized democracy and latitude are positively related with political 
development in both models, while oil production is negatively correlated with political 
development.  
Figure 4.2 presents the results of various tests of the relationship between presidentialism, 
parliamentarism, semi-presidentialism, and economic development. In every case, the model fit 
is good with F values significant at better than the 0.0001 level and R
2 
overall ranging from 0.04 
to 0.94. Results suggest that parliamentarism is associated with better telecommunications 
infrastructure, better export and import rates, and higher levels of per capita GDP across both 
models. However, presidentialism appears to be associated negatively with certain aspects of 
economic development and it is negatively related with export, import rates and produces low 
levels of GDP per capita. Presidentialism seems to create better trade rates than parliamentarism 
in both models. On the other hand, semi-presidentialism is associated with low levels of trade 
rates and low levels of telecommunications infrastructure, but the relationship between semi-
presidentialism and GDP per capita, export and import rates are not significant.  
In general, the models seem to demonstrate that parliamentarism provides better 
economic development than presidentialism and semi-presidentialism. From other variables, 
population, legal origin and latitude produce significant values for all models but the results are 
mixed.  
Figure 4.3 presents the results of different tests of the relationship between 
presidentialism, parliamentarism, semi-presidentialism and social development. In every case, 
the model fit is good with F values significant at better than the 0.0001 level and R
2
 overall 
ranging from 0.24 to 0.63. 
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In three cases, presidentialism is associated with higher levels of social development than 
parliamentarism. Results show that presidential systems are associated with higher levels of 
literacy rates, fertility rates and longer life expectancy than parliamentarism. The results provide 
a significant relationship between presidentialism and fertility rates, literacy rates and life 
expectancy in both models (FE, GLS).  
On the other hand, parliamentarism is negatively related with fertility rates and it is 
positively correlated with life expectancy and literacy rates in both models, while it does not 
provide a significant relationship in literacy rates in both models. In addition, semi-
presidentialism is significantly associated with life expectancy in the both models and it is 
positively correlated with literacy rates in both models but the results are not significant. Also, 
the results do not provide a significant relationship between semi-presidentialism and total 
fertility rates in both models.  
Generally, it is possible to say that parliamentary systems have important advantages 
over presidential systems across a wide range of indicators of political and economic 
development. In every case, except the impact of import rates, the results indicate a strong 
positive significant relationship between parliamentary systems and economic and political 
development. However, the results are not equally impressive for presidential systems. In most 
cases, the results show that there is a negative significant relationship between presidential 
systems and economic and political development. On the other hand, presidentialism provides a 
better social development than parliamentary systems in both models. For semi-presidential 
systems, the results are mixed. In some cases, semi-presidential systems are positively associated 
with social development and negatively correlated with political and economic development, 
while in other cases the results do not provide a significant relationship. 
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4.5. Country Comparisons 
The second part of this chapter focuses on a country-based comparison and examines 
Turkey from a comparative perspective. The main goal is to compare Turkey with other states 
that have or have tried a presidential system by using social, economic and political variables. 
This comparison provides an opportunity to show the similarities and differences between these 
countries and Turkey.  
It is important to acknowledge at the start that each country has a different political, 
cultural or social origin. It is not possible, of course, to evaluate all variables, but still the main 
point is to present a general view or a perspective to the reader. For that reason, the comparison 
that follows utilizes the basic factors such as GDP per capita, GDP growth, population, religion, 
region, mortality rate, life expectancy, democracy status, regime stability. In Table 4.5, all free 
and partly free countries that adopted a presidential system between 1975-2012 are shown. 
“Year” represents the first year the country adopted a presidential regime. Some presidential 
regimes have some interruptions between years during which the regime collapsed and when the 
country readopted a presidential regime. That is also presented in the Table 4.5. 
Table 4.5 shows that only Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, the United 
States, and Venezuela have had stable presidential regimes since 1975. Brazil has also enjoyed a 
stable regime but its presidential system began only in 1979. There are some presidential regimes 
that have existed for a very short period (six or seven years), such as Liberia, the Maldives, and 
Indonesia. There are some presidential regimes, including Argentina, Ecuador, Ghana, 
Guatemala, Nigeria, Bolivia, Sierra Leone, Tunisia and Uganda, which collapsed and later 
readopted a presidential system.  Also, there are some countries -- such as Bangladesh and 
Tunisia -- that have presidential regimes for several years but then adopted a different regime.  
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Table 4.5: Countries with Presidential Systems from 1975-2012 
Country Name  Year 
Argentina   1975-1976, 1983-2012 
Bangladesh   1976-1991 
Benin    1990-2012 
Bolivia   1979, 1982-2012 
Brazil    1979-2012 
Chile    1990-2012 
Colombia   1975-2012 
Comoros   2004-2012 
Costa Rica   1975-2012 
Cyprus (1975-)    1990-2012 
Dominican Republic  1975-2012 
Ecuador   1979-1982, 1984-1999, 2002-2012 
El Salvador   1984-2012 
Ghana    1979-1980, 1993-2012 
Guatemala   1975-1982, 1986-1993, 1996-2012 
Honduras   1982-2012 
Indonesia   2005-2012 
South Korea   1988-2012 
Liberia    2006-2012 
Malawi   1994-2012 
Maldives   2008-2012 
Mexico   2000-2012 
Micronesia     1991-2008 
Nicaragua   1984-2012 
Nigeria    1979-1983, 1999-2012 
Palau     1994-2008 
Panama   1990-2012 
Paraguay   1990-2012 
Peru    1980-1989, 2001-2012 
Philippines   1986-2012 
Sierra Leone   1996, 1998-2012 
Suriname   1981-1988, 1991,  
Tunisia    1980-1984, 2008-2012 
Uganda    1980-1984, 2008-2012 
United States   1975-2012 
Uruguay   1985-2012 
Venezuela   1975-2012 
Note: Only free and party-free countries are evaluated. 
Source: The data for 1975-1990 years are collected from Przeworski et al. 2000 ACLP Political 
and Economic database; 1990-2008 years are collected from Cheibub et al., 2010, Democracy 
and dictatorship data set. Years from 2008-2012 are collecting from Keefer, 2010, Database of 
Political Institutions.  
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4.5.1. Economic Perspective 
For economic comparison, income, GDP growth, annual growth rate are evaluated and 
population values are showed. Income is the real GDP per capita and it shows the income level 
for each country. GDP growth is the annual rate of growth of per capita income. Growth rate 
presents the annual rates for each country and population is classified in thousands and shows the 
population of each country. In Table 4.6, country comparisons from economic perspective are 
shown.  
4.5.2. Political Perspective 
For the sake of comparison, the variables country status, democracy scale, political rights 
scale, regime durability, and institutionalized democracy score are used. The Democracy scale 
ranges from 0-10, in which 0 is least democratic and 10 most democratic. The Political Rights 
scale shows how people participate freely in the political process, including the right to vote 
freely in legitimate elections, compete for public office, and join political parties and 
organizations. Countries are graded between 1 (most free) and 7 (least free). 
 Institutionalized Democracy refers an additive eleven-point scale (0-10) and defines the 
poor to powerful democracies. Regime Durability shows the number of years since the most 
recent regime change or the end of transition period. Country comparisons from political 
perspective are showed in Table 4.7.  
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Table 4.6: Country Comparisons from Economic Perspective 
 
Country Year Income  GDP   Annual Growth     Population  
Growth              Rate 
   1975 
Argentina  6055    -0.02   -1.8  26049   
Colombia   2508     2.2              -0.3  25381   
Costa Rica  3308     2.1   -0.6  1968   
Dominican Republic 1960     5.1   -5.6  5048   
Guatemala  2243     1.9   -0.7  6018   
United States  13712    -0.3   -2.5  215981  
Venezuela  7378     2.8   -0.2  12734   
Turkey   2840     6.7    7.1  40026   
 
 1979 
Brazil   4074     6.7    4.9  118927.2  
Bolivia  2037     0.1    1.4  5240.63  
Ecuador  3122     5.2    1.6  7742.05  
Ghana   949    -2.5   -7.5  10500.32  
Nigeria  1390     6.7   -7.8  68982.88  
Turkey   2957   -0.6   -3.2  43531   
1980 
Peru    2877    3.0    2.6  17324   
Tunusia  2530    7.4    6.7  6384   
Uganda  534      -   -6.3  12806   
Turkey   2872              -2.4   -2.8  44439   
 
1982 
Honduras  1439   -1.3   -4.1  3808.4   
Turkey   2867    3.5    0.3  46688   
 
1984 
El Salvador  1787     1.3    2.2  4730.06  
Nicaragua  1889    -1.5   -1.6  3312.71 
Turkey   3022     6.7     3.9  49070   
  
1985 
Uruguay  3969     1.4    0.4  3009 
Turkey   3077     4.2    1.8  50306   
1986 
Bangladesh  1261     4.2      3.7  100956.8  
Philippines  1535     3.4   -0.4  56157.121 
Turkey   3299     7.0    7.2  51433  
1988 
Korea, South  5606     10    10.3  42031 
Turkey   3419     2.1   -0.6  53715 
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(Table 4.6 continued) 
Country Year Income  GDP   Annual Growth     Population  
Growth              Rate 
1990 
Benin   924   9.0    0.3  4737   
Chile   4335   3.7   -0.4  13099   
Cyprus (1975-)  8368   7.4    6.0  681   
Panama  2881   8.1    3.2  2398   
Paraguay  2128   4.1    5.6  4219   
Sri Lanka  2096   6.4    2.8  16993  
Turkey   3743   9. 3    9.6  56203 
1991 
Micronesia  203764  7.4    7.4  98800  
Suriname  2510.3   2.8               2.4  413011  
Turkey   3666   0.7              -2.0  57305  
1994 
Malawi  462.60  -10   -12  9493.11  
Palau      7.3     7.3 
Turkey   3748.3  -4.7   -7.4  60573 
1996 
Sierra Leone  651   6.0    2.3  4630 
Turkey   4149.6   7.0    4.9  62695 
2000 
Mexico  9733.7   5.3         7.1  97221 
Turkey   3865.7   6.8    6.0  66831.483 
2004 
Comoros  371329  1.9   -1.0  585389  
Turkey   4455.4   9.4    8.2  66845.653 
2005 
Indonesia  1273.4   5.7   5.6  2244809 
Turkey   4829.7   8.4   7.4  67743.052 
2006 
Liberia   5950   9.8   7.8  3384791 
Turkey   5162.7   6.9              5.3  68626.337 
2008   
Maldives  14722   12   5.7  313843 
Turkey   5439.3   0.7   1.1  70363.511 
 
Note: Year is the first year for the country adopted Presidential Regimes     
Source: 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2008 and Micronesia data are coming from quality of Government 
data set 2015. The other years are collected from Cheibub et al., 2010, democracy and 
dictatorship data set. 
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Table 4.7: Country Comparisons from Political Perspective 
 
Country Name           Year       Status    Institutionalized   Democracy Regime Political Rights 
                            Democracy              Scale      Durability        Scale 
 
Argentina  1975 Partly Free 6  7.33  2  2 
Colombia  1975 Free  8  8.25  18  2  
Costa Rica  1975 Free  10  10  56  1 
Dominican Republic 1975 Partly Free 1  5.08  9  4 
Guatemala  1975 Partly Free 1  4.66  1  4 
United States  1975 Free  10  10  166  1 
Venezuela  1975 Free  9  8.91  6  2 
Bolivia  1979 Partly Free 0  4.83  1  3 
Brazil   1979 Partly Free 2  4.41  5  4 
Ecuador  1979 Free  9  8.91  0  2 
Ghana   1979 Partly Free 6  6.5  0  4 
Nigeria   1979 Free  8  8  0  2 
Peru   1980 Free  7  8  0  2 
Tunisia   1980 Partly Free 0  1.5  21  6 
Uganda   1980 Partly Free 4  5.75  0  4 
Honduras  1982  - 6  -  0  - 
El Salvador  1984 Partly Free 6  6.5  0  3 
Nicaragua   1984 Partly Free 1  3.91  0  5 
Uruguay  1985 Free  9  8.91  0  2 
Bangladesh  1986 Partly Free 0  3.32  4  4 
Philippines  1986 Partly Free -88  6.08  0  4 
South Korea  1988 Free  7  7.75  0  2 
Chile   1990 Free  8  8.66  1  2 
Cyprus (1975-)   1990 Free  10  10  16  1 
Benin   1990 Partly Free -88  4.16  0  6 
Panama  1990 Partly Free 8  7.83  1  4 
Paraguay  1990 Partly Free 3  5.91  1  4 
Sri Lanka  1990 Partly Free 6  5.83  42  4 
Micronesia  1991 Free  -  10  -  1 
Suriname  1991 Partly Free 6  6.25  0  4 
Malawi  1994 Free  6  7.75  0  2 
Palau    1994 Free  -  -  0  - 
Sierra Leone  1996 Partly Free 5  5.58  0  4 
Mexico  2000 Free  8  8.25  3  2 
Comoros  2004 Partly Free 6  6.5  0  4 
Indonesia  2005 Free  8  8.25  6  2 
Liberia   2006 Partly Free 7  6.91  0  3 
Maldives  2008 Partly Free -  5.27  -  4 
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(Table 4.7 continued) 
Country Name           Year       Status    Institutionalized   Democracy Regime Political Rights 
                            Democracy              Scale      Durability        Scale 
Turkey     
   1975 Free  9  8.5  2  2  
   1980 Partly Free 2  2.91  0  5 
   1990 Partly Free 9  8.08  7  2 
   2000  Partly Free 8  6.33  17  4 
   2010 Partly Free       8                     7.58  27  3 
   2012 Partly Free 9             7.66  29  3 
   
Source: All data are collected from quality of Government data set 2015. 
 
According to the results of Table 4.6, out of these presidential systems, five have a stable 
system. The other stable presidential regime, which is Brazil, began in 1979. When we look at 
the economic variables or these stable presidential regimes, and compare them with Turkey, we 
see that Turkey’s scores are lower than Brazil, the United States, Venezuela, Costa Rica and 
slightly higher than Colombia, and the Dominican Republic, at the date those countries adopted 
presidential regimes for the first time.  
Table 4.7 shows that the presidential countries present different patterns from a political 
perspective. Some of them, such as United States, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Venezuela, Uruguay, 
have very high democracy score, while some, such as Bolivia, Tunisia, Bangladesh, the 
Dominican Republic, Brazil, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Paraguay, have very low scores. For 
Turkey from 1975 to 2012, general democracy scores are very high, except in 1980 because of 
the military intervention.  
For regime durability, it is seen that fully half of these countries (eighteen out of thirty 
six) experienced a regime change. But also, there are some countries, such as the United States 
and Costa Rica that have had a stable regime for more than fifty years. Turkey’s political regime, 
after 1980, survives without interruption.  
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The Political Rights scale also presents mixed results for these countries. Costa Rica, the 
United States, and Cyprus are the freest countries, in which people freely and completely 
participate in the political process. On the other hand, Tunisia, Benin and Nicaragua are the least 
free countries that provide the least political participation for their citizens. For Turkey, the 
scores change from 1975 to 2012 but, in general, it can be categorized in the middle. 
 From the Table 4.7, it is possible to say there may be other factors that provide a 
presidential regime’s stability, in addition to these variables. The United States and Costa Rica 
have very high democracy scores. However, the Dominican Republic and Brazil have also stable 
presidential regimes, but they have very low democracy scores and political freedom scores. In 
other words, it is not valid to make a generalizations about presidential regime based on these 
variables alone.  
4.5.3. Electoral Perspective 
 
The Electoral system and effective number of parties’ variables are used for electoral 
comparisons. Electoral system shows the type of electoral system used in elections in that 
country in that year. The effective number of parties is used to measure how many effective 
parties there are in the political system. Country comparisons from electoral perspective are 
presented in Table 4.8.  
 Table 4.8 shows the electoral systems and effective number of parties for each country. 
All these presidential regimes except Nicaragua have the same electoral systems.  All these 
systems -- Single-Member-District-Plurality, Two-Round System and Alternative Vote-- are 
types of plurality systems. However, Turkey employs a Proportional Representation system.  
 For the effective number of parties, the results are mixed for these countries. Some 
countries,  including the United States, the Dominican Republic, Paraguay, Honduras, and 
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Tunisia, have two or fewer effective parties,  Some, including Brazil and Liberia, have more than 
nine or ten effective number or parties. Turkey has more than three effective parties, in general.  
Table 4.8: Country Comparisons from Electoral Perspective 
 
Country Name Year       Effective Number of Parties Electoral System 
                   
Argentina  1975   3.19  Two-Round System  
Colombia  1975   2.37  Two-Round System  
Costa Rica  1975   4.01  Two-Round System  
Dominican Republic 1975   1.35  Two-Round System  
Guatemala  1975   4.6  Two-Round System  
United States  1975   2  Single-Member-District-Plurality  
Venezuela  1975   3.35  Two-Round System  
Bolivia  1979   3.5  Two-Round System 
Brazil   1979   11.17  Two-Round System 
Ecuador  1979   6.4  Two-Round System 
Ghana   1979   3.75  Single-Member-District-Plurality 
Nigeria   1979   3.71  Single-Member-District-Plurality 
Peru   1980   4.16  Two-Round System 
Tunisia   1980   1  - 
Uganda   1980   2.24  Single-Member-District-Plurality 
Honduras  1982   1.99  Two-Round System 
El Salvador  1984   2.56  Majaritarian System 
Nicaragua   1984   2.27  List PR 
Uruguay  1985   2.74  Two-Round System 
Bangladesh  1986   -  - 
Philippines  1986   2.26  First past the post 
South Korea  1988   4.23  Alternative Vote 
Chile   1990   5.3  Two-Round System 
Cyprus (1975-)   1990   3.62  Two-Round System 
Benin   1990   8.83  Majority 
Panama  1990   3.72  Alternative Vote 
Paraguay  1990   1.68  Alternative Vote 
Sri Lanka  1990   2.74  Two-Round System 
Micronesia  1991   -  Single-Member-District-Plurality 
Suriname  1991   2.69  Two-Round System 
Malawi  1994   2.74  Single-Member-District-Plurality 
Palau    1994   -  - 
Sierra Leone  1996   4.55  Two-Round System 
Mexico  2000   3  Alternative Vote 
Comoros  2004   -  Single-Member-District-Plurality 
Indonesia  2005   8.55  Two-Round System 
Liberia   2006   9.56  Single-Member-District-Plurality 
Maldives  2008   -  - 
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(Table 4.8 continued) 
Country Name Year       Effective Number of Parties Electoral System 
Turkey 
1973   3.3  PR- D’Hondt with no threshold  
1983   2.5  PR- D’Hondt with double threshold1                     
1987   2.1  PR- D’Hondt with double threshold2  
1991   3.6  PR- D’Hondt with double threshold  
1995   4.4  PR- D’Hondt with national threshold             
1999   4.9  PR- D’Hondt with national threshold             
2002   1.8  PR- D’Hondt with national threshold             
2007   2.3  PR- D’Hondt with national threshold             
2011   2.3  PR- D’Hondt with national threshold            
   
Note: 
1
: The Hare quota was coupled with a 10 percent national threshold. Parties were required 
to get at least 10 percent of votes at national level in order to gain representation in parliament 
according to this Hare quota. 
2. In 1983 and 1987 elections, the “quota” was used which was an extra seat added to the ones 
already allocated to the district’s winner party by the d’Hondt system. 
Source: All data are collected from quality of Government data set 2015. 
  
4.5.4. Social Perspective 
 
Last, region, religion of the countries, and mortality and life expectancy rates are used for 
country comparisons. Mortality rates are used to show the infant mortality rate. Life expectancy 
is presented to show the average life time in the country. In addition, the region and religion of 
each country are presented. In Table 4.9 country comparisons from social perspective is 
presented. 
From Table 4.9, it is seen that most of these presidential regimes are in Latin America 
and Sub-Saharan Africa. There are a few countries in Asia. There are no presidential regimes in 
the Middle East. In addition, most of these countries have predominately Christian populations. 
These constitute the main differences from Turkey. For life expectancy and mortality rates, 
results are mixed as well. 
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Table 4.9: Country Comparisons from Social Perspective 
 
Country Name Year        Mortality Life     Region  Religion 
                       Rate  Expectancy  
Argentina  1975  24.755  68.05       Latin America Christianity 
Colombia  1975  33.502  62.75       Latin America Christianity 
Costa Rica  1975  29.854  69.54       Latin America Christianity 
Dominican Republic 1975  37.055  61.06       Latin America Christianity 
Guatemala  1975  43.763  55.13       Latin America Christianity 
United States  1975  14.6  72.69  America Christianity 
Venezuela  1975  34.391  66.96       Latin America Christianity 
Bolivia  1979  40.25  51.19       Latin America Christianity 
Brazil   1979  32.222  62.2        Latin America Christianity 
Ecuador  1979  35.334  62.31       Latin America Christianity 
Ghana   1979  43.525  51.98       Sub-Saharan A. Christianity 
Nigeria   1979  46.948  45.18       Sub-Saharan A. Christianity/Islam 
Peru   1980  35.833  60.06        Latin America Christianity 
Tunisia   1980  36.13  62.02        North America  Islam 
Uganda   1980  49.051  49.44        Sub-Saharan A. Christianity 
Honduras  1982  42.527  61.21        Latin America Christianity 
El Salvador  1984  35.095  58.74        Latin America Christianity 
Nicaragua   1984  41.476  60.15         Latin America Christianity 
Uruguay  1985  18.155  71.58        Latin America Christianity 
Bangladesh  1986  38.748  57.90        South Asia Islam 
Philippines  1986  34.605  64.16        South East Asia    Christianity 
South Korea  1988  15.1  70.40        East Asia  Buddhism 
Chile   1990  23.063  73.54        Latin America Christianity 
Cyprus (1975-)   1990  19.048  76.51    Mediterranean Sea Christianity 
Benin   1990  46.302  53.42        Sub-Saharan A.    Christianity 
Panama  1990  26.288  73.06        Latin America Christianity 
Paraguay  1990  33.469  68.01        Latin America  Christianity 
Sri Lanka  1990  20.621  69.68          South Asia            Buddhism 
Micronesia  1991  33.505  66.31        The Pacific           Christianity 
Suriname  1991  23.039  67.58        Caribbean  Christianity 
Malawi  1994  47.926  46.84        Sub-Saharan A. Christianity 
Palau    1994  -          Pacific Ocean  - 
Sierra Leone  1996  43.814  36.03        Sub-Saharan A. Islam 
Mexico  2000  24.148  74.26         Latin America Christianity 
Comoros  2004  39.361  58.82        Sub Saharan A.  Islam 
Indonesia  2005  21.376             68.85          South East A.       Islam 
Liberia   2006  49.601             56.14          Sub Saharan A. Christianity 
Maldives  2008  21.785  75.87        South Asia Islam 
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 (Table 4.9 continued) 
Country Name Year        Mortality Life     Region  Religion 
                       Rate  Expectancy  
 Turkey 1975  127.4  55.38        Middle East Islam 
   1980  100  58.69 
   1990  59.8  64.28 
   2000  28.4  69.5 
   2010  12.5  73.7 
   2012  11.5  74.86 
Source: Region, religion, mortality rates data are collected from quality of Government data set 
2015. Data on life expectancy are collected from World Bank.  
 
4.6. Conclusion 
In the literature, there is not a clear distinction between the forms of government, because 
there are many different factors that affect the political performance for each form (Schmidt, 
2002). In other words, in the literature there is not a consensus about the effects of forms of 
government on political, economic, and social developments -- some favor parliamentary 
regimes, while others support presidential ones.    
Based on our statistical analysis, it is possible to say that parliamentary systems have 
important advantages over presidential ones across a wide range of indicators of political, and 
economic development. In every case, except regarding the impact of import rates, the results 
point to a strong positive relationship between parliamentary systems and economic and political 
development. However, the results are not very impressive for presidential systems, in most 
cases. The results show that there is a negative and significant relationship between presidential 
systems and economic and political development. On the other hand, presidentialism provides a 
better social development than parliamentary system. For semi-presidential systems, the results 
are mixed. In some cases, semi-presidential systems are positively associated to social 
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development and negatively correlated with political and economic development while in others 
cases the results do not provide a significant relationship. 
In addition, from the country comparisons with Turkey and other countries that have or 
tried presidential regimes since 1975, it is hard to make a generalization about presidential 
regimes. In general, there are many differences among them and between these presidential 
regimes and Turkey. It is seen that presidential countries present different patterns from both a 
political and economic perspective. For instance, some of presidential countries such as United 
States, Costa Rica have very high democracy score, while some such as Bolivia, Dominican 
Republic, and Nicaragua have very low scores. For the Turkish case, democracy scores from 
1975 to 2012 are very high (except 1980 because of the military intervention). From an electoral 
perspective, it appears that nearly all presidential countries have plurality electoral systems for 
president election except Nicaragua, but some of them use PR to elect their legislators. In 
addition, most of these presidential regimes are in the Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa 
and they have predominately Christian populations. However, because of Turkey’s geographic 
position and its religion, Turkey is separated from these presidential countries. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
The Turkish ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) government under the 
leadership of President Recep Tayip Erdogan has been planning to change the current 
parliamentary system to a presidential system. To that end, they already have begun making 
some arrangements, including changes regarding the election of president, for this 
transformation. As a result of a constitutional amendment which was adopted via a nationwide 
referendum on October 21, 2007, the president is to be elected in a popular plurality election; the 
first elections following this major change were held on 10 August 2014. Former Prime Minister 
Erdogan became the 12
th
 president of Turkey by winning fifty two percent of the popular vote. 
For the first time, a Turkish president was elected directly by citizens instead of the parliament. 
Erdogan’s main goal before 2010 was to adopt a presidential system similar to the one in the 
United States; however, Erdogan and other AKP deputies quickly changed their discourse and 
started talking about creating a Turkish-style presidential system instead of a US style 
presidential system after 2010. 
This discussion of system change raises several prominent concerns. First of all, the 
ruling government is talking about a fundamental change from parliamentarism to 
presidentialism, but there is not a single successful example in the world of such a change over 
the past decades. Second, the public -- even parliamentarians-- do not know the operational 
details of the proposed system. Third, after 2010, with the idea of a so-called Turkish-style 
presidential system, the topic became ever more complicated; the government is not clear about 
the meaning of “Turkish-style presidential system” (how the system will work, how the 
separation of power will be executed, etc.). As a result, within these concerns in this study, I 
attempted to shed light on the applicability of presidential system in Turkey.  
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In order to evaluate this applicability, in Chapter 2 of this dissertation I explained the 
Turkish parliamentary system and focused on the system change discussions. In general, there 
are two important problems in Turkish parliamentary system. First, the sui generis structure of 
1982 Constitution is problematic, resulting in a complex and incomprehensible government 
system: it is neither pure parliamentarism nor pure presidentialism. With the changes on the 
election procedure of the president after 2007, the system got even more complicated; it turned to 
a parliamentary system with a directly elected president. The second important problem is 
instability; for instance from 1960 to 1980’s Turkey had twenty governments created and 
defeated; some governments were in power less than a year. For that reason, when the debates 
regarding system change are examined from the beginning, it is possible to conclude that the 
stability issue has been always the central topic. Previous supporters of a presidential system, for 
example former President Turgut Ozal, former President Suleyman Demirel, and then President 
Erdogan and deputies of AKP, all pointed to the stability issue. A new system, according to these 
supporters, would eliminate ineffective coalition governments and provide stability. However, it 
begs the question of what is the main reason of this instability (e.g., weak coalition 
governments); is it the parliamentary system, the election system, the party system, or some 
combination thereof? For instance, if coalition governments were the main reason of this 
instability, it looks like Turkey eliminated this instability problem after 2002 by the creation of a 
single party government (the Justice and Development party) under the parliamentary system. It 
is important to clarify once again that, there is a strong correlation between voting rules and the 
party systems; as it is defined in Duverger’s Law: plurality systems in single-member districts 
tend to create two-party systems, while proportional systems tend to produce multi-party 
systems. In other words, the proportional representation electoral system and the related highly 
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fractionalized party structure of Turkey may be the main reasons of coalition governments in 
Turkey, not the parliamentary structure of the republic. 
In order to find an answer to instability and parliamentary system puzzle, in Chapter 3, I 
evaluate the party structure of Turkey. First, based on Mainwaring’s (1993) analysis, by using 
Rae index of party fractionalization, the effective number of parties, and Least Square index, 
Turkey is compared with a set of stable democracies that have presidential, parliamentary and 
semi-presidential systems between 1946-2010. This comparison provides important inferences 
for Turkey. First, from 1946 to 2010, parliamentary democracies seem to be more successful in 
sustaining democracy (four presidential, twenty one parliamentary democracies and four mixed 
systems). Second, in this time period, party fragmentation and the number of effective parties are 
low in presidential systems compared to parliamentary and mixed systems. This finding does not 
necessarily imply less democracy; instead it shows that presidential systems are more likely to 
have two or less effective parties, while parliamentary systems are more likely to have more than 
two effective parties in this time period. In addition, the Turkish party structure is evaluated 
since 1946 and the results show that the Turkish case provides a complicated party system for 
examination. Turkey after 1946 has been characterized as a multiparty system;, however, after 
2002 a two-party system seems to have emerged in the parliament. The Turkish election system 
(proportional representation with multimember districts under d’Hondt formula and a 10 percent 
national threshold) is possibly the main reason of this emergence of two party system in the 
parliament. Also, high inflation rates, as well as the financial crisis in 2001 negatively affected 
the credibility of the parties in the coalition government in 1990s; as a result, voters’ 
dissatisfaction with most of the established parties was also effective in changing party system in 
2002. In the 2002 election, a newly founded Justice and Development (AKP) party got over one-
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third of the votes (34.3 percent) and as a result won nearly two-thirds of the seats (363 out of 
550) in the parliament. The opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) got only one-fifth of the 
votes (19.4 percent of the votes), but the party won one-third (178 out of 550) of the 
parliamentary seats. On the other hand, almost forty five percent of the popular votes were 
wasted because these votes were shared by other parties that failed to pass the 10 percent 
threshold. Clearly, the electoral system damages the proportionality of the party representation in 
the parliament and, most importantly, the 10 percent national threshold prevents the introduction 
of other parties to the parliament. For instance, if the threshold was 5 percent in 2002 election, 
five other parties-- Right Path P. (DYP), Nationalist Movement P. (MHP), Young P. (GP), 
Motherland P. (ANAP), and Democratic People P. (DEHAP)-- would have gained parliamentary 
representation in addition to the AKP and CHP.   
Based on the findings from Chapter 3, it is not proper to argue that Turkish party 
structure is suitable for presidentialism or parliamentarism. If it is argued that Turkey has a 
multiparty structure with a proportional representation system, it may be possible to conclude 
that the structure of Turkish party systems may be more appropriate to a parliamentary system 
than a presidential system. Based on the comparison from 1946 to 2010, the results clearly 
indicate that presidential systems are more likely to have two effective parties, while 
parliamentary systems are more likely to have more than two effective parties in this time period. 
However, specifically because of the ten percent national threshold, the Turkish electoral system 
does not provide the required result of a proportional representation system. Thus, there are 
indeed important problems in the electoral system, such as representation problem and waste of 
nearly half of the votes because of the ten percent national threshold.     
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In Chapter 4, I further explore and test the relationship between government system and 
political, economic and social development. In a time series analysis, I use different dependent 
variables for each policy areas with the main independent variable being the mechanism of 
government formation (presidentialism, semi-presidentialism, parliamentarism). Based on the 
results from Chapter 4, it is possible to argue that parliamentary systems have important 
advantages over presidential systems across a wide range of indicators of political and economic 
development. In every case, except the impact of import rates, the results indicate a strong 
positive relationship between parliamentary systems and economic and political development. 
However, the results are not equally impressive for presidential systems. In most cases, the 
results show that there is a negative and statistically significant relationship between presidential 
systems and economic and political development. On the other hand, presidentialism provides a 
better social development than parliamentary systems in both models. For semi-presidential 
systems, the results are mixed. In some cases, semi-presidential systems are positively associated 
with social development and negatively correlated with political and economic development, 
while in other cases the results do not provide a statistically significant relationship. 
In the second part of the Chapter 4, a country-based comparison is provided in which 
Turkey is compared with other states that have (or attempted to implement) a presidential system 
since 1975 by using social, economic, and political variables. This comparison provides an 
opportunity to show the similarities and differences between these countries and Turkey and 
presents a general view to the reader. First, the country comparisons show that it is hard to make 
a generalization about presidential regimes. In general, there are many differences between them 
and between these presidential regimes and Turkey. For instance, from a political and economic 
perspective, presidential countries present different patterns. For instance, while some 
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presidential countries have very high democracy score, such as United States, Costa Rica, others 
have very low scores, such as Bolivia, Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua. For the Turkish 
case, democracy scores from 1975 to 2012 are very high (except 1980 because of the military 
intervention). Second, the only common feature of presidential systems is the election system; it 
appears that nearly all presidential countries have plurality electoral systems for president except 
Nicaragua but many of these countries use PR for elections to their legislature. Also, most of 
these presidential regimes are in the Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa and they have 
predominately Christian populations. Turkey is separated from these presidential regimes in 
following respects: Turkey is placed in the Middle East with a predominately a Muslim 
population, but the election system provides some similarities with these presidential countries.  
Based on the findings from Chapter 4, it is possible to say that a transformation to 
presidential regime will not guarantee economic and political development for Turkey. The 
results clearly indicate that parliamentary systems provide better political and economic 
development than presidential systems. Also, based on country comparisons, results show that it 
is hard to make a generalization about presidential regimes from economic, social and political 
perspectives. Each country may have different factors that affect its economic or political success 
in addition to its presidential system. In other words, it is not proper to expect that a regime 
transformation to a presidential system per se will dramatically improve Turkey’s economic, 
political and social development by itself. 
These findings combine to make a compelling case that arguments of a system change are 
not reasonable. Some argue that presidential system may ultimately lead to a monarchy, a 
sultanate or a dictatorship. On the other hand, others argue that a new presidential system may 
suddenly solve all the problems currently plaguing Turkey. Neither of these extreme views is 
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correct. First of all, a presidential system is one of the democratic government systems, so it is 
not accurate to say it may turn into a dictatorship or monarchy. On the other hand, it is very 
simple and naïve to say that a new system will solve all the problems; at the very least a new 
system will introduce some new problems and costs (technical costs, costs in the learning 
process) in the adaptation process. In addition, it can be said that every strong leader who comes 
to power puts the presidential system debate on the agenda to solve the instability problem, but 
their intention is to remain in power longer, and the discussion is not based solely – or even 
mainly -- on the needs of the republic. 
This dissertation tells a story of how the Turkish case remains in the middle of the 
parliamentary-presidential debate in the literature. Scholars, politicians, writers and thinkers 
support different arguments based on their political views. However, a system transformation 
cannot be decided on individual political desire or individual political thought, since it will affect 
society as a whole and the country’s future. There may be some clear problems with a Turkish 
parliamentary system, but these alleged problems do not warrant a whole system change. It is 
important to analyze all the processes and develop a very well organized plan based on the 
features of Turkey before taking action. First of all, it is important to emphasize that the 
instability problem is not the result of current parliamentary system; instead it is based on the 
electoral system and since 2002, it looks like Turkey eliminated this instability problem under 
the current single party government. Second, because of the 1982 constitution (which is not in 
full accordance with the parliamentary system and created a mixed or hybrid system) and a new 
election procedure of president, it is crucial to focus on a new constitution in which the operation 
and division of labor of the two bodies of executive structure should be determined. All the 
problems in the current systems should be determined and new solutions based on these 
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problems should be provided. Turkey has a parliamentary tradition, and has experience with the 
current system; as a result, it is more appropriate to solve the problems of the current system and 
continue with the same regime. A regime transformation without any detailed plans will bring 
more problems. Specifically, a new Turkish style presidential system may not be a solution, there 
is not any example of it, and nobody may guarantee the success of this system. It is important to 
know the legal mechanisms and the logic of a new system before making any transformations. In 
addition, the government is not clear about the procedures of this Turkish style presidential 
system; there will not be any control mechanisms if the current government abuses political 
power, since they will be the creator of this new system. 
This dissertation contributes to the fields of political institutions specifically to 
government formation. It shows that, in general, parliamentary systems have important 
advantages over presidential systems across a wide range of indicators of political, economic and 
social development. On the other hand, it also indicates that it is hard to make a generalization 
about presidential system from a political or economic perspective; obviously there are other 
features such as military heritage that affect the country’s economic or political success.  
Future research on a new Turkish constitution is critical: how should be a new 
constitution be written and what should be the contents. In addition, the electoral system of 
Turkey may be examined in detail, especially in regards to solving the problems (such as 
representation) in the electoral process. There are, of course, limitations of this study due to data 
availability; it is not possible to examine each characteristic of presidential or parliamentary 
regimes and provide a comparison with Turkey. But still, I hope this dissertation provides some 
insights for the regime transformation debate in Turkey.   
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APPENDIX: VARIABLES 
 
A: Political Development 
Control of Corruption: It measures perceptions of corruption, conventionally defined as the 
exercise of public power for private gain. The particular aspect of corruption measured by the 
various sources differs somewhat, ranging from the frequency of additional payments to get 
things done, to the effects of corruption on the business environment, to measuring grand 
corruption in the political arena or in the tendency of elite forms to engage in state capture. 
Government Effectiveness: It combines into single grouping responses on the quality of public 
service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the 
independence of the civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of the government's 
commitment to policies. The main focus of this index is on inputs required for the government to 
produce and implement good policies and deliver public good.  
Political Stability: It combines several indicators which measure perceptions of the likelihood 
that the governments in power will be destabilized or overthrown by possibly unconstitutional 
and/or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism 
 
Rule of Law: It includes several indicators, which measure the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society. These include perceptions of the incidence of 
crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts. 
Together, these indicators measure the success of a society in developing an environment in 
which fair and predictable rules form the basis for economic and social interactions and the 
extent to which property rights are protected 
 
Voice and Accountability: It includes a number of indicators measuring various aspects of the 
political process, civil liberties and political rights. These indicators measure the extent to which 
citizens of a country are able to participate in the selection of governments. This category also 
includes indicators measuring the independence of the media, which serves an important role in 
monitoring those in authority and holding them accountable for their actions. 
 
B: Economic Development 
Telephone lines (per 100 people):  
 
Trade (% of GDP): It is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a 
share of gross domestic product. 
 
Export: Exports of goods and services measured as a share of gross domestic product.  
 
Import: Imports of goods and services measured as a share of gross domestic product.  
 
C: Social Development 
Infant mortality rate: Total Infant mortality rate 
 
Life expectancy: Total Life expectancy at birth 
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Literacy Rate: Total Literacy Rate 
 
 
D: Control Variables: 
Political System: 0. Presidential. 1. Semi-presidential. 2. Parliamentary. Systems with unelected 
executives (those scoring a 2 or 3 on the Executive Index of Political Competitiveness - to be 
dened below) get a 0. Systems with presidents who are elected directly or by an electoral college 
(whose only function is to elect the president), in cases where there is no prime minister, also 
receive a 0. In systems with both a prime minister and a president, the following factors are 
considered to categorize the system: a) Veto power: president can veto legislation and the 
parliament needs a super majority to override the veto. b) Appoint prime minister: president can 
appoint and dismiss prime minister and / or other ministers. c) Dissolve parliament: president can 
dissolve parliament and call for new elections. d) Mentioning in sources: If the sources mention 
the president more often than the PM then this serves as an additional indicator to call the system 
presidential (Romania, Kyrgyzstan, Estonia, and Yugoslavia). The system is presidential if (a) is 
true, or if (b) and (c) are true. If no information or ambiguous information on (a), (b), (c), then 
(d). Countries in which the legislature elects the chief executive are parliamentary (2), with the 
following exception: if that assembly or group cannot easily recall him (if they need a 2/3 vote to 
imp each, or must dissolve themselves while forcing him out) then the system gets a 1. 
 
Institutionalized Democracy: The Democracy indicator is an additive eleven-point scale (0-10). 
The operational indicator of democracy is derived from coding of the competitiveness of 
political participation, the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment and constraints 
on the chief executive.  
 
GDP: GDP per Capita 
 
Population: Total population 
 
Region: The Region of the Country. This is a tenfold politico-geographic classification of world 
regions, based on a mixture of two considerations: geographical proximity (with the partial 
exception of category 5 below) and demarcation by area specialists having contributed to a 
regional understanding of democratization. The categories are as follow 
(1) Eastern Europe and post Soviet Union (including Central Asia), 
(2) Latin America (including Cuba, Haiti & the Dominican Republic), 
(3) North Africa & the Middle East (including Israel, Turkey & Cyprus), 
(4) Sub-Saharan Africa, 
(5) Western Europe and North America (including Australia &New Zeeland), 
(6) East Asia (including Japan & Mongolia), 
(7) South-East Asia, 
(8) South Asia, 
(9) The Pacic (excluding Australia & New Zeeland), 
(10) The Caribbean (including Belize, Guyana & Suriname, but excluding Cuba, Haiti & the 
Dominican Republic) 
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Latitude: The absolute value of the latitude of the capital city, divided by 90 (to take values 
between 0 and 1) 
 
Legal origin: Identifies the legal origin of the Company Law or Commercial code of each 
country. There are other possible origins: English Common Law, French Commercial Code, 
Socialist/Communist Laws, German Commercial Code, Scandinavian Commercial Code 
 
Ethnic fractionalization: The definition of ethnicity involves a combination of racial and 
linguistic characteristics. The result is a higher degree of fractionalization than the commonly 
used ELF-index in for example Latin America, where people of many races speak the same 
language. 
 
Colonial Origin: This is a tenfold classification of the former colonial ruler of the country. The 
categories are the following: (0) Never colonized by a Western overseas colonial power (1) 
Dutch (2) Spanish (3) Italian (4) US (5) British (6) French (7) Portuguese (8) Belgian (9) British-
French (10) Australian. 
 
Protestant: Protestants as percentage of population. 
  
Muslim: Muslims as percentage of population. 
 
Other Religious Denomination: Percentage of population belonging to other denominations.  
 
Oil Production: Oil production in metric tons 
 
Gas Production: Gas production.  
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